Comparing Pojman's and Benedict's Views on Cultural Relativism

Pojman’s objections to relativism center upon the existence of common human nature and experience, and that “…it is possible to communicate cross-culturally and find that we agree on many of the important things in life” (Pojman 181). This correlates to the idea of common moral concepts among different cultures and societies. In this common experience of “needs and interests” (Pojman 185), it stands to reason that certain moral practices will better serve needs and interests than others. This contrasts greatly with Benedict’s all cultures are equal proposal. Benedict makes a valid argument that people develop moral codes as a result of their culture. There is no right or wrong way to develop a society, the only tried and true method is trial

It’s possible no culture has found these “better” ways, the advantage to relativism is that we can appreciate the attempt. The flipside is that relativism tends to view other cultures in comparison to the relativist’s native culture, defining ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ as seen through that culture instead of the studied culture. Pojman’s objectivism offers a step back from the situation, allowing the questions, “Does this moral concept or action better the society or the individual?” and “Do these values and practices promote fulfillment of human needs and interests?” Recognition of cultural diversity in moral norms, beliefs, and practices is valuable in our modern ‘global village.’ In this context, some principles of moral relativism are valid: people are products of their society and culture, there are always social deviants, and ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ behaviors are perceived in every culture. However, the existence of these ‘truths’ do not prove the theory of moral relativism. Pojman refines these observed qualities of human cultures and connects them to a common set of human needs and