Within the framework of Operational Design (OD), the United States’ (U.S.) planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was poor. This essay will evaluate the U.S. military campaign planning for OIF from 2002 to 2007, using operational design as a framework for its analysis, with the following four points. First, military planners understood the aspects of the operational environment (OE) required for the initial 2003 Iraqi liberation, but not to the degree necessary to define the follow-on Phase IV problem statement. Second, while the initial operational approach (OA) was necessary for the liberation of Iraq, it was not sufficient to gain and maintain the security of the populace required during Phase IV stability operations. Third, strategic …show more content…
These included Red Team studies, which pointed to a lack of “intelligence and a political framework” in the application of force as one contributor to the growing insurgency. Based on the assessment that MNF-I was under-resourced, two new headquarters were established. The first was Multi-National Corps – Iraq (MNC-I), to command the tactical fight. The second was Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I), “to train and equip the Iraqi military.” MNF-I even created “an academy to train leaders in counterinsurgency principles as they began their tours in Iraq.” However, a sobering assessment at the Joint Campaign Progress Review in December 2006 stated that “(m)any of the risks identified within the Campaign Plan have materialized. Many of the assumptions did not hold. We are failing to achieve objectives in the Economic Development, Governance, Communicating, and Security lines of operations within the planned timeframes.” The mismatch remained at the end of 2006 between too few means, ineffective ways, and the U.S. desired
Strategy depends on numerous analytical factors and some of these present challenges to planners. This essay will identify some of these challenges that strategists encountered during WWII. Moreover, it will present strategy as a fluid process requiring refinement throughout.
Unified Land Operations defines the army operational design methodology (ADM) as “a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solving them. The operational design methodology incorporated into army doctrine serves as a method to compliment the military decision making process (MDMP). Although the ADM it is often confused with replacing MDMP, its purpose is to address complex problems from a nonlinear approach. ADM helps the commander to answer questions to problems. However, only a collaborative effort of an operation planning team (OPT) will achieve the approach to answering complex problems. Doctrine alone does not provide the answer to complex problems, but rather offers a guide to solve them. To conceptualize the MDMP, planners must incorporate ADM to provide a better understanding, visualization, and description of the problem. The purpose of this paper is to provide the framework to support why ADM is required in the MDMP.
War finds success and failure inescapably linked to how well the Combined, Joint, and Multinational Commander ensures the Joint War Fighting Function “Sustainment” planning is linked to strategic, operational and tactical objectives. General Eisenhower’s Operation OVERLORD, the Allied cross channel, air, and seaborne invasion of France during World War II provides an excellent case study to show successful integration of the principles and the spirit of the Joint War Fighting Function “Sustainment.” OVERLORD required synchronizing, coordinating, and integrating the logistics capabilities of coalition forces, their equipment as well as civilian manufacturing capabilities to meet the strategic end state (e.g. the defeat of Germany). This article will review the purpose and definition of Joint Sustainment, its imperatives and logistics planning principles and examine how Eisenhower and his planners incorporated these imperatives and principles into Operation OVERLORD.
The United States launched an operation known as Operation Desert Shield, also known as the Persian Gulf War, in August of 1990 in response to Saddam Hussein’s order to the Iraqi forces to take over Kuwait. President George Herbert Walker Bush made the decision to send American troops to Saudi Arabia to form an international coalition that would eventually turn into an operation known as Operation Desert Storm. The United States Army had not witnessed an event of such international and Homefront importation since the Cold War.
The 2nd Brigade of 101st Airborne Division found out in the summer of 2004 that they had to prepare for the war in the Middle East more particularly for Iraq. With Colonel Todd Ebel in Command of the 2nd Division with a year to prepare over 3,400 men and woman he got right to work. Colonel Ebel started by choosing his staff and who he thought was fit to take charge and lead this ever more complicated war. It was a huge religious civil war taking place in Iraq at the time with the Sunnis at war against the Shi’ite and after the capture of Saddam insurgency started uprising immediately. This uprising along with the uprising of Muqtada al-Sadr a key leader that had lots of violent followers that soon grew into a form of a militia called Mahdi Army which became another huge problem for the U.S. because the line between a legitamite populist movement and a huge theocratic organized-crime and terror ring was a thin one. The 2nd Brigade Infantry Battalions consisted of 1-502nd (First Strike) and 2-502nd (Strike Force) and 2nd brigade as a whole is known as the “Black Hearts”. Ebel’s mission was to deny insurgent’s access to Baghdad through his AO and as intelligence increased to uproot and destroy insurgent safe havens, while also training the IA so they could ensure the stability of the region later on. Ebel chose Lt. Col. Kunk as commander of “First Strike” 1-502nd and Lt. Col. Haycock as commander of “Strike Force” 2-502nd. By Ebel’s personality evaluations of Kunk and Haycock he decided that Kunk would work in the area that involved him being more engaging where populist centers were and work with local officials and Haycock more in the fighting areas. Kunk was in command of 3 rifle companies, 1 weapons company, 1 logistics company...
A big challenge faced by those planning the operation, was that no one had the full picture. The command and control of units in Afghanistan were split into three separate entities; each had their own assets and intelligence sources. The U.S. ground forces under United States Central Command (CENTCOM) were lead by Lieutenant General (LG) Paul Mikolashek out of Kuwait. How...
The operational requirements of the Army during overseas contingency operations have been extensive. The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) Model has proven effective in sustaining persistent mission requirements by ensuring units are operationally prepared to deploy. Commanders and Senior Non Commissioned Officers (SNCO) have responded professionally to the ARFORGEN process by building and maintained cohesive units ready to meet the stringent demands of COIN operations. U...
The United States Marine Corps has values drilled into our head at day one at recruit training. A marine lives by the Values of Honor, Courage, and commitment. Honor covers a lot of traits such as ethics, moral, integrity, respect, and maturity to name a few. Courage covers our mental, moral, and physical toughness. It focuses on doing what is right. It requires high personal standard and to lead by example with making decisions. This relates to the inner strength that tells us we can go further. Finally, commitment instills professionalism, discipline, pride, and concern for others. We must carry these values at all times 24/7.
ADM McDonald failed to clearly and concisely convey his commander’s intent express to the joint force. The commander must clearly and concisely express what the force must do and the conditions the force must establish to accomplish the mission. ADM Mcdonald received guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for Operation Urgent Fury. ADM McDonald issued the guidance to the LANTCOM staff that began the planning process for the operation. Based his guidance, the staff developed a phased operation that establishing the endstate and the conditions to meet that end. However, LANTCOM excluded staff planners from other services during the early stages of planning. The exclusion resulted in a joint force unsure of the commander’s intent and the part each service would play during the operation. For example, the LANTCOM held a pre-deployment conference a few days before the invasion. The 82nd Airborne Division planners departed the conference unsure of the division’s role for the operation. LANTCOM plan for Operation Urgent Fury resulted in a navy plan for joint operations instead of a joint plan for joint operation. The failure to convey the commander’s intent ensured a joint force conducting indep...
The ability to understand a problem, determine the desired end state, and develop a strategy to achieve that end state is a highly sought after skill in every facet of the military profession. However, in a joint setting, the problems are generally much more complex requiring an advanced mastery of problem solving from joint staff officers. The complexities of planning on the joint staff level stem from the amount of education it takes to simply understand the problem. Joint staff officers not only must understand the components and capabilities of their own service, they must also understand any service they might interact with to include the nine combatant commands. These demands put a heavy emphasis on joint professional military education before the joint staff officer shows up to their assignm...
1. Arabic-Media.com (Arabic Media) Site 1997-2011, http://arabic-media.com/iraq_history.htm 2. CRS Report for Congress, 17 February, 1998, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/98-129.pdf
Armed with numerous studies, and intensive public hearings, Congress mandated far-reaching changes in DOD organization and responsibilities in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This landmark legislation significantly expanded the authority and responsibility of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Included in this expanded authority and responsibility was the requirement for the chairman to develop a doctrine for the joint employment of armed forces. As operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Storm have vividly demonstrated, the realities of armed conflict in today's world make the integration of individual service capabilities a matter of success or failure, life or death. Furthermore, the operation Desert One demonstrated the need for a strengthened Joint Warfare Doctrine and the consequent change in Joint Warfare Employment. It is plain to see the benefits of having the greatest navy integrated with the world's greatest army and air force. However, even in the wake of a relatively successful joint operation in the Middle East (Desert Storm), certain weaknesses are evident in the current joint employment tactics and/or capabilities. By analyzing past operations such as Urgent Fury and Desert Storm, we are able to see sufficient evidence that the Joint Warfare Concept can be disastrous in one instance and virtually flawless in another.
Iraq’s history is one of both prosperity and violence, and dates back to the ancient civilizations of Mesopotamia. While dominated by a variety of civilizations, the region enjoyed a relatively stable society. Since the birth of Islam, the religion has been the dominant cultural belief of the region, and has made its way into the laws and ruling of the region. (InDepth Info, 2010)
In today’s operational environments, the U.S. Army is facing a range of problems and mission sets that are arguably more complex than previously encountered. Forces face an array of demands that encompass geo-political, social, cultural, and military factors that interact in unpredictable ways. The inherent complexity of today’s operations has underscored the need for the Army to expand beyond its traditional approach to operational planning. In March 2010 in FM 5-0: The Operations
...roach, anticipation, operational reach, culmination, arranging operations, and forces and functions. Among those elements end state, center of gravity, and line of effort are particularly useful I developing operational approach. The feeders for operational art are commander’s experience, intellect, creativity, intuition, education, and judgment. However, operational design calls for problem identification, achieving common understanding of the situation and continuous and recursive refinement of situational understanding. Although operational design supports operational art with general methodology, by definition, they both differ by the fact that operational art is application that essentially uses cognitive faculties, whereas operational design is a process that integrates cognitive faculties, tools, and system to conceive of and construct viable approach.