Contrary to the belief of eliminative materialism, reductive materialism illustrates that sensations such as feelings do exist, and that brain events are the cause of those thoughts, pains, and feelings (Morris p159). Another form of monism is called idealism. Idealism is a form of monism that proposes the idea that everything is based on the mind or mentality of a person and nothing exists outside of our mind. “The theory is that all that exists is the product of minds or ideas, that physical objects have no existence outside of the mind t... ... middle of paper ... ...d physical events can cause physical events but the mind and body never interact with each other. This theory fails just as the Epiphenomenalism theory does because parallelism does not answer the question about when a person’s deep feelings do lead them “mental decisions and intentions” (Morris p161).
It can exist on its own. This holds that each distinct non-physical entity mind composed a different kind of substance to material objects. Substance dualist believed only spiritual substances can have mental properties. It is “soul” along with certain memory and psychological continuities that constitutes the survival of the person. Physical properties of property dualism are properties like having a certain weight, conducting electricity and mental properties are properties like believing that 1+1=2, being in love, feeling pain, and etc.
In which he concludes that the mind can exist without the body (Skirry). The words, mind, and soul in this case are interchangeable and demonstrate two distinct parts that make up an individual person. Now to explain the interactions of the mind and the body. Since the mind and the body make up a person as a whole, it is... ... middle of paper ... .... It is fair to say that the mind does not have to obey the physical laws that influence the death of our bodies, and the mind can potentially live on in its non-physical form separate from space and time.
The mind body problem is the controversial idea of the connection between the mind and the body. Physicalism is a solution to the mind body problem, providing the idea that there is nothing above the world and accepts the mind to be a physical essence, nothing above the body. Physicalism provides different approaches in search of the mind and its constituents. By approaching the mind as a physical entity, behaviorist, a type of physicalism, view the mind as a category containing emotions, sensations and feelings. Another approach within physicalism is functionalism, the idea that the mind is a series of input and output of mental states.
One of the ways in which Descartes attempts to prove that the mind is distinct from the body is through his claim that the mind occupies no physical space and is an entity with which people think, while the body is a physical entity and cannot serve as a mechanism for thought.  I believe most of this portion of his position to be true. The body quite certainly has a physical presence and is not capable of controlling or thinking for itself. I begin to disagree with Descartes’ theory at the point where he states that the mind is non-extended. The mind is assuredly capable of thought, as Descartes states, and has intangible elements in the form of memories and personality characteristics; however, I believe that the mind is an extended entity because physical matter is required for these elements to exist.
Thus, I believe in the presence of an immaterial self that governs the brain and the body. I disagree that “mental states are explainable in terms of physical brain states”. This is because mental states cannot be reduced to physical brain states. Physical brain states can only give rise to a definitive method to an outcome while immaterial thoughts of a mental state can give rise to various methods to an outcome. These immaterial thoughts of a mental state are made possible by the immaterial self.
Property dualism is the view “That mental properties are nonphysical properties arising from, but not reducible to, physical properties,” (Vaughn 224). Essentially, the major flaw with property dualism is similar to substance dualism, that is there is no way of creating nonphysical properties that interact with physical properties (Vaugh 220). All three of these perspectives best mesh with the epistemological view of skepticism, that is “The view that we lack knowledge in some fundamental way,” (Vaughn 317). This is because the three dualism perspectives view the mental and physical as distinct, and skepticism accounts for the lack of knowledge in some areas, like the mental in the three
Moreover, a brain sits useless unless it has a mind. Substances with shape, mass, and other physical properties characterize the physical. In contrast, substances without any size, shape, mass often characterize the mental. One of the first things about our bodies is that they have limitations that we may think are not there. Our bodies seem to be what they are no matter what we think about them.
Idealism states that the mind is all that exists and that the outside world is either mental or an illusion that the mind creates. Idealism also says that all things are ideas. Idealism argues that the physical is a function of the mind therefore saying that the mind is the only one that exists. Monists argue that mental events are physical events and the mind is what has the most control. Monists still cannot come to a conclusion whether the body is the one that exists or the mind is the one that exists.
By contrast, in knowledge by representation, the subject experiences another kind of relation to the object of knowledge thanks to the presence of a medium in the subject’s mind, called "mental form." Mullâ Sadrâ considers mental forms as the mental existence of the same quiddities (mâhîyyât) existing in the external world. The only difference is that they have another type of existence. In this essay, I argue that this approach is congruent with the principality of quiddity, which is rejected by Mullâ Sadrâ. To be consistent with the basic pillar of Mullâ Sadrâ’s philosophy, viz., the principle of existence, I hold that one should begin with the continuity of existence through mental, imagery and external worlds from which the mind abstracts the same quiddity, not vice versa.