W.T. Stace uses his paper “The Refutation of Realism” to argue that we have no good reason to believe in the existence of objects unperceived by any finite mind. His argument reflects one of exhaustion, in which he claims that the only two ways to argue for the existence of these unperceived objects, is either by inductive or deductive methods. Because both of these fail, we have no way to provide good reason for the belief that objects exist while unperceived. In this paper I will explain why Stace’s argument fails, more specifically his approach to inductive reasoning.
The cosmological argument is however not a valid argument in explaining the existence of god because the conclusions do not logically follow the premises. The main point in the cosmological argument is the first cause. As stated (by Aquinas) the world... ... middle of paper ... ...he conclusion does not logically follow. If nothing is self creating, god for whatever reason should not be an exception. Aquinas first way suggested thing in motion are put in motion something.
Through deductive reasoning, Parmenides proves that if something exists, then it cannot come to be or perish, change or move, nor be the subject to any imperfection. His proteges were left with an enormous problem: how could one reconcile Parmenides’ rejection of change with the possibility of giving a rational account of the changing world of sense experience? By accepting only certain parts of his doctrine of being, his successors ultimately fail in their attempts to explain the changing universe in light of the Parmenidean paradox. How does Parmenides draw the conclusion that if something is, then it is unchanging? A more formal examination of his arguments regarding subjects of inquiry shows how he comes to the conclusion that all is one.
Kant claims that humans cannot see things in themselves due to the cognitive limitations that they have, (Grier). Using his theory of transcendental idealism, he proves transcendental realism wrong. Kant’s ‘Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics’ constitutes his theory of knowledge, while disproving any scepticism caused by Hume, by claiming that knowledge of objects are independently determined by how they are perceived by us. To better understand its meaning, transcendental idealism needs to be defined against other forms of idealism. Idealism, in general, is the claim that reality is dependent on the mind and their ideas, (Morrison).
The philosophy of History is based on such ideals as the idea that Reason rules history. George Hegel used Immanuel Kant's system of philosophy as a basis for his own, discarding a few ideas and adding some more. Particularly, he found fault with his idea of the underlying reality of everything, or "noumena," can never be known. They exist in a plane outside of our own reality and understanding, and are therefore impossible to perceive and study, much like Plato's "forms." Hegel countered this notion with the phrase, "What is rational is real, and what is real is rational."
Due to this Henry’s argument is incorrect. Henry’s argument is unable to provide a proper way for truth verification thus it is a weak argument. The Skeptics require us to show them that they have to accept something as they will never claim so do to their own beliefs on their own and there claims cannot be defeated without such a thing. As such the lack of it makes Henry’s argument ineffective and forgettable. Bibliography Henry of Ghent.
Saul Kripke and W.V. Quine argue that there are no facts about meaning. Perhaps their strongest argument for their rejection of this claim is through their accounts that facts are determinate by rules and that meaning is lost within translation. Kripke depends on facts about rules for his skeptical solution for Wittgenstein’s account that every course of action is made in accord with a rule. Quine basis his argument on the use of translation; he claims that there are no facts about meaning because there is no correct translation of one sentence into another.
Incompatibilists debate the opposite and say free will does not coexist with the idea of determinism and they are incompatible. The claim they address is that there is no possibility that there is true determinism and free will. Robert Kane analyzes both sides in his attempt to show the differences between each side and to draw possible conclusions to the question and existence of free will. The compatibilist and incompatiblists agree that there are other worlds where there is free will but disagree on the fact that determinism is true. Compatibilism is the idea that there is a connection between ones free will and the actions we take.
As the argument is reliant on this assumption, it falls apart as the deductions made are based on this whole concept. To counter this, the philosopher Malcolm disagrees with Kant by saying that existence can be a property of a necessary being such as God. The same concept can’t be applied to contingent beings, such as coins, because they are imperfect beings. I don’t believe this to be valid however, as we don’t know for certain anything about God’s properties. Aquinas believes, as humans we don’t have the intellect to prove God’s existence Overall, this shows that the ontological argument doesn’t prove God’s existence, as existence can’t be a predicate, so any deductions made from this assumption can’t form valid conclusion... ... middle of paper ... ...esses his suspicion of the argument as it “lacks a single piece of data from the real world”.
Circularity and Stability William Alston argues that there is no way to show that any of our basic sources of belief is reliable without falling into epistemic circularity, i.e. relying at some point on premises that are themselves derived from the very same source. His appeal to practical rationality is an attempt to evaluate our sources of belief without relying on beliefs that are based on the sources under scrutiny and thus without just presupposing their reliability. I argue that this attempt fails and that Ernest Sosa’s appeal to the coherence theory of justification fails, too, if it is understood as an attempt to find a similar external evaluation of our sources of belief that does not just assume their reliability. I concluded that there is no alternative to taking an internal view to our own reliability and embracing epistemic circularity.