Millikan's Theory

2600 Words6 Pages

Millikan's Theory Representations are for Millikan part of a larger group of entities

for which she considers there is no generic name in English, and which

would include "[n]atural signs, animals' signs, people's signs,

indexes, signals, indicators, symbols, representations, sentences,

maps, charts, pictures" [LTOBC, 85]. For want of a better term,

Millikan calls these entities signs, and claims that what is common to

all signs is their being, to a greater or lesser degree, intentional.

That is, what all signs have in common, in a family resemblance way,

is their bearing a certain relationship to entities other than

themselves - a relationship which is usually characterized as "being

about something else", "meaning something else". In what follows, I

will consider what the nature of this "being about something else" is

according to Millikan. I will pay particular attention to mental, or

inner, representations, despite the fact that Millikan believes

"articulate conventional signs" - that is, I take it, verbal

utterances - to be the paradigm case of signs. For, like Searle,

Millikan regards verbal utterances and other external verbal-like

modes of representation (such as writing), to have an intentionality

derived from the original intentionality of states of mind, and thus

explainable in terms of the latter.

Intentionality is, according to Millikan, a question of degree:

indeed, she rejects Brentano's original motivation for reintroducing

the term, which was to establish a criterion for the mental, thus

creating "a clean gap" between the mental a...

... middle of paper ...

... to consciousness, and vice versa. Certainly, it does seem

rather counterintuitive to see intentionality as (exclusively)

ethologically motivated. Moreover, it is not very clear what the

teleological purpose of consciousness might be - what proper function

of our cognitive systems is fulfilled by our being conscious?

---------------------------------------------------------------------

[1] However, as we shall see, Millikan conceives of intentionality in

a broad and a narrow sense, and in it will be the narrow, more

intuitive sense of the word that we will be concerned with in dealing

with representations.

[2] Which of course does not mean that desires are always fulfilled -

as Millikan strikingly puts it, "many desires, like sperm, emerge in a

world that does not permit their proper functions to be performed".

Open Document