Microcredit Programs: Tackling Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

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The problems that Microcredit programs attempt to solve are the problems of moral hazard, asymmetric information, and adverse selection.
Moral hazard is the situation where one party in an agreement can maximize their utility by breaking the terms of the agreement or by harming the other party. Typical examples of moral hazard include the difficulty that an employer has in ensuring that her employees work hard and are not lazy. This is typically solved by basing the worker’s compensation on the output of their labor, not on whether they worked or not.
Adverse selection is the process by which other economic factors select the worst possible applicants for a position. This is seen in how risky drivers will purchase insurance more often than …show more content…

If the rate is set at 2 percent, the demand from reliable consumers will be 40 and the demand from unreliable consumers will also be 40. However, we must remember that due to the unreliable borrowers, and the corresponding risk of default, the interest rate is 24% not 2%. That means that demand among reliable consumers is -5.8 and none will borrow while demand is still 40 for unreliable borrowers who will all borrow. The reason why unreliable consumer demand is unrelated to rate prices is because they are unreliable and do not intend to make payments in the first …show more content…

A reliable borrower has a utility equation lower than that of an unreliable borrower.
M+L+DP < M+L+(0)
Microcredit group lending practices aim to solve both of these problems that prevent poor borrowers from receiving credit through traditional methods. Individuals in the recipient community form groups among themselves and receive a loan as a collective with the knowledge that every member of the group is liable for the debts of the other members. The fact that these groups are voluntary and among people who live in the same community greatly reduces the risk of unreliable individuals receiving loans.
● Example 4:
A group of 5 is needed to receive a loan from a microloan organization of 100 usd. Each member has an incentive to only join the group if they know and trust each member because the individual debt is calculated by (total debt)/(number of paying members) and if one person defaults the debt of the other members increases by 25%. (100/5=20 and

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