Lord Steyn's Justification Of Psychiatric Harm

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In order to establish whether Lord Steyn’s statement is accurate the justifications of the current laws regarding negligently caused psychiatric harm must be assessed. This area of law can be particularly emotive, with criticism aimed at the current categorisation of victims which cause many cases to fail. Through the examination of current judicial approaches to the categorisation of victims and the implementation of various controls and restrictions this essay will assess whether Lord Steyn’s criticism is justified and whether reform is necessary.

The first point to consider is how ‘pure psychiatric harm’ is defined in law. Firstly, in order for an injury to be actionable, the harm must be medically recognised (Hinz v. Berry [1970] 1 All …show more content…

Whilst the judiciary repeatedly reaffirms the need for control measures, it is argued that the law in its current state is unfair as it limits claims for harm that occurs gradually (Alcock). It also questionable whether the restrictions on claims which require greater analysis into the illness is justifiable. Lord Denning stated in White v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1999] 2 AC 45 that such claims are restricted due to the cost and time requirement of expert opinion in establishing whether a condition is considered medically …show more content…

It was held in Page that there is no distinction between psychiatric and physical harm in the case of a primary victim, and providing that the risk of physical injury was reasonably foreseeable a duty would be owed. It is not necessary for the risk of psychiatric harm to be foreseeable as demonstrated in Dulieu v. White & Sons [1901] 2 KB 669. Due to the nature of the circumstances this is generally accepted as a suitable way of dealing with primary victim claims. If a person fails to satisfy the criteria of a primary victim they are deemed a secondary victim. Here, it is likely that the victim has witnessed the event or feared for the safety of another but was not in any danger themselves. As with primary victims, there must be a medically recognised condition induced by shock. The test to establish whether a duty is owed to secondary victims was set out in Alcock. It is much more stringent than the test for primary victims and greatly restricts potential claims. The judiciary impose these restrictions in order to prevent limitless claims, establish genuine psychiatric illness and restrict liability for

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