Lockheed Martin Cyber Attack Kill Chain Summary

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This paper reexamines the Lockheed-Martin Cyber Attack Kill Chain from the perspective of counterterrorism tradecraft. The Cyber Attack Kill Chain and the Terrorism Kill Chain are nearly identical; therefore, information gained from cyber campaign analysis and counterterrorism intelligence are likely functionally analogous, and therefore should be behaviorally equivalent in the intelligence cycle. Applying counterterrorism intelligence techniques to the Lockheed-Martin Cyber Attack Kill Chain will close a considerable functional gap in cybersecurity, providing cyberresilience and allowing decision makers to incorporate tailored and predictive cyberresistance into enterprise-wide risk-management and governance processes.

The only step missing …show more content…

As a result of this, terrorists sometimes forgo rehearsal altogether for fear of discovery. An unrehearsed act of terrorism, while more likely to be seen through to fruition (Actions on the Objective), stands a greatly reduced chance of success.
Some modern cybersecurity analysts disparage the Lockheed-Martin Cyber Attack Kill Chain model, claiming that it is intrusion-centric and does not account for many current and emerging threats including insider threats, social engineering, and remote access.2 Intrusions are now a much broader problem class than they were when the Lockheed-Martin paper was written. However, if hackers tend to use trend-focused approaches, then that functional gap closes considerably with an application of strategic-level counterterrorism techniques.
Current intrusion detection systems focus on system vulnerability, and therefore determine immediate threats and not strategic patterns. The cyberthreat environment requires strategic-level analysis of the broader threat, including emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). For strategic-level data collection, vulnerability-focused systems are …show more content…

The intelligence officer then presents these questions, called intelligence gaps, to the collection manager, who coordinates operations that task intelligence assets (collectors) with finding the answers to the intelligence gaps. As intelligence gaps are filled, analysts determine new gaps, and the process begins anew.
This “peeling of an onion” can be a difficult concept for civilian analysts – and particularly “business intelligence analysts” whose jobs revolve around quantifiable and incontestable data – to grasp. It is likely even harder for many executive-level consumers to appreciate and may create a point of contention. However, gap analysis drives the counterterrorism intelligence cycle, and it must do so in a Strategic Intrusion Analysis Cell.
By understanding the aggressor’s kill chain, particulary in reference to an APT, the defender can not only thwart the current attack but also detect future attacks earlier and build resiliency into the defensive posture. This is the purpose of intelligence in counterterrorism, and it is directly analogous to APT.
In addition to employing the intelligence cycle, other counterterrorism intelligence practices

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