Quine basis his argument on the use of translation; he claims that there are no facts about meaning because there is no correct translation of one sentence into another. In this paper, I will argue that in the accounts of both Kripke and Quine, Kripke provides us with a substitution which makes us a little less worrisome about falling completely into skepticism than that of Quine’s account, I will then provide a possible resolution that can assist in dissolving Quine’s perturbing skepticism. In “On Rules and Private Language,” Saul Kripke argues that the meaning of a certain thing is determined by facts about the rules for the use of that certain thing in the linguistic community that he belongs. He begins with Wittgenstein’s paradox, “no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made in accord with the rule” (Kripke, 627). The distinction between abiding a rule and acting in accord with a rule is that the latter construes no violation of the rule.
Thereby conforming to sociality. In Mill's book Utilitarianism he makes a distinction between act and rule-utilitarianism. Both types of utilitarianism are not without great flaw and therefore cannot exist as a base for moral principle. By adding the branch of rule-utilitarianism to the utilitarian tree Mill tries to compensate for some of act-utilitarian's flaws but as seen rule-utilitarianism has it's own objections and does not improve on the simple of act-utilitarianism thought out by previous philosophers. Rule-utilitarianism just patches-up some of act-utilitarian holes only it does not cover the entire thing.
(1) This view holds that in understanding a text, historical event, cultural phenomenon or perhaps anything at all, objectivity is not a suitable ideal because there does not exist any one correct interpretation of the phenomenon under investigation. In Gadamer's words, "understanding is not merely a reproductive but always a productive activity as well" (G 280; E 296); it is a "fusion of horizons" of the past and present, objective and subjective (G 289; E 306). At the same time, Gadamer wants to steer clear of an "anything-goes" relativism. In other words, in Gadamer's view, understanding is a process that invites and even demands a plurality of interpretations, but not at the expense of giving up criteria that distinguish right ones from wrong ones. What exactly are Gadamer's grounds for denying the existence of a uniquely correct interpretation of a text, object, or event?
Substitutivity The problem of substitutivity has always been a thorn in the side of the study of semantic logic. Why does it sometimes appear that terms that refer to identical objects cannot be replaced with each other in propositions without altering the truth value or meaning of said proposition? Leibniz's Law would seem to ensure that we could perform such an action without anything significant having changed, but this is clearly not so. I intend to look at the history, not only of this problem, but of the theories that have created an atmosphere in which these questions can be contemplated. Finally, I will offer some of my own insights and perceived problems.
W.T. Stace uses his paper “The Refutation of Realism” to argue that we have no good reason to believe in the existence of objects unperceived by any finite mind. His argument reflects one of exhaustion, in which he claims that the only two ways to argue for the existence of these unperceived objects, is either by inductive or deductive methods. Because both of these fail, we have no way to provide good reason for the belief that objects exist while unperceived. In this paper I will explain why Stace’s argument fails, more specifically his approach to inductive reasoning.
Compatibilists and Incompatibilists debate determinism and free will. Determinism is the idea that our actions are determined by past events. In other words, in our present state we do not have control over our actions and they are pre-determined. Only one thing can happen given a certain condition and nothing else can occur. Determinism seems to pose a problem because it tests the possibility that we do not have free will or control over our actions because with certain conditions there can only be one possible outcome.
My argument turns on the opposition between the necessity and universality of the a priori and the particularity and contingency of the existent. Its main point is that the a priori can remain necessary and universal only if the existence of objects is kept distinct from it. I. Introduction To the extent that category theory, i.e. that there are certain predicates of things that are fundamental to our thought about objects in general, has been based on our thought of objects of possible experience, it has been highly suspect.
Wittgenstein's Dilemma Either language can be defined or it can be investigated empirically. If language is defined then this will be mere tautology. If language is investigated empirically then this will lead to a substantial yet contingent truth. The cure for this dilemma for Wittgenstein in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was to submit the doctrine that the structure of language cannot be said but only shown. This doctrine is vague and misconceived.
Explanation, Understanding, and Subjectivity ABSTRACT: Many theorists of explanation from Hempel onward have worked with the explicit or implicit assumption that considerations of the subjective sense of understanding should be kept out of the formulation of a proper theory of explanation. They claim that genuine understanding of an event comes only from being in an appropriate cognitive relation to the true explanation of that event. I argue that considerations of the subjective sense of understanding cannot be completely removed from the process of formulating and justifying an acceptable theory of explanation. Although understanding is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for an explanation, understanding is necessary as an initial guide to the nature of explanation. The widespread method of providing counterexamples for criticizing theories of explanation presupposes that there is a neutral method of identifying at least some clear cases of explanation and some clear cases of non-explanations.
Metaphors With the possible exception of completely formal exercises in logic, philosophy is thoroughly metaphorical and largely conditional. Moreover, the purposes served by metaphors and conditionals in it are similar. Metaphors ask us to imagine the world in a new way, while conditionals may ask to imagine a new world. Yet some conditionals and metaphors are incompatible. There are limits to how metaphors can occur in conditionals, and how conditionals can themselves be metaphors.