“War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. . . The commander must work in a medium which his eyes cannot see; which his best deductive powers cannot always fathom; and with which, because of constant changes, he can rarely become familiar.”
—Carl von Clausewitz
This is one of the inevitable problems military intelligence analyst encounter. The battlefield itself is a challenge in the sense that it is filled with uncertainties and unknowns—Clausewitz termed these “friction of war” which may result to the adversary changing its actions totally different from what you had planned for and will require the commander trusting his own judgment to make new decisions or a delay in action by any individual of a battalion—someone’s M16 can jam or something. Since war is fundamentally a human enterprise, it is shaped by human nature and is subject to the complexities, inconsistencies, and peculiarities, which characterize human behavior. Human beings, friendly as well as enemy, are unpredictable. Second, because war is a complex struggle between independent human wills, we can never expect to anticipate with certainty what events will develop. In other words, the fundamentally complex and interactive nature of war generates uncertainty. Uncertainty is not merely an existing environmental condition; it is a natural byproduct of war. The analyst however should be aware not of the uncertainties but aware of uncertainties—this means that he can best produce intelligence not when he knows all that can go wrong, be delayed or a surprise act by the adversary but when he is aware that some of these can occur. ...
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...rmine if the information is useless, a warning or effective in determining the enemy’s intentions. However, in a short time that this project was to be completed, there are other challenges like surprise acts, unknown feature of the Future and the commanders might be too pre-occupied with the enemy forces to state detailed requirements, budget fluctuation (can increase or decrease), technology and other historical cases that lessons and improvements can be drawn from. Regardless, this paper has shown the basic framework of intelligence analysis and in relations to the MOS 35F, provided explanation to the basic analytical tools that are used in analyzing HUMINT. Since I could not acquire the guidebook, it will be needed for further and deeper research into the professionalization of the U.S Army Intelligence analyst 35F.
(U) Background: Over the course of United States history the Army has made changes to how it engages its foreign enemies. These tactics techniques and procedures are the result of lessons learned during conflict, mistakes made under fire, and the results of a nation at war. As a result the IPB process has changed to accommodate a dynamic and often fluid battlefield. However this has not changed the core concept behind IPB, the four steps still remain an integral part of the Commanders Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), and are essential in war gaming. IPB assist in providing valuable Intelligence to the War Fighter throughout all phases of operations. This paper will cover each step of the IPB Process as well as discuss products associated with each of those steps and how these products can be an asset to the Commander and the War Fighter.
In order to receive a victory in the Battle of the Bulge, General Patton used Mission Command Analysis in order to understand how he can be successful for this mission. The first thing of understanding t...
Accepting risk is an inherent necessity of commanders past and present. General Gates knew a purely defensive operation was risky, but he also knew that engaging the British on open terrain was an even greater risk. Commanders today should consider the implications of accepting too great a risk while developing the situation and operational approach to their desired end state. Whatever the mission, by empowering subordinates, enabling disciplined initiative and driving the operations process, commanders will not only provide that needed and desired leadership, they will affect the outcome of the battle.
Modern warfare will be fought predominantly in the chaos of the urban environment. As we move into the future we must never forget our past; always keeping in mind where we seek to go. Operations such as Vigilant Resolve, which on the surface seem like a failure, are quickly turned to future success if we remember, study, learn, and grow from them.
Intelligence failure was one of the main reasons why the Tet offensive happened. The allies undergo a failure of intelligence before Tet, a failure that helped plan the stages for changes in the strategies of the US. The four parts of intelligence are crucial in determining the actions of the enemy. The four tasks consist of collection of information, the analysis of the information, the decision to respond to a warning issued in the analytical stage, dissemination of the order to respond to the field co...
Past military events have demonstrated the importance of anticipation and preparation for a wide spectrum of missions and capabilities. To conduct these operations, the U.S. Military must prepare to move and conduct them anywhere in the world. The Military must also have the capability to conduct low intensity wars against an ill-defined enemy as well as major conventional style conflicts against major states.
It is interesting and even surprising that the two major strategies regarding war were developed by European contemporaries of the late eighteenth and nineteenth century. Antoine Henri de Jomini (1779-1869) approached his philosophy of war in a structured, scientific manner. Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) took a more fluid, open-ended approach to his philosophy of war. The fact that they lived during the same time period in Europe is also fascinating in that they likely knew of each others’ writings as well as potentially influenced and were influenced by the philosophy of the other. Jomini’s scientific approach is more applicable to the tactical and operational levels of war while Clausewitz approaches war as more of an art or interaction between people that is more appropriate to the strategic and political levels of war. Although their two war strategies are presented as opposing strategies, by comparing concepts from each of the theorists to the other theorist’s work shows that they are actually more complementary than competing in that they are addressing different levels of war. The concepts to be evaluated are Clausewitz’s “Trinity of War”, “war as a continuation of politics”, and the “unpredictability of war” as well as Jomini’s definition of strategy and his “Fundamental Principle of War”.
Addressing the issues raised here and answering the uncertainties outlined in reference to irregular warfare procedures may provide a more subtle analysis of the capabilities of modern and irregular forces. What is called for is a greater degree of attention and sensitivity to, and flexibility for, irregular forms of warfare. It requires the Community to preserve what expertise it has on areas where irregular warfare is under way or likely and to develop new skills and the people to use them for this form of war.
Although there is a level of complexity, an inherent and deterministic logic underpins traditional warfighting operations. Planners can apply certain principles to contingency planning for traditional warfighting. Once planners understand relationships between the parts of the problem, they recognize that every action has a consequence, and although some actions reinforce the adversary system’s power, others degrade that power. The typical wargaming method of action, reaction, and counteraction significantly contributes to this oversimplification of combat, which, after all, is a human endeavor and thus subject to fog and friction. Traditional wargaming is an extremely useful tool, but planners must understand that whereas the wargaming outcome is deterministic, combat is not. In complex, ill-structured problems, wargaming is still required, but the real benefits do not necessarily come from the results. The far greater benefits are derived from the discussions of possibilities and probabilities from the interaction of systems and actors within and between
...these intelligence failures, more emphasis is now placed on the creation of intelligence products used on the battlefield. All possible enemy courses of actions are now red teamed in an attempt to produce a much accurate analytical product.
I have organized this paper into five distinct sections; mission, task organization, capabilities, limitations, and finally the conclusion. After the reading and comprehension of this paper, you should have gained a basic understanding of the Special Forces (SF) Chemical Reconnaissance Detachments (CRD). The following paper is mixed with Unclassified (UCI) and For Official Use Only (FOUO) information. FOUO is annotated at the beginning of all For Official Use Only information, the rest of the paper is UCI. If you wish to share this information paper with others, please at a minimum; confirm identity of the person prior to providing (FM 380-5, 2000). For further handling instructions please refer to FM 380-5, or contact me, I will gladly answer all questions.
“The strategic foundation for predictive policing is clear enough. A smaller, more agile force can effectively counter larger numbers by leveraging intelligence, including the element of surprise. A force that uses intelligence to guide information-based operations can penetrate an adversary’s decision cycle and change outcomes, even in the face of a larger...
After a brief analysis of the relevant literature on the politicization of intelligence, the case of the Korean War is outlined. Next, the literature is applied to the case and, lastly, the research question is answered in the conclusion section of this study.
Samuel B. Griffith’s translation of “Sun Tzu: The Art of War” is an inside look at military practices of today. I did not find one technique that is not or would not be utilized in modern military maneuver, leadership, or training. The most astounding fact is that the Art of War was written well over two thousand years ago, even at the most conservative date. Although most of the techniques in this text are already in practice today, the value of “The Art of War” is a never-ending treasure chest of knowledge, and it deserves a place as a required reading for anyone seeking knowledge about war fighting or the history of war.
One of the most important factors in a nation’s success in war is strategy, and it is also the