... Intelligence and Security. Ed. K. Lee Lerner and Brenda Wilmoth Lerner. Vol. 1. Detroit: Gale, 2004. 312-315. Gale U.S. History In Context. Web. 13 Dec. 2011. http://ic.galegroup.com:80/ic/uhic/ReferenceDetailsPage/ReferenceDetailsWindow?displayGroupName=Reference&disableHighlighting=false&prodId=UHIC&action=2&catId=&documentId=GALE%7CCX3403300213&userGroupName=mlin_s_hullhs&jsid=2be90fb974b37f6aca36a57ec3c49ff7
The other 15 accounts show the issues with intelligence analysis. Sometimes the intelligence is tainted and based on preconceived notions or preferences. However, May’s collection points out that most issues are related to interpretation, perception, prejudice, avoidance, outside distractions, and how leaders react to the information. As well, the idea that intelligence agencies are vulnerable to deception and insider threat is a risk, so always retain skepticism and consider the source. Finally, the collection points out that military intelligence collect is very good, yet operations intelligence is not so
Intelligence failure was one of the main reasons why the Tet offensive happened. The allies undergo a failure of intelligence before Tet, a failure that helped plan the stages for changes in the strategies of the US. The four parts of intelligence are crucial in determining the actions of the enemy. The four tasks consist of collection of information, the analysis of the information, the decision to respond to a warning issued in the analytical stage, dissemination of the order to respond to the field co...
The use of intelligence within law enforcement intelligence agencies is not always perfect. There may be a way to safeguard against the misuse of intelligence processes to assure proper use it at all times, but it has not yet been discovered. The only way that agencies can try and control the misuse of intelligence is to study the historical failures of the past.
Tiffen, Rodney. "The Public Case of War: Australian use of Intelligence and the Case of war in Iraq." In Intelligence and National Security Policymaking on Iraq: British and American Perspectives, edited by James P Pfiffner and Mark Thythian, 106-126. Texas: Manchester University Press, 2008.
This paper will detail how I would explain to my policymaker what the psychological barriers are for intelligence collection and analysis. Next, I will provide an argument as to what types of rigors are needed to improve intelligence analysis making it more reliable. Finally, I will persuade the policymaker to support my argument in order to receive more funding in order to implement the type of improvements I have defined.
The morality of secret operations has been questioned since intelligence first began. The President of the United States must decide at the highest level which secret operations should be conducted and which are not ethical. The problem that has happened in the past is that the President has looked at the Director of Central Intelligence as his “personal advisor” when it comes to advising on intelligence affairs (Johnson 292). President Kennedy looked to his brother Bobby when making decisions of national security, and President Reagan set up his personal friend, Walter Clark, as his National Security Advisor.
In order to effectively act on a controversial issue or problem, whether in a position of power over others, or simply day to day decision making, it is often essential to advancement when making decisions to gather information relevant to the decision before acting. This lesson can be learned from issues throughout the Cold War era, and used in today’s political tension and riots that are currently raging in Egypt. During the Cold War, there were incidents where United States (U.S.) intelligence could have saved many soldiers their lives, whether they were American, Cuban, or Vietnamese. Three key events in the Cold War cost lives, and aided in wrongful decision making. These events were the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, and the vague Gulf of Tonkin incident. The third event, however, demonstrates the superiority that comes with Gathering information before acting on it, and is the tense time of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Throughout history there are multiple intelligence failures such as 9/11 and Pearl Harbor. These failures are due to intelligence collected which was either delayed or misdirected to the rest of the intelligence community. Both events had catastrophic consequences and yet these tragic events has allowed the intelligence community to develop better security like warning signals and combat readiness to protect the United States. Pearl Harbor is still considered one of the worst intelligence failure in the history of the United States to date. During the upcoming months before the attack the U.S Naval Fleet intercepted and deciphered vast amounts of encrypted messages from Japan’s Imperial Navy. Due to manpower and at the time Japan being perceived as not a threat intercepted messages were disregarded or were delayed in being read. “The United States did not perceive the Japanese ability to attack the United States Naval Fleet at all and thus to bring the U.S into war- a step in which logically appeared to be a gross strategic miscalculation, as it indeed was” (Grabo, 2004). But ...
Interrogation Ethics in the Context of Intelligence Collection is written by Michael Skerker. This chapter mainly discussed the ethics of coercive and non coercive interrogations. Non-coercive interrogations is primarily based on oral tactics (i.e., direct questioning, self questioning), deceitfulness, and trickery. Coercive interrogations uses threats and force in order to get honest confessions from a detainee. Both interrogations technique help with protecting the United States from harm and terrorist acts. In chapter ten, Guarding against Politicization: A Message to Analysts is composed by Robert M. Gates. It generally explained that roles of the intelligence managers and analyst in politicization. Chapter eleven, Memorandum: One Person