The Battle of Ia Drang was the first significant battle between the major players of the Vietnam War, the U.S. Army and the NVA, but also was the first battle to feature so prominently the helicopter and the US doctrine of Air Mobility. Many of the developments of that era are still present today, or are direct forerunners of our current helicopters and doctrine. This paper will discuss the historical background and prelude to the battle, the helicopters, tactics and roles they fulfilled, and lessons learned. History The Howze Board had already begun working on the concept of air power furthering mobility on 25 April 1962, prior even to the board’s opening directive being issued on 3 May, its formation prompted by a memo from the Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Secretary McNamara had gone as far as to mention in this memo that "I shall be disappointed if the Army's reexamination merely produces logistically oriented recommendations to procure more of the same, rather than a plan for employment of fresh and perhaps unorthodox concepts which will give us a significant increase in mobility.”1 The Howze Board consisted of multiple committees, to include Tactical Mobility, Firepower, and Reconnaissance. The various committees from the Howze Board referred their work to the Field Test Group, who then tried the various recommendations and theories from the committees. The board’s concluding statement was evident: “Adoption of the Army of the airmobile concept-however imperfectly it may be described and justified in this report-is necessary and desirable. In some respects the transition is inevitable, just as was that from animal mo... ... middle of paper ... ... superior firepower to negate the strength of enemy numbers; as Col Nguyen Huu An noted, "Move inside the column, grab them by the belt, and thus avoid casualties from the artillery and air." 11 Works Cited Askew, Samuel. “Air Mobile Warfare and the Battle of the Ia Drang Valley.” Voices.Yahoo.com. March 24, 2010 Galloway, Joseph L. “Ia Drang – The Battle That Convinced Ho Chi Minh He Could Win.” Historynet.com. October 18, 2010. Mason, Robert. Chickenhawk. New York, Penguin, 1983. Moore, Harold G; Galloway, Joseph L. We Were Soldiers Once ... and Young — Ia Drang: the battle that changed the war in Vietnam. New York, Open Road, 2012. Stanton, Shelby L. Anatomy of a Division: 1st Cav in Vietnam Novato: Presido, 1987. Tolson, Lt.Gen. John J. Airmobility 1961-1971 (Vietnam Studies). Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1989.
E-History (2012, N.d.). Retrieved March 25, 2012, from http://ehistory.osu.edu/vietnam/essays/battlecommand/index.cfm.
Throughout the battle, you see numerous Army Values and Warrior Ethos being used. “I will never leave a fallen comrade”, was the etho used the most, to reach the separated platoon. The battle also shows that not all tactical orders are effective, but as a leader you must never second guess yourself.
Thesis. Air War College, 1987. http://www.airwar.edu//a>. Maxwell, Alabama: United States Air Force, 1987. DTIC Online -.
Airmen: An Illustrated History: 1939-1949.” Oct. 2012. Vol. 65 Issue 4, pg. 316-319. 4p. Ebsco Host. Tucker, Phillip Thomas, 1953. Web.2014.
In this paper, I will provide a Battle Analysis and outline the events leading up to and surrounding the Battle of 73 Eastings (refers to a north-south grid line). In addition, I will describe how the United States Army’s (USA) 2nd Armored Calvary Regiment (ACR) defeated forces from the Iraqi Republican Guard (IRG) using speed, technology and superior combat power. Although some consider the Battle of 73 Eastings extremely successful, some consider it a failure due to the large amount of Iraqi forces that retreated towards Bagdad. Lastly, I will analyze how each side used their intelligence assets and what they could have used to change the outcome.
"Overview of the Vietnam War." Digital History. Digital History, n.d. Web. 20 Mar. 2014. .
Hynes, Samuel Lynn. "What Happened in Nam." The soldiers' tale: bearing witness to modern war. New York, N.Y., U.S.A.: A. Lane, 1997. 177-222. Print.
During the battle, COL Hughes moved to areas under heavy fire to advice his commanders directly and motivate his Marines to push forward. He exhibited extraordinary professionalism as he maintain his presence as a true ground commander who fought side-by-side with his Marines. Initially, cloud cover was heavy and poor weather prevented close air support (CAS) and artillery support. With organic assets readily available, he personally directed fire support on enemy defenses slowly weakening Communist forces hold on the city. Clearly, COL Hughes was able to inspire trust to his subordinates whose end result was a cohesive team that fought a successful battle
James S. Olson. The Vietnam War: handbook of the Literature and Research. (London: Greenwood Press,1993)
Lawson, Robert L., and Barrett Tillman. U.S. Navy Air Combat: 1939-1946. Osceola, WI: MBI Pub., 2000. Print.
In 1957, the army began developing a new fighting force based on the helicopter. ...
Unikoski, Ari. “The War in the Air - Summary of the Air War”. First World War.com. 2009. http://www.firstworldwar.com/airwar/summary.htm
“I believe that operational-level commanders must first master the basic philosophy and principles of warfare. Only then can they make current or new technologies their servant.” Since 1947, airpower theory had the greatest impact on the employment of American airpower, because the promise of strategic bombing would deliver decisive effects and achieve a swift victory continued throughout the wars in Korea, Vietnam and Iraq. Although strategies, doctrines and technology changed over time, the application of US airpower revealed the dependence on the traditional air power theory in the second half of the twentieth century. In the first part, this paper will present the main prophecies and predictions of two of the most relevant airpower theorists.
Samuel B. Griffith’s translation of “Sun Tzu: The Art of War” is an inside look at military practices of today. I did not find one technique that is not or would not be utilized in modern military maneuver, leadership, or training. The most astounding fact is that the Art of War was written well over two thousand years ago, even at the most conservative date. Although most of the techniques in this text are already in practice today, the value of “The Art of War” is a never-ending treasure chest of knowledge, and it deserves a place as a required reading for anyone seeking knowledge about war fighting or the history of war.
Tice, Brian P. (1991). Unmanned Aerial Vehicles – The Force Multiplier of the 1990s. Airpower Journal.