Counter Insurgency In The Vietnam War

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The U.S. conducted major offensives to weed out insurgents; on April 2004 American forces drove insurgents out of Fallujah in a large-scale ground attack. However, al Qaeda retook the city weeks later. The offensive operations conducted by the U.S. forces were effective as they would disrupt insurgent control of Iraqi cities, but the U.S. was not establishing strong security in the areas just captured. The result of little to no security in the cities retaken by American forces resulted in al Qaeda taking back most positions. The U.S. had to retake Fallujah in November and the operation cost more than 90 American lives. The U.S. needed to stop making the same mistake of clearing an enemy area and losing it once troops would move to the next …show more content…

had to rethink their plan for counter insurgency due to many mistakes being made regarding the military’s tactics for fighting insurgents and the way America trained the Iraqi security forces. Military officials began to look back at America’s past wars like Vietnam and El Salvador to see how unconventional wars were won. Americans were able to see many “comparisons with the long, soul-destroying counterinsurgency in Vietnam.” In an unconventional war the enemy is more likely to have success because he has the home field advantage, knows the landscape, environment and local people much better than the foreign force. During Vietnam the U.S. had a high number of casualties reaching almost 60,000 as the U.S. was fighting an unconventional enemy, the Vietcong. As casualties increased the U.S. began to train and advise the South Vietnamese in order to defeat the …show more content…

and Iraqi forces cleared city after city they noticed the number of insurgents still continued to rise. The biggest objective was to prevent foreign fighters from coming into Iraq because as the Iraqi and U.S. forces eliminated insurgents more continued to flood into Iraq. A majority of these foreign fighters who were moving into Iraq were coming through the Iraqi town of Tal Afar in North Western Iraq. There were over 500 insurgents in Tal Afar who were commanded by al Qaeda’s Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The city became a terrorist cell where insurgents created a safe haven, weapons depot and training camp. A year before, U.S. forces ran al Qaeda out of the city but returned soon after. U.S. forces were determined to prevent insurgents from retaking any more area. On September 2nd, 2005 U.S. armored troops along with 5,000 Iraqi forces staged an operation to take back Tal Afar. At the end of the operation more than 200 insurgents were killed and many more ran away. The success of the mission is another great example of how the training from SOF and allowing the Iraqi security forces to fight their own war have been successful at battling

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