Consictivism And Realism In Kuhn's Critical Realist Theory

If the just briefly mentioned constructivist and positivism were the extremes of a philosophical spectrum of social sciences, then critical realist theory occupies a rather moderate median standpoint: even though this research tradition assumes that there is an independent, partly open reality (much like positivism), it considers that “social practices must be critical precisely in order to be explanatory”(Sayer, 2000, p.158) and therefore ensures its position in establishing axiological ambitions to provide knowledge about the real structures and mecanisms underlying a phenomenon. Here, the aim of science is rather to establish how likely it is that various actors assume causality in certain phenomena since it recognizes that it is rarely possible to prove that event X always leads to event Y. This standpoint

Much like Kuhn’s paradigms, critical realist theories are in a state of incommensurability in that “they ordinarily incorporate much of the vocabulary and apparatus, both conceptual and manipulative, that the [other] had previously employed. But they seldom employ these borrowed elements in quite the traditional way. Within the new paradigm, old terms, concepts, and experiments fall into new relationships one with the other.” (Kuhn, 1962, p. 149). Of course, in the critical realist philosophy, premises do not shift in a chronological manner and rather exist parallel to each other: but “communication across the […] divide is inevitably partial” (Kuhn, idem) due to the disagreement on explanations. In Realism & Social Science, Andrew Sayer points out the issues and limitations of this philosophical school of thoughts by specifically stressing that pointing out the ‘superior’ premise and explanation can be often unclear simply because their can be shaped by certain judgments, interests and values (Sayer, 2000, p.