Comparing failed states

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Examining the degree of state failure between contemporary Georgia in to the moderate degree of state failure in present-day Serbia, this essay argues that the resource curse most significantly accounts for the disjuncture in regime capabilities and potency found across these cases. The availability of large oil and natural gas resources in the context of the Georgian case, the country’s state never faced pressures to engage in significant economic diversification or to build state apparatuses to collective revenue and providing services. In contrast, the Serbian case demonstrates that the country’s separation and reconstruction in the wake of early 1990s warfare saw the country forced to build a potent central state structure and the absence of rent-accruing natural resources created a context in which the state was forced to build enhanced capacity.
Beginning with an overview of the most-similar-systems research design used in the context of this project, the essay moves forward to provide overviews of the patterns of state failure which occurred in Georgia and Serbia. Noting that the former has suffered from greater deterioration in this regard, the essay argues that Georgia represents a case of a mostly-failed state which is still in the midst of decline. Subsequently, the essay moves forward to provide an overview of the resource curse itself. In this regard, it notes that this theoretical concept is one which proposes that the presence of significant natural resources within a state’s boundaries is highly germane to economic stasis and low state capacity because of the corruption and rent accrual which results from these characteristics.
Applying the resource curse to both of the cases under analysis; the essay finds that...

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...lows economic development. Because revenues from resource exportation are misappropriated, the state never encourages a domestic culture of entrepreneurship or attempts to diversify its economy in a manner suitable to inuring it from the boom-bust cycle of the international economy.
Writ-large, these corrupt policies thus ultimately serve to both perpetuate economic marginalization and vulnerability throughout the oil and gas-producing states of the developing world. On this basis, Sachs & Warner (2001) propose that the resource curse is thus very germane to provoking failed or failing state regime structures inasmuch as the rents provided by resources do not provide incentives for any type of state capability construction other than that which is associated with benefiting from these rents. Thus, according to Sachs & Warner (2001), the resource curse perpetuates

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