Influenced by his military background, Colonel Harry G. Summers' argument’s validity resides in the congruity to the Clausewitzian perspective of “activities characteristic of war may be split into two main categories: those that are merely preparation for war, and war proper” expressed in his seminal work "On War"; Summers appropriately applies classical strategic thought to explicate America's military failings. Summers' divides his interpretation into two sections entailing an analysis of the Vietnam conflict characterised by the principles of war - the objective, the offensive, mass, economy of force, manoeuvre, unity of command, surprise, security, and simplicity. Part 1 examines the implementation of inept policies that perpetuated the …show more content…
Post World War II, the dawn of the nuclear era and the onset of Cold War, the emphasis of bureaucracy (headed by McNamara’s Planning, Programming and Budgeting system) replaced traditional military strategy in pursuit of maintaining an economically viable defense establishment and prevent conflicts culminating to a nuclear exchange with either China or the Soviet Union. War became a diplomatic signalling exercise as “neophyte political scientists and systems analysts” and the sole preserve of the president akin to an European “18th century-type army answerable only to the Executive”. The military embraced such ideas as means of bureaucratic survival. Conversely, the application of such conditions was incompatible with the nature of unorthodox warfare (unamenable to quantitative analysis) and the “constitutional requirement for congressional declaration of war”, a political structure that created “impediments to public dissent” . Thus, it may be assumed that the American public will become hostile to a war waged on their behalf (hence the anti-war movement) without permission (congressional authorisation); president Johnson did not pursue an official declaration of war as he approached the problems of Vietnam through the prism of domestic politics and the determination to sustain the …show more content…
Krepinevich. The U.S assumed it could transplant the operational methods that had proved successful in the previous European battle theatres of World War II, an approach seemingly vulnerable to the guerrilla warfare of Vietnamese communist forces. Convoluted policy inhibited the U.S from adopting complementary military tactics, rather continuing offensives against Southern Vietnamese guerrillas served to adjunct a North Vietnamese conventional invasion; it proved to be a “kind of economy of force operation the part of North Vietnam to buy time and wear down superior U.S military forces” . Krepinevich contends that the Vietnam-era American army wrongly adhered the classical army concept - military strategy concentrating on conventional warfare characterised by high volumes of firepower - and thus was unprepared for the insurgency warfare of Indochina as the U.S focused on North Vietnam’s conventional capabilities rather than the principal opponent, the Viet Cong. Krepinevich observes the “United States Army was neither trained nor organised to fight effectively in an insurgency conflict environment” and thus unintentionally attributed to the effectiveness of the “Communist strategy of protracted warfare” . Hence,
One of the key strengths of this book is the author's first-hand knowledge of the people, places, and events that he is writing about. He also supplemented this first-hand knowledge with extensive interviews. In one example, he elaborated on the "chain of command" in Vietnam, which began with General Paul Harkins (and William C. Westmoreland) to the CINCPAC (Admiral Harry Felt) and from CINCPAC to Washington. "Not once in their four years of mutual agony in Vietnam did Harkins's successor, General Westmoreland, pick up the telephone and call his commander-in-chief, President Lyndon B. Johnson. Westmoreland did not have the authority, he told me."(169) This information came directly from an interview with Westmoreland. There are other anecdotes similar to this with each contributing to the extensive nature of the book's detail.
Appy’s book is valuable to its readers in showing how Vietnam became the template for every American war since, from novelties like the invasion of Grenada to the seemingly never-ending conflicts post-9/11. But before all that, there was Vietnam, and, larger lessons aside, Appy’s book is a fascinating, insightful, infuriating and thought-provoking study of that conflict, from its earliest days
The Vietnam War: A Concise International History is a strong book that portrays a vivid picture of both sides of the war. By getting access to new information and using valid sources, Lawrence’s study deserves credibility. After reading this book, a new light and understanding of the Vietnam war exists.
...am War is not just history but the fundamental part of our history. Therefore, it needs to be taken seriously. Only if we take it seriously, can we prevent ourselves from doing the same mistakes again. It also teaches how the war policies and authorities can blind us from the real reason behind the war. It is important to also know the enemy and plan accordingly. One can clearly see that higher technologies can go wrong when accompanied with failed strategies. Most important of the all it makes the readers reconsider their definition of just-war. Most important of all, “Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam” by Christian G. Appy teaches us how education and economic advantages can help us from facing the worst.
Fussell, Paul. "Vietnam." The Bloody Game: An Anthology of Modern War. Ed. Paul Fussell. London: Scribners, 1991. 651-6.
In conclusion, I think that the United States became increasingly involved in the Vietnamese War because of the policies they had made as a promise to fight communism, and because they had sorely underestimated Vietcong’s ability to fight back using Guerrilla warfare. They refused to pull out of the war in fear of losing face before the world, but this pride factor scored them massive losses in the war. In the end, with both side sustaining heavy losses, the US were still seen as mutilators in the war, with advanced showing what their intervention had costed, and Vietnam was still fully taken over by Communism – they had achieved nothing and lost a lot.
Only in the Vietnam War was the United States’ participation criticized. This is such a gigantic change from prior wars that it bears study as to why it happened, and better yet, should have it happened. This paper will discuss the United States’ involvement in the Vietnam War, by asking the simple question, Should have the United States’ gotten involved in the first place? This paper will prove that, in fact, America should not have gotten involved in the Vietnam War. The Vietnam War took place between 1947- 1975.
The Vietnam War was one of the most prolonged wars in US history. Although there were no exact dates, it is believed that US involvement lasted for around 20 years. The US went into this war hoping they could stop the spread of communism and defeat the northern Vietnamese. The battles were like nothing they had seen before and it was very difficult for the soldiers to differentiate between the enemies and civilians. To make it even more difficult for the soldiers, their “information was based on faulty intelligence”. Võ Nguyên Giáp, a northern Vietnamese general, believed that the US and the southern Vietnamese had an unstable relationship. He hoped that through the Tet Offensive the US would believe they were no longer worth defending. Fighting was done using guerrilla warfare which blurred the lines of legitimate and illegitimate killings and this had effect of bringing peoples morales down. Support for the war had always been split but this battle caused even the government to reconsider their involvement. The Tet offensive changed the US's attitude towards the Vietnam war by leading to further anti-war protests, a credibility gap in America, and for President Johnson to negotiate peace and not seek reelection.
He was also a Gulf War veteran who commanded an armored cavalry. His desire in writing this book was to examine, through the recently declassified documents, manuscript collections, and the Joint Chief of Staff official histories, where the responsibility for the Vietnam foreign policy disaster lay, but also examine the decisions made that involved the United States in a war they could not win. This book details the discussion of government policy in the stages of the Vietnam crisis from 1961-July 1965. It examines the main characters of President Lyndon B. Johnson, Robert McNamara, in addition to the military, which included the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It began in the Kennedy era amidst the Bay of Pigs incident and how that led to mistrust of the military planning by advisors and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
“Vietnam: A Mistake of Western Alliance” is not the only piece of writing by Mark Atwood Lawrence about the Vietnam War. He has written two books on the topic: Assuming the Burden: Europe and the American Commitment to War in Vietnam and The Vietnam War: A Concise International History. He has also written other essays about the war and co-edited The First Vietnam War: Colonial Conflict and Cold War Crisis. He received degrees from Stanford and Yale and is a Professor of History at The University of Texas at Austin (Mark Atwood Lawrence).
Anderson, D. (2002). The Columbia guide to the Vietnam War. New York: Columbia University Press.
The North Vietnamese Communist leadership's ability to reassess and adapt during the Vietnam War was reflected in how well they combined guerilla and conventional operations to achieve their strategic goal of unifying Vietnam under communist rule. Throughout the conflict, the Viet Cong (VC) were employed to conduct guerilla operations while North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and VC "main force" units were used to transition to conventional operations. Guerilla operations enabled Hanoi to inflict a steady flow of casualties on US forces which increased anti-war sentiment in America. NVA and VC main force conventional operations reinforced the US Army's conventional approach to the fight which caused the Americans to alienate the people of South Vietnam. By alienating the South Vietnamese people, the Americans enhanced the VC's ability to conduct guerilla operations and control rural population centers which weakened the credibility of the Government of South Vietnam (GVN). The combined effects of guerilla and conventional operations supported the North Vietnamese strategy of a protracted conflict that was sure to weaken the resolve of the United States and eventually defeat the GVN.
Amongst military theorists and practitioners who studied war, its origin and implications, Carl von Clausewitz assumes a place among the most prominent figures. With his book On War, he demonstrated his capability to provide thorough historical analysis and conclusions of the conflicts in which he was engaged, and as a philosopher he reflected about all encompassing aspects of war. Today, Western armies conduct modern warfare in a dynamic environment composed of flexible and multiple threats in which civilians form a substantial part. Studying Clausewitz provides current military and political leadership useful insights to understand twenty-first century warfare. He explains the nature of war, provides an analytical tool to understand the chaos of warfare, and he argues for well educated and adaptable leadership capable of creative thinking. Although he died before his work was complete, his writing style was ambiguous and unclear at some moments, and current technology reduced some of his tactics obsolete, his work still arouses and inspires military and political strategists and analysts.
Willbanks, James H. "The Real History of the Vietnam War." ARMCHAIR GENERAL Nov. 2007: 54-67. SIRS Issues Researcher. Web. 3 Apr. 2014.