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Cross cultural communication challenges
Cross cultural communication challenges
Ways to achieve effective inter-cultural communication
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Leonard Prescott, vice president and general manager of Weaver-Yamazaki Pharmaceutical of Japan, believed that John Higgins, his executive assistant, was losing effectiveness in representing the U.S. parent company because of an extraordinary identification with the Japanese culture.
The parent company, Weaver Pharmaceutical, had extensive international operations and was one of the largest U.S. drug firms. Its competitive position depended heavily on research and development (R&D). Sales activity in Japan started in the early 1930s when Yamazaki Pharmaceutical, a major producer of drugs and chemicals in Japan, began distributing Weaver's products. World War II disrupted sales, but Weaver resumed exporting to Japan in 1948 and subsequently captured a substantial market share. To prepare for increasingly keen competition from Japanese producers, Weaver and Yamazaki established in 1954 a jointly owned and operated manufacturing subsidiary to produce part of Weaver's product line.
Through the combined effort of both parent companies, the subsidiary soon began manufacturing sufficiently broad lines of products to fill the general demands of the Japanese market. Imports from the United States were limited to highly specialized items. The company conducted substantial R&D on its own, coordinated through a joint committee representing both Weaver and Yamazaki to avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts. The subsidiary turned out many new products, some of which were marketed successfully in the United States and elsewhere. Weaver's management considered the Japanese operation to be one of its most successful international ventures and felt that the company's future prospects were promising, especially given the steady improvement in Japan's standard of living.
The subsidiary was headed by Shozo Suzuki who, as executive vice president of Yamazaki and president of several other subsidiaries, limited his participation in Weaver-Yamazaki to determining basic policies. Daily operations were managed by Prescott, assisted by Higgins and several Japanese directors. Although several other Americans were assigned to the venture, they were concerned with R&D and held no overall management responsibilities.
Weaver Pharmaceutical had a policy of moving U.S. personnel from one foreign post to another with occasional tours in the home-office international division. Each such assignment generally lasted for three to five years. There were a limited number of expatriates, so company personnel policy was flexible enough to allow an employee to stay in a country for an indefinite time if desired. A few expatriates had stayed in one foreign post for over ten years.
Prescott replaced the former general manager, who had been in Japan for six years.
Saigusa, O. (2006). Japan's healthcare system and pharmaceutical industry. Journal of Generic Medicines , 4, 23–29.
However, RLK’s competitors are downsizing and outsourcing R&D and exploiting on the cost advantages. If RLK decides to invest more money into R&D and should the new product stall on launch, they face the danger of becoming bankrupt.
his company, John Lin, the CEO and founder of Shang-Wa, approaches Bernard Lester, CEO of Lester Electronics with a serious proposal to form and partnership and expand the business in to a neighboring Asian country. Lester Electronics however, has to decide whether a partnership is the best way to go, or if acquiring Shang-Wa outright would be more beneficial. This paper will go over any issues and opportunities associated with this scenario.
Both companies’ changing strategic postures and organizational capabilities led to the major restructuring each company was forced to undertake as its competitive position was eroded. However, it is extremely difficult to overcome deeply set administrative heritage. Although Matsushita and Philips followed different strategies - classic "global" and "multinational" models respectively, both of them proved to have limitations.
Stewart, Edward C. “The Japanese Culture of Organizational Communication.” In Organization Communication: Emerging Perspectives II. Edited by Lee Thayer. Norwood, N.J.: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1987, pp. 136-182.
Spokane Industries has contracted Franklin Electronics for an 18 month product development contract. Franklin Electronics is new to using project management methodologies and has not been exposed to earned value management methodologies. Even though Franklin and Spokane have worked together in the past, they have mainly used fixed-price contracts with little to no stipulations. For this project, Spokane Industries is requiring Franklin Electronics to use formalized project management methodologies, earned value cost schedules, and schedules for reports and meetings. Since Franklin Electronics had no experience with earned value management, the cost accounting group was trained in the methodology in order to bid for the project.
Assuming success in the original market entry, there is much potential for development, including bringing in more of Innocent’s product range, and expansion to the rest of Japan, which could be the gateway to the rest of Asia.
Weinstein, Andrew. "Japan's Auto Industry ." About JAMA. N.p., n.d. Web. 20 Apr. 2012. .
The company was founded on innovation when Hayakawa set up a small shop to manufacture snap belt buckles of his own design. Three years later, he invented the first mechanical pencil, and business grew rapidly until the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923 wiped out the small factory. When Hayakawa reestablished the business, it was to assemble crystal radio sets that he had reverse engineered from one imported from the U.S.
Tanaka was the right manager who defensed and challenged all challenges and difficulties that faced the company and placed defense above anything else in his management policy. Also, he was the one who can handle the persistence of high-yen environment. Nogawa`s behavior on the yen situation was not enough to solve the crisis, despite he responded to grow the initial and external pressures for internationalization, and gave the approval to establish two important overseas plants. On the other side, Tanaka prevailed in the market, and raised the price above 10%. With that increase Komatsu gained a significant profit.
. . . . although the amount of foreign capital invested directly in Japan from 1899 to 1931 was not large, the impact of this investment on Japan was very great indeed. It is clear that foreign direct investment: first, participated in and stimulated a broad range of business endeavor, often employing advanced methods; second, provided valuable knowledge about western technology and management practice; affected the internal economic geography. (p. 13)
In Japan, supply chain relationships of Toyota are based on a complex system of co-operation and equity interests. Co-operation and asset concentration are encouraged, and antitrust prohibitions are far less restrictive than in the US.
In recent years Paolo de Cesare was very successful at the head of the European and Japanese Max Factor divisions, but the idea of taking the SK-II that was so successful in the Japanese market global is very risky. Up until the 1980's, P&G Japan was only a minor contributor to the P&G international growth. In 1985, Durk Jager found that the key reasons for the failure lied in the fact that they had not recognized the distinctive needs of the Japanese consumer. Over the next four years under his management changes were made to research, advertising and distribution that provided a 270% increase in sales, and Jager assumed the position of group vice president for Asia. However, in the 1990s the business could not keep up with the competitors in the Japanese market. Just as indicated in the article "Philips versus Matsushita," the organization began to be more focused on the structure of the company than the strategy of the company and where it was going. Jager then developed Organization 2005, his strategy in the rapid development and roll out of new products globally, which also involved several management changes. Just as indicated in the article "Philips versus Matsushita," the organization began to be more focused on the structure of the company than the strategy of the company and where it was going. One of the changes in O2005 was the promotion of Paolo de Cesare to head Max Factor Japan and was faced with the dilemma of whether or not the SK-II could break into the global skincare market.
Why is Avon so much more dependent on its foreign operations than on its home (U.S.) operations? (Daniels, 2010)
During the 1990s, Japan has been exposed to one of the most difficult structural transition periods in its post-war history, in terms of social and economic conditions. There have been two major changes: one is a substantial decline in economic growth in real terms, and the other is a changing social structure characterized by the declining birth rate and the ageing population. Under the pressure of changes in the economic environment caused by globalization and innovations in information technology, Japanese business corporations are forced to adapt to the new situation. While companies faced with fierce international competition, it became more critical to understand the basic knowledge of complicated legal, cultural, economic, and social issues. Engaging in international trade also requires attention to international regulations, international business planning, international market research, funding, distribution and other areas that must be considered separately from domestic business issues. The paper suggests some of the basic tools that can apply to solve the problem or to bring the business opportunity to fruition in today's Japanese business environment