The intelligence cycle was developed in order for analysts to grasp fundamental practices of producing an intelligence product . These practices are illustrated as generally five processes, which have been represented in various rotational models. The following paper will introduce a sixth step titled policy and state safety requirements and analyse these six iterative processes correspondingly as, policy and state safety requirements, planning and direction, collection, process and exploitation, analysis and dissemination. This paper will be limited to examining these relationships and observing strengths and weaknesses within these activities, only as they may occur within an intelligence community. Upon examining these relationships, the writer will argue that the key to establishing strengths in efficiency and relevance by using the intelligence cycle, is crucial on interpreting the model as a theoretical guideline from which intelligence systems may build or mirror , as opposed to a realistic step by step process to developing an intelligence product. Theoretical suggestions supporting this argument will form part of the conclusion of this paper.
Six Principle Processes of the Intelligence cycle
Before examining the six processes of the intelligence cycle as they may work within an intelligence community as illustrated above, it is necessary to first understand what their respective functions are meant to carry out. The compartmentalization of the six areas may suggest each process is specialised, may use different methods to reach their goals, or may need varying levels of security clearances . To decipher a starting point within the intelligence cycle, it has been argued that the sole purpose for initiating and m...
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..., also the assessment, checking and processing of intelligence information, submitting it in proposals as appropriate to higher authority...in accordance with decision directives of leading organisers’, Mitrokhin, V. ‘KGB Lexicon: the soviet intelligence officer’s handbook’, Publication, 2002, Great Britain, pp 46.
‘There is widespread agreement to the doctrinal definition of the intelligence cycle’, Grey, D. and Slade, C. ‘Applying the intelligence cycle model to counter terrorism intelligence for homeland security’, European Journal of Scientific Research, Volume 24, No. 4, 2008, pp 2.
Hulnick, A. ‘What’s wrong with the intelligence cycle’, Intelligence and National Security Journal, Routledge Publications, Volume 21, Issue 6, dated 1 December, 2006, pp 961.
Intelligence is the sum of all products and services together within the intelligence cycle model.
Since, as he establishes, leadership’s political priorities were critical to the ultimate decision in the CIA’s actions, the degree to which the CIA actually concentrated on this mission of collection and analysis depended on the perceived threats from the top. Consequently, the actual level of reliable analysis deteriorated as demonstrated by the example of ORE analysists who were “normatively risk averse” and trying to “get it right,” and provide analysis that fit into the view of their leadership. Lacking trust in their analysists’ conclusions, the CIA proved unable to supply reliable intelligence and forge “collaboration and integration.” Rather than addressing institutional problems the CIA developed a pattern that continued throughout its entire history. Even though it refers to the Reagan era, Immerman’s conclusion that in a time of crisis the CIA deemed that they “required a change in leadership more than an institutional adjustment,” could easily apply to any other period. This application of psychology to history while enlightening does detract from the reader’s understanding of a formation of a CIA “culture” that limited its intelligence analysis efficiency. Without this fundamental comprehension of a CIA “culture,” some of Immerman’s later
For the American intelligence community, George Washington is considered the father of intelligence. The introduction of the intelligence concept and its application in some missions during the early days of America helped America’s Founding Fathers to succeed against t...
In order to transform a local police agency into an intelligence-led organization, they go through several steps. The first, after strict training and funding is to task and coordination processes. The second is to make and develop the intelligence products to be used in the operations. Next is to begin the use of standardized training for all the people to be involved. Since some local agencies cannot afford to train every employee in this...
Due to the unique nature of the intelligence field, error of judgments can (and has) had catastrophic consequences. These errors are a result of complex decision making processes involved in the generation of intelligence products, affected by not only training and expertise, but by cognitive factors, particularly bias. The aim of this paper is to identify two different models of decision making (bounded rationality and intuitive decision making), the biases found in both models that affect the final intelligence product, and how these biases can be mitigated in order to avoid intelligence failures or minimise their impact.
Intelligence failure was one of the main reasons why the Tet offensive happened. The allies undergo a failure of intelligence before Tet, a failure that helped plan the stages for changes in the strategies of the US. The four parts of intelligence are crucial in determining the actions of the enemy. The four tasks consist of collection of information, the analysis of the information, the decision to respond to a warning issued in the analytical stage, dissemination of the order to respond to the field co...
About two weeks ago, I went to a discussion with General Michael Hayden at the Commonwealth Club. Hayden is the only person to have served as a director of both the CIA and the NSA. The talk he gave was about “American intelligence in an age of terror,” specifically discussing portions of his new book, which bears the same name. For sake of our discussion, we will focus on only one primary facet of Hayden’s talk--how we should view the role the intelligence community plays in everyday life.
In Robert Baer’s book See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA’s War on Terrorism, he accounts his career in the CIA from the eighties to the late nighties. Through his time, Baer observes a particular relationship between U.S. intelligence agencies and their political masters. Specifically, Washington would direct intelligence resources for political purposes rather than that of gaining intelligence or combatting terrorism. Due to this, Baer through explicit accounts of meetings and conversations among other intelligence officials argues that political disinterest and even misuse of intelligence resources led to failures such as the 1993 TWC bombing, the 1998 U.S.S. Cole incident, and 9/11. As a result, through Baer’s exploits, U.S. intelligence agencies were hindered in its efforts to combat foreign threats due to intelligence operatives and managers either being limited in their capabilities or mismanaged to fulfill political promises rather than intelligence goals.
In this week’s assignment we will be looking at a number of significant issues that are or have confronted the intelligence community in a post 9-11 environment. We will quickly touch on the role the Global War on Terrorism has had on changes to the intelligence community’s position, procedures, and policies along with assessing how the intelligence community has directed it efforts when it comes to dealing with traditional military threats from other countries. It is inarguable that for the large majority of times, change is instituted to make a situation better, or to prevent a bad situation from arising. So too can be said about the countless changes in policy and practices that have affected the intelligence community since 9-11. Retrospectively assessing a few of these polices it can become difficult to see in its totality if they have helped the intelligence community or in a way weakened it.
Lowenthal, Mark M. (2006). Intelligence: From secrets to policy [Third Edition]. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
Probabilistic reasoning is difficult. People prefer to reject ambiguity and demand that concrete predictions be made. However, intelligence is inherently ambiguous. In intelligence forecasting, it is difficult to determine what information constitutes a signal, and what constitutes noise. In “Connecting the Dots: The Paradoxes of Intelligence Reform”, Malcolm Gladwell analyzes several high-profile “intelligence failures”, such as the Yom Kippur War, September 11th, Pearl Harbor, and the Bay of Pigs fiasco, as well as several psychological studies, and comes to the conclusion that: (1) there is no such thing as a perfect intelligence system - all systems require tradeoffs; (2) failures do not constitute the limitations of the intelligence community,
Intelligence is the ability to obtain and use knowledge and skills. Intelligence is what assists humans in thinking rationally, acting purposefully, and adapting to the environment. This is a broad description of intelligence. When it comes to specifying intelligence, there is much debate, especially when it comes to how to measure intelligence. There are IQ tests that produce a single intelligence. However, many argue that these tests are too vague and that these tests do not consider factors that play a role in an individual’s intelligence. While this is true, psychologists have used this test to conduct studies on what affects intelligence levels. Three significant factors that have been studied on and that are believed to
Nedzi (D-Mich.), Luclen N. “Oversight or Overlook: Congress and the US Intelligence Agency.” A Congressman talk to the CIA senior seminar, November 14, 1979, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol18no2/pdf/v18i2a02p.pdf (accessed January 7, 2014).
Tidd, J. M. (2008). From revolution to reform: A brief history of U.S. intelligence. The SAIS
One of the most important steps in the intelligence cycle is deciding who or whom will receive the analyst’s work. This process is called dissemination. Once completed, the intelligence product has to be able to be passed on to those personnel that meet the requirements of dissemination; Right to know, Need to know, Authority to release.
Intelligence by definition is “the ability to acquire and apply knowledge and skills” (Oxford Dictionary, 2014). However, many psychologists argue that there is no standard definition of ‘intelligence’, and there have been many different theories over time as psychologists try to find better ways to define this concept (Boundless 2013). While some believe in a single, general intelligence, others believe that intelligence involves multiple abilities and skills. Another largely debated concept is whether intelligence is genetically determined and fixed, or whether is it open to change, through learning and environmental influence. This is commonly known as the nature vs. nurture debate.