For a Philosophy of the Impersonal
1. Never more than today is the notion of person the unavoidable reference for all discourses, be they philosophical, political, or juridical in nature, that assert the value of human life as such. Leaving aside differences in ideology as well as specifically staked-out theoretical positions, no one doubts the relevance of the category of person or challenges it as the unexamined and incontrovertible presupposition of every possible perspective. This tacit convergence with regard to the category of person is especially obvious in a hotly debated field like bioethics. Truth be told, the debate between Catholics and secularists turns on the precise moment at which a living being can be considered a person (for Catholics, at the moment of conception, for secularists much later), but never on the decisive weight being awarded this attribution of personhood: whether one becomes a person by divine decree or through natural means, awarding personhood still remains the threshold, the decisive means by which a biological material lacking in meaning becomes something intangible. What remains presupposed here, even before other criteria and normative principles come into play, is the absolute ontological predominance, which is to say the incommensurable value added to the personal with respect to what is not: only life that has passed through this symbolic door can be sacred or qualitatively significant, and so can provide the proper personal credentials.
Turning to law, we find the same presupposition at work here, but now reinforced by a more elaborate argumentative apparatus: to be able to legitimately assert what we call subjective rights (at least in the modern juridical conception of righ...
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In the traditional political history of Italy the people outside of the ruling class of the society were rarely studied. Only with the use of social history did the issues of class and gender begin to be debated by scholars. Numerous recent articles have done a great job of analysing particularly men of high status. In this paper I will look at the lower classes of Renaissance Florence. More specifically, I will center my focus on the lives of women during this era, how they were treated and viewed by people of other classes and how women were viewed and treated by men.
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Firstly, Marquis makes clear that we are working under the assumption that the fundamental disagreement present in the abortion debate is whether or not the fetus is a being worthy of being saved, and cites several writers that also believe in this fundamental disagreement to support his case. He then examines this paradigm as it pertains to the abortion argument, with pro-choicers on one side saying that fetuses are not rational actors, and pro-lifers on the other side saying that life begins at conception and making emotional appeals. He writes that the prima facie cases of the pro-choice and anti-abortionist movements are, respectively, that “being a person… gives intrinsic moral worth,” It is only… wrong to take the life of a member of the human community;” “It is always… wrong to take a human life,” and “it is always… wrong to end the life of a baby.” Marquis does not, in actuality, reject the validity of either side’s claims (185).
The purpose of the present paper is to discuss a very interesting piece of art, Fra Filippo Lippi's “Portrait of a woman with a man at a Casement”. I will begin by the analysis of the formal qualities of the painting such as the composition, the color, line, texture, proportion, balance, contrast and rhythm. I will then discuss how the work fits a certain stylistic category. I will demonstrate that the painting reflects the social and cultural trends of the period in which it was created.
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With the ongoing debate and the advancement of technology in determining the viability of a fetus, abortion, the ending of a pregnancy by removing a fertilized egg, has become increasingly controversial. The morality of abortion has caused many to separate into opposite sides of the spectrum, pro-life and pro-choice. The arguments over abortion has stirred a continuous debate between a pro-choice stance such as that presented by the analogical reasoning of Thomson or Glover’s examination of social context and a pro-life position argued by a moral view of personhood by Noonan. The ethical arguments presented by the conflicting views in the abortion debate has caused others to taken into consideration a sociological account visible in Luker’s examinations of world views in order to discover underlying motivations.
The criterion for personhood is widely accepted to consist of consciousness (ability to feel pain), reasoning, self-motivation, communication and self-awareness. When Mary Anne Warren states her ideas on this topic she says that it is not imperative that a person meet all of these requirements, the first two would be sufficient. We can be led to believe then that not all human beings will be considered persons. When we apply this criterion to the human beings around us, it’s obvious that most of us are part of the moral community. Although when this criterion is applied to fetuses, they are merely genetic human beings. Fetuses, because they are genetically human, are not included in the moral community and therefore it is not necessary to treat them as if they have moral rights. (Disputed Moral Issues, p.187). This idea is true because being in the moral community goes hand in hand w...
The existence of deep philosophical disagreement need not be an occasion for alarm or despair; it could, instead, point the way to a fruitful method of proceeding. Thus, a theory of the character and value of rights might be expected at the very minimum to identify certain crucial issues— where philosophers are divided—and then to sketch out the main grounds of the positions taken. What we would be looking for is the crux, the hinge on which the issue turns, so that it might be resolved one way or the other.
It is abundantly clear how Leonardo Bruni feels about the city of Florence. In Panegyric to the City of Florence, he expresses nothing but the highest praise for the city. Every aspect of Florence is backed by a clear reason why it is the best, and there is no other city in the world that can compare. According to Bruni, Florence has extraordinary beauty, architecture, geography, history, government, and people. This, of course, is only one person’s opinion. In the diaries of Buonaccorso Pitti and Gregorio Dati, they too give their opinions on the city of Florence. In general, they do not seem to give Florence the same recognition and praise that Bruni gives.
As Thomson observes, most of the common argument on abortion is to define whether or not a fetus is a person. This type of argument, Thomson believes, does not lead to the conclusion of whether or not abortion is permissible. Therefore, she assumes that a fetus is a person from the moment of conception for sake of her arguments. Since fetus is a person and a person has a right to life, fetus is, then, has a right to life. Rather than arguing for or against the statement, Thomson approaches by evaluating the right to life and criticizing the false implications that one might have on having the right to life.
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With the start of human life unclear, relying on our intuition becomes ineffective; thus leaving that obligation up for debate. Should we grant a full set of moral rights to a fetus on their first trimester as we do a fully developed person of moral standing? The answer is yes. In accordance to Emmanuel Kant’s ethical theory, the act of abortion, in direct violation to the first and second formulation to the categorical imperative, is morally wrong. I defend the human value of a fetus from the moment of conception upon the following Kantian grounds: denying or removing another person’s future of a life cannot be (1) universalized nor (2) is it acting in a way that treats others as ends in themselves.