The philosophy of rights has been a perennial subject of discussion not only because it is embedded in the intellectual tradition and political practices of many countries but also because it exhibits deep divisions of opinion on fundamental matters. Even a cursory survey of the literature on rights since, say, the time of the Second World War would turn up a number of perplexing questions to which widely divergent answers have been given: What are rights? Are rights morally fundamental? Are there any natural rights? Do human rights exist? Are all the things listed in the UN's Universal Declaration (of 1948) truly rights? What are moral rights? Legal rights? Are basic moral rights compatible with utilitarianism? How are rights to be justified? What is the value of rights? Can infants have rights, can fetuses have them, or future generations, or animals? And so on. The existence of deep philosophical disagreement need not be an occasion for alarm or despair; it could, instead, point the way to a fruitful method of proceeding. Thus, a theory of the character and value of rights might be expected at the very minimum to identify certain crucial issues— where philosophers are divided—and then to sketch out the main grounds of the positions taken. What we would be looking for is the crux, the hinge on which the issue turns, so that it might be resolved one way or the other. A theory arises on a body of problems; it has a context and ultimately reflects a limited aim. Theories of rights should be regarded, then, as partial explications or characterizations rooted in an attempt to resolve some particular crucial issue or other. It is tempting, but misleading, to regard the ensuing theories as concerned with the nature of rights; it is muc... ... middle of paper ... ...pute about what rights we have in the absence of a theory of what makes attributions of rights valid. We may be led to the issue also by a philosophical interest in understanding how and why a collection of rights fits together. The job of the kind of theory I am after is to provide a general organizing idea or principle that makes sense of talk of rights and explains how and why certain attributions of rights can be declared valid and others cannot. Since propositions of rights are a pervasive and contested feature of our political practice, the question of what they should be taken to mean is a central problem for political theory. Whether we hold them to be self-evident truths, or nonsense, or fictions, or something else, we cannot avoid taking some view of their sense if we are to give an adequate account or critique of our political principles and institutions.
After the initial remarks, the author presents the four myths by setting out the works of several scholars. Marks identifies the first myth as “The Myth of Presumptive Universality”. She presents Joseph Raz’s views that we have human rights not because we are human, but because those rights simply exist. Raz also claims that the rights that we have adopted are biased and do not respect the cultural diversity of the world. The scholar claims that if rights were truly universal then we should’ve had a higher
Feinberg, J. “ The Nature and Value of Rights.” Journal of Value Inquiry 4(1970): 243
In Lynn Hunt’s Inventing Human Rights novel, she focuses on revealing the various incidents in which the discussion of human rights were created, critiqued and defined. She asks the question, “If equality of rights is so self-evident, then why did this assertion have to be made and why was it only made in specific times and places?” Her question is ideal. Why would something that is allegedly so self evident have to be discussed and debated about when clearly anyone that is a “human being” is entitled to equal rights?
Since the Renaissance of the 15th century, societal views have evolved drastically. One of the largest changes has been the realization of individualism, along with the recognition of inalienable human rights.(UDHR, A.1) This means that all humans are equal, free, and capable of thought; as such, the rights of one individual cannot infringe on another’s at risk of de-humanizing the infringed upon. The fact that humans have a set of natural rights is not contested in society today; the idea of human rights is a societal construction based on normative ethical codes. Human rights are defined from the hegemonic standpoint, using normative ethical values and their application to the interactions of individuals with each other and state bodies. Human rights laws are legislature put in place by the governing body to regulate these interactions.
One of the main reasons why human rights have been put in place is to protect the public life and public space of every individual being. One fundamental characteristic of human rights is that they are equal rights; they are aimed at providing protection to every person in an equal way. These rights have been entrenched through laws that are passed by states and international conventions. Human rights laws have evolved over time, and have been shaped by several factors, including philosophical theories in the past. This paper looks at the theories of two philosophers, Emmanuel Kant and John Stuart Mills, and how their teachings can be used to explain the sources of human rights. Kant’s moral philosophy is very direct in its justification of human rights, especially the ideals of moral autonomy and equality as applied to rational human beings. John Stuart Mills’ theory of utilitarianism also forms a solid basis for human rights, especially his belief that utility is the supreme criterion for judging morality, with justice being subordinate to it. The paper looks at how the two philosophers qualify their teachings as the origins of human rights, and comes to the conclusion that the moral philosophy of Kant is better than that of Mills.
Tasioulas believes that two things that will help explain the criteria for rights lies in possibility and burden. This saying that it is understood that there are cases that interest cannot fulfill duty for many reasons, but it needs to be met at times to let human interests further contribute to human rights. If it is possible to meet the duties needed next you must consider the burden it places on the bearer and on the society as a whole. Tasioulas concludes, “if it can be successfully executed, the interest-based account of human rights promises to make sense of the phenomenon that eluded Wolterstorff: the status of the right-holder as the ultimate source of the moral claim embodied in his rights.” All this to say that there are foundations to human
- These rights are natural rights, petitions, bills of rights, declarations of the rights of man etc.
It depends on positive rights that we do not have against all other persons or groups, rights that arise only because we are joined together with certain others in a political society under strong centralized control. It is only from such a system, and from our fellow members through its institutions, that we can claim a right to democracy, equal citizenship, nondiscrimination, equality of opportunity, and the amelioration through public policy of unfairness in the distribution of social and economic goods (2005, p. 127).
Indeed, human right is never just a legal matter as it also involves moral principles to justify its inalienable and non-transferable status. UDHR preamble states that human right is the “recognition of the inherent dignity”. That means we are entitled to human rights because we have inherent values to be pursued and realized. Human rights are originated in ourselves, but not conferred by law or others. If a society does not recognize those aforementioned justifications, human rights would be unsupported and a...
Throughout societies in history and presently, we can see the employment of two primary forms of rights: positive and negative. The bulk of the following attempts to highlight the differences between the two. The proponents of each will also be discussed.
There is the opportunity to find a middle ground where a Bill of Rights could be introduced confined to certain rights that are suited to judicial judgment over political matters. The rights of individuals are better protected by judges than politicians, who are affected by the desire to keep onside with public sentiment, for the fear of losing power. Judges however are concerned with the rights of individuals.
Simmons, A. John (1992). The Lockean Theory of Rights. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 127.
Rights have been and continue to be violated across the world on both massive and miniscule scales. With rights violations being a constant issue, it is necessary, although it may be difficult, to determine which violations are human rights violations. Two aspects are crucial in this process: universality and paramountcy. Although practicability is also set forth as a criterion by Maurice Cranston, it is not as crucial when determining which acts violate human rights, or when they came into existence. This is due to the fact that when trying to distinguish between rights and human rights, almost all rights, not just specifically human rights, can, in some way, be practicable. For this reason, practicability, for the purpose of this essay, is
The doctrine of human rights were created to protect every single human regardless of race, gender, sex, nationality, sexual orientation and other differences. It is based on human dignity and the belief that no one has the right to take this away from another human being. The doctrine states that every ‘man’ has inalienable rights of equality, but is this true? Are human rights universal? Whether human rights are universal has been debated for decades. There have been individuals and even countries that oppose the idea that human rights are for everybody. This argument shall be investigated in this essay, by: exploring definitions and history on human rights, debating on whether it is universal while providing examples and background information while supporting my hypothesis that human rights should be based on particular cultural values and finally drawing a conclusion.
Rights delineate a space around individuals that must be respected. The study of rights is a struggle to understand how rights may be prioritized, and in what cases the interests of someone may overcome the rights of another. Gewirth and Nagel are both asking whether there are rights which may not be overridden, even in the case where it seems that overriding them would serve some greater common good. They call these rights ‘absolute.’