Weltpolitik: Calculated Policy or Haphazard Folly? A paper examining the question, “Was Germany’s Weltpolitik a violation of the unwritten rules of European Diplomacy? I. Thesis Germany’s Weltpolitik was a clear violation of the status quo and thus the unwritten rules of European diplomacy as Kaiser Wilhelm II ruined Anglo-German relations, spent more than the German economy could handle, and aggressively tested international alliances. II. Bismarck’s Decline The start of Weltpolitik began when Otto von Bismarck ended his absolutist reign as German Chancellor in 1890 . Bismarck’s break with Kaiser Wilhelm II came after a prosperous and powerful term as Chancellor under Kaiser Wilhelm I. In fact, Kaiser Wilhelm II was only on the throne for two years before Bismarck realized their differences were too great and submitted his resignation . After establishing a unified Germany after several continental crises, Bismarck retreated to conservatism and preservation of the established order . Bismarck had isolated a revolutionary France, pinned Russian interests against British policy in the deteriorated Ottoman Empire, and propped up the Austro-Hungarian Empire with the refortified Dual Alliance3. All of these measures were calculated and precisely timed thanks to Bismarck’s uncanny political capabilities. Wilhelm II’s forced dismissal of Bismarck signaled the end of rational negotiations with all the great world powers, but also the beginning of the pursuit to win over the British as a lasting ally3. Bismarck’s successor was a different kind of Chancellor, a man who would share the responsibility of German statesmanship with Kaiser Wilhelm II. A grandson to Queen Victoria of Great Britain, Wilhelm II was not co... ... middle of paper ... ...2003. Feuchtwanger, Edgar. Imperial Germany 1850-1918. London: Routledge, 2001. Menning, Ralph. The Art of the Possible: Documents on Great Power. 1996. Probert, Paul. Our Natural Ally: Anglo-German Relations and the Contradictory agendas of Wilhelmine Socialism, 1897-1900. New York: Berghan Books, 2003. Retallack, James N. Germany in the age of Kaiser Wilhelm II. New York: Macmillan St. Martin's Press, 1996. Rohl, John C. Wilhelm II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Strandmann, H, Geoff Eley, and James N Retallack. Wilhelmism and its legacies; German modernities, Imperialism, and the meanings of reform, 1890-1930. New York: Berghahn Books, 2003. Thackeray, Frank W. Events that changed Germany. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2004. Williamson, D.G. Bismarck and Germany 1862-1890. Essex: Longman Group Limited, 1986.
Hagen W (2012). ‘German History in Modern Times: Four Lives of the Nation’. Published by Cambridge University Press (13 Feb 2012)
...h Austria’s presence. Thus, in the Nikolsburg Armistice, he agreed “to make no annexations in Austria in return for a large cash indemnity and Franz Joseph’s pledge to remove Austria from the German Confederation and whatever political structure Prussia might design to succeed it.” In doing so, Bismarck removed all legitimacy of Austrian presence in Germany. No longer could Austria involve itself in German politics without violating the treaty. As a result, this exclusion would make certain that a “centralized German state under Prussian domination” would come to exist. This war went perfectly for Bismarck, for he was able to achieve all he desired in the outcome. The armistice itself helps to prove that the war was orchestrated intentionally by Bismarck, for he exacted little from his enemy but his ultimate goal – ensuring Prussian supremacy in Germany.
Bismarck believed that Germany should be united under Prussian leadership and that Austria should have nothing to do with Germany. Bismarck was chosen as chancellor by the Prussian king as he had a proven record as a monarchist and had little time for liberal and excessive parliamentary ideas. Bismarck helped his long term plan to unite Germany and to be the ruler by getting in a strong position with the king. The king owned Bismarck a 'favour´ as Bismarck had solved the king´s constitutional crisis. Bismarck played a crucial part in the unification of Germany as he helped to set up the Northern German Confederation after defeating Austria in the second of three wars.
The German nation was born in January 1871 at the Palace of Versailles. Many factors have been noted by historians as to what led to the eventual unification of Germany such as; economic and industrial factors and the role of Otto Von Bismarck. A debate that has emerged over German Unification is whether it was united by ‘coal and iron’ or ‘blood and iron’; this looks at whether economic or political factors were the main driving force behind unification. In this essay I will explore these factors and gain an understanding of how these factors contributed to German Unification and come to a decision as to whether it was a nation unified by economic
Treitschke, Heinrich. “History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century and Historical and Political Writings.” The Human Record. By Alfred J. Andrea and James H. Overfield. Vol. 2. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2011. 2 vols. 292-295.
But Bismarck never actually attached himself to the National Liberal aims, and instead he ‘mainly sought to safeguard the position of the federal states, above all Prussia, and ensure their rights were protected’, so therefore it can be seen that he had planned unification from the outset, thus Bismarck playing a very important role in the unification of Germany. Furthermore his ‘domestic policies were driven by his determination to consolidate the new national state’, once again showing his large impact on the unification of Germany. However it is undeniable that the national liberal movement did play a large and important role in the unification of Germany and the most obvious and clear example of this is that ‘the National Liberals were the most powerful political party in Germany by the end of the unification process’ showing their political power. However, without Bismarck it could be argued that they would not have been able to get their views across but also Bismarck sought unification through war to secure the Germany he supposedly wanted. This is seen as Bismarck knew that ‘an agreement with Austria to divide Germany was always unlikely and that ultimately force would have to decide the issue’, this clearly linking into the Wars of Unification that followed which in the end secured the unification of Germany
The Songerweg emphasizes the particular model of history that Germany, unlike other Western countries, has gone through. Specifically, ‘proponents of this concept emphasize the peculiarities of German history, such as political institutions, social structures, or mentalities and experience, usually in comparison with other Western countries, to demonstrate the unique course of German history’ (Buse & Doerr, 1998, p. 934). Although initially the theory of Sonderweg viewed the characteristics of German historical development as positive, the situation has changed after the World War II. Specifically, in the 19th and early 20th centuries historians applied the Sonderweg model to stress a focus on the role of strong central state and military as the driving force of the development of the country (Buse & Doerr, 1998). In addition to this, historians regarded social reforms in Germany that were made from ‘above’ rather than being the outcomes of revolution to be a positive feature that depicted German state in a favorable way. Finally, the historical school viewed the course of German industrialization and culture as superior to similar processed in the rest of Western European
Many historians in the period 1970 – 2000 attempted to write a complete account of the Weimar republic and very few succeeded, however, E.J Feuchtwanger’s ‘From Weimar to Hitler’ published in 1993 is one of the most successful overviews published. Feuchtwanger excellently examines the high politics of the Weimar re...
In the late 1800s, Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck used different strategical plans in order to gain as much power possible, the majority of the plans consisted of him taking advantage of the different political parties. Bismarck used many traditional political strategies in order to gain the power he craved for, such as creating harsh laws and prohibiting certain beliefs or ideas. Unfortunately, these strategies did not satisfy the people, so Bismarck later started to increase the welfare of the working class, apologized to the Socialists, and did much more to obtain more political strength which eventually created a new conservatism. In an effort to increase political power for the Kaiser, Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck uses liberal and traditional
...to win this continental war, if it was to come to that. They also in turn had the belief that ‘France may panic, and advise peace’. This would have been a diplomatic win in the German’s books. This would have ‘split Russia from France and isolate both without war’. Although this second point was believed to be unlikely by the German’s it still was a happy, and reassuring possibility. Fischer then went on to say that Hollweg told Bulow that any war that was to occur would last at the most three to four months. Hollweg then went on to explain the possibilities of a ‘friendly relationship’ with England, and then through England, a similar friendship with France. He then stated that this would bring forth a triple alliance with England, France, and Germany all extinguishing the existence of Russia, which would easily threaten the civilization of Europe. Fischer then concludes his essay in Hollweg’s address to the Central Committee of the Reichstag at the beginning of October during the ever increasing debate on the unlimited submarine warfare. Fischer states that, “ … this outlines Germany’s real guilt, her constant over-estimation of her own powers, and her misjudgment of realities.”
The focus of this study is the effect that Otto Von Bismarck's leadership and politics had on Pre-World War One tensions in Europe. This study investigates to what extent the actions of Otto Von Bismarck led to World War One. The focus of this study is the period between Bismarck's appointment to Minister President of Prussia on September 23, 1862 and the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war on Serbia on July 28, 1914. Bismarck's earlier career is discussed briefly but only as a method to understand his political attitudes. And similarly, as Bismarck was removed from office in 1890, the only events discussed between 1890 and 1914 will be based off of policies instilled by Bismarck, not those of Wilhelm II.
Fulbrook, Mary. A Concise History of Germany. 2nd ed. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Print.
Berghahn Books. 2000 Germany and the Germans. After the Unification of the. New Revised Edition. John Ardagh.
The alliance system ideated by the German chancellor Otto von Bismarck kept peace in Europe but its main aim was, however, to forestall the possibility that, in the event of war, Germany would have to fight it on two fronts (basically France and Russia). This was achieved by diplomatically isolating France so that its dream of recapturing its lost provinces of Alsace-Lorraine couldn't be fulfilled. This was done by, firstly, the creation of the League of the Three Emperors or Dreikaiserbund. It was first projected as a meeting of the monarchs of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia in 1872 and confirmed the following year, the 22nd of October 1873. Here, the very general and formless agreement was given a more solid form by military agreements promising to help any country attacked by a fourth party. And all this even though that there was mutual rivalry between Russia and Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. This proved to be a concrete way to isolate France for as E. Eyck mentions, "the League ensured that neither Austria-Hungary nor Russia was available as an ally for France". At this point, Bismarck didn't consider Britain as a potential French ally as they had a long history of rivalry. Secondly, in 1887 the Reinsurance Treaty was signed with Russia in which it promised to support Russia's claims to the strait and to remain neutral in the event of war unless it attacked Austria-Hungary, the same with Russia, who promised to remain neutral unless it attacked France.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969. Kitchen, Martin. A History of Modern Germany: 1800-2000. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006. Sprout, Otto.