“Johnson placed his own judgment over that of the overwhelming majority of northern voters, and this was a great error morally and tactically” (Garraty 421). Another mistake of Johnson was his alienation of the Republicans, the dominant party at the time. He consistently failed to cooperate with party leaders and agree on mutual resolutions to urgent problems that necessitated action. Johnsonian Reconstruction avoided the most controversial topic at the time – black rights. Nearly all Republicans, ranging from moder... ... middle of paper ... ...uction era, democracy in the United States was completely unsuccessful, and most of the reason for this failure can be attributed to Andrew Johnson.
The League of Nations had many 'design' weaknesses; with probably the most important and noticeable weakness was the absence of the USA. It was a great shock and disappointment for the rest of the world when the American people voted for a 'policy of isolation', and despite the campaigning of Woodrow Wilson, decided not to join the League of Nations. This can be considered a great weakness because the USA was becoming the most powerful and influential country in the world, and therefore the League would probably be unwilling to make a decision which would go against the USA, and it would also mean that a country inside the League, who had trade sanctions placed upon them would still be free to trade with the USA. The League of Nations also seemed to have a weakness in not accepting Germany in the League when it was first formed. This gave the impression that the League was for the 'winners' of WWI, with Britain and France part of the inner council, and kept the German people bitter and still wanting revenge.
After the treaty of Brest- Litovsk revealed the subordinate position of the Bolshevik regime toward Germany, the situation changed. The nationalists started to realize that Lenin could urge for peace but could not enforce it and that he could preach the liberation of the nationalities but could not help them in their struggle for freedom. Wilson , on the other hand, was the president of the strongest nation on Earth and therefore, the nationalists finally realized that they would have more chances by siding with Wilson instead of Lenin (even though that this meant that they didn’t agree with 80% of what he preached). To show the world that he was willing to go as far as Lenin in the peace quest, Wilson decided to make the “Fourteen Points”. The “Fourteen Points’’ was nothing more than a statement declaring that the WWI was being fought for a moral cause and calling for postwar peace in Europe – changing completely Wilson’s previous statement of “peace without victory’’.
Describing Tsar King Alexander II's Time in Power To a certain extent, Tsar King Alexander II was a false liberator, however from closer examination, it is not clear cut and there are strong arguments to suggest the contrary. The reasons for the view that Alexander was a false liberator are that firstly, the Crimean war saw Britain, France and Turkey dealt an unexpected and resounding defeat to Russia, who until then was regarded as a superpower. This therefore made change and reform inevitable? Secondly, his reforms were limited in scope and therefore did not reform all that was needed to be. Thirdly, and most importantly for the side for false liberation is the fact that Alexander was simply trying to pacify his people.
Within liberal dominated mediums, ‘empire’ continues to be a “dirty word” (Dowd 2009), linked as it is by the American people with the histories of German and Japanese imperial ambitions (Townsend 2009). Cox asserts that self identification with this term is avoided by even more erudite members of society, but that this reality is plainly obvious to outsiders (2004, p230). Whilst the lack of acceptance of the USA as an empire is self evidenced by the very need for this debate, less sound is the assertion that this is in denial to reality. Cox raises the issue of territorial acquisition and magnitude (2004, p230) as qualifiers for empire, making the point as others have (Meinig 1993), that actions like the Louisiana Purchase demonstrate that the USA meets the qualifications of classical definitions of empire.The distinction of classical definitions is needed owing to the current state of uncertainty surrounding what it is that an empire is. Empire, both in print and as an idea, lack... ... middle of paper ... ...k to the far reaching nature of the distinct American empire; global hegemony of the US in areas of finance, education, media and international law; whilst NATO, ANZUS and Israel speak directly to the conciliatory and consolidation efforts of successive, democratically elected US governments.
The endeavour to rid the world of the evil of war and the advancement of the conditions for peace have been developed from the assumption that the interaction of the states, and the way they ought to conduct relations among themselves, are dependent upon the nature of man. Thucydides' "History of the Peloponnesian War" is such a study of international relations. Not a philosophical work, it is considered of great importance within political and philosophical enquiry. In the "History," Thucydides attempts to disclose the underlying causes of the war between Athens and Sparta. He looks beyond the explicit clash of interest and Imperialist gains and endeavours to outline the implicit human motivations of fear, glory, and honour.
Many would argue that the Cold War was simply inevitable due to the opposing ideologies but, there are many things to look at when considering the cause. One must first start at the end of World War II and then look at some important documents that followed; Winston Churchill’s Iron Curtain Speech and Stalin’s response, The Truman Doctrine, and the Marshall Plan. When World War II was ending the United States and the USSR were allies. However, they were not allies because they wanted to support each other out of respect. They were allies because they shared a common enemy and while allies, they were lying and spying on each other creating mistrust.
· He did his best to get on with Stalin and treat the USSR fairly, giving them the benefit of the doubt, to Churchill's annoyance. Stalin Stalin saw things differently to the other two leaders. When he talked about "free elections," he meant something quite different from Roosevelt. He would never have agreed to the election of non-communists in countries occupied by the Red Army, only elections to elect different members of the Communist Party. He had no intention of leaving the USSR open to attack.
They could not help draw comparisons to their own independence from tyranny some 150 years earlier. However, many Americans and especially the politicians in power viewed the Bolsheviks as a threat. They not only disliked their subversive actions and international agenda (to spread the revolution across the globe), but they also felt threatened by the Bolshevik instigation of a separate peace, a fear validated in 1918 with Brest-Litovsk Peace . Reed defended the Bolsheviks by placing them on the same level as the soviets. He declared that it was “absurd” to be in support of the soviets and not support the Bolsheviks .
American isolationist sentiments were fairly pervasive in the early years following World War I. Most Americans unhesitatingly preferred energetic attempts to isolate the nation from active efforts in stabilizing world order. Old Wilsonian internationalists had grown disillusioned with the League of Nation and its ineptness in handling Japanese imperialism in Asia. Moreover, others believed that war and internationalism would only benefit powerful business and corporate interests. Consequently, the Neutrality Acts were designed as legal safeguards to prevent the U.S. from being dragged into the conflict.