What Is Nozick's Argument Against Philosophical Hedonism?

Nozick’s original argument seems biased against philosophical hedonism, despite the deceptive simplicity and innocence of the accompanying syllogism: (P1) If we would want to plug into the experience machine, then pleasure is all that matters to us; (P2) we would want to plug into the experience machine; (C) so, pleasure is all that matters to us. Obviously, we have no need to read Nozick’s paper to presume he concludes that most people would not plug into the machine, and so there must be more to the human experience than mere pleasure simpliciter. I argue that P1 and P2 are incorrect. In fact, they are craftily misleading and mostly irrelevant to the actual question of what matters to a human being, which Nozick obfuscates as the conclusion (a conclusion he intends to disprove): pleasure is all that matters to us. In order to understand this, we must first explore the concept of the machine, and then we might better apprehend why it would not be used, the

Rather, it seems consistent, in terms of evolutionary psychology and the anthropological etiology of human motivations, that declining individuals are likely convinced that time spent in the NEM might cause them to miss arguably better experiences achievable only through the complexities of life in the external world. Voluntary users of the NEM are actively and consciously seeking pleasure, a fact made obvious by the NEM concept and their explicit use of the machine. In both cases, the individuals in question are actively seeking the optimal set of experiences, and the chief difference is found in their preferences for pleasure-experience delivery. In this way, the telos of human motivations may not be pleasure per se, but the delivery vehicle is arguably the pleasurable