What, then, of moral truths? The correspondence theo... ... middle of paper ... ...ll, or is the pragmatist theory correct? Perhaps, then, the pragmatist theory is closest to how humans behave, even if how we behave is not always in accordance with an ultimate truth. In the end, no current definition of truth satisfies me. I even fail to convince myself of my own beliefs on truth; there’s always a contradiction and flaw.
If P is not a basic justified belief , but rather a nonbasic justified belief (meaning that these belief do not need support of other beliefs in order to be deemed true), it would have... ... middle of paper ... ...ss is “made-up” to achieve the desired results. How is one supposed to know which process to use in assessing a belief for reliability and justification if there might be an infinite amount of different processes to choose from? This is a major issue for reliabilists and there is no solution to this problem. Reliabilism appears to be a logical reasoning to why your beliefs might be justified, but without a proper, clear-cut, general theory, how is one supposed to know what processes to employ? And if you have beliefs that fit well with each other and make you to believe you beliefs are justified, then they are in fact justified?
This brings up the question of how one can even know truth. For Descartes, the certain truth is “I think, therefore I am,” which is his first principle. However, even if this is a certain truth, how can we know anything else to be true? More importantly, however, the first rule states that nothing should be accepted that can be called into doubt, or to accept only that which is indubitable. Yet how can anything be indubitable, save perhaps Descartes’ first principle, and even there some may be able to find flaws?
And opinions are dismissal. Just because Clifford doesn’t have any faith, doesn’t mean that he has to tell everyone to not make any decisions without concrete and sufficient evidence. The reason is because people shouldn’t lie to themselves. The man who lies to himself doesn’t understand himself. I think that Clifford did make a mistake in saying that anything without sufficient evidence is considered wrong.
There is a significant difference between knowledge and certainty. If a person is certain that a belief is true, he is fully convinced that it is true; yet it does not mean that he has knowledge. If he is correct about the truth of his belief, then his certainty is simply luck. If he is false, then he made a mistake believing that the believe is true and his certainty is a mistake. In both cases, his certainty does not give rise to knowledge in this paper, I will counter argue why Descartes claim about certainty is necessary for knowledge is wrong because knowledge needs justification, not certainty.
Your moral compass forms an ethical norm, and this is very much an impulsive decision, not one made based on knowledge. Human beings’ belief systems don’t always work according to evidence. Belief is made up of many different factors and many times we can very easily believe something simply because it is embedded in our belief system, with little to no evidence. Blind faith is hard for many. Clifford takes the side of Evidentialism, which is the assertion t hat for a belief to be true knowledge, it must be supported by evidence.
In this paper I will argue that Roderick Chisholm gives a correct solution to the problem of the criterion. The philosophical problem with criterion is that we cannot know the extent of knowledge without knowing criteria, and vice versa. Chisholm approaches the problem of criterion by saying that in order to know whether things are as they seem to be we must have a procedure for recognizing things that are true from things that are false. He then states that to know if the procedure is a good one, we have to know if it really recognizes things that are true from things that are false. From that we cannot know whether it really does succeed unless we already know what things are true and what things are false.
Other will embrace skepticism, the view that we lack knowledge in some fundamental way (Vaughn, 254). Skeptics believe that our beliefs are actually false, because we cannot distinguish wakefulness from asleep. Skeptics will raise the question of relativism as well. Knowledge can be cognitive where the truth depends on what persons or cultures believe (Vaughn, 254). Subjective knowledge is the notion that the right actions are those endorsed by an individual.
Hume On Empiricism The ultimate question that Hume seems to be seeking an answer to is that of why is that we believe what we believe. For most of us the answer is grounded in our own personal experiences and can in no way be justified by a common or worldly assumption. Our pasts, according to Hume, are reliant on some truths which we have justified according to reason, but in being a skeptic reason is hardly a solution for anything concerning our past, present or future. Our reasoning according to causality is slightly inhibited in that Hume suggests that it is not that we are not able to know anything about future events based on past experiences, but rather that we are just not rationally justified in believing those things that we do. We can most certainly make inferences based on causal reasoning, but these inferences have no proofs.
Davidson argues for "the folly of trying to define truth" and claims that Tarski's "accomplishment was accompanied by a proof that truth cannot (given various plausible assumptions) be defined in general" (Davidson, 1996:269). Tarski's plausible assumptions are that his "semantic conception of truth" can be formulated only for formal languages which are not semantically closed. But these assumptions are not so plausible as they seem since it can be shown that if we accept them it is impossible to formulate a theory of truth because the epistemological presuppositions of formal semantics undermine any theory of representation of reality in which our cognitions can be true or false representations (Nesher, 1996). Yet Davidson concludes from Tarski's theory of truth that "there cannot be definition of `For all languages L, and all sentences s in L, s is true in L if and only if ... s ... L'."