The Eighth Summits

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Scaling the Eighth and Ninth Summits: Structure and Decision Making The commercialization of Mount Everest expeditions in the late 20th century marked both great civilian conquest of a once superhuman feat and tremendous loss of life for visiting climbers. Robert Hall and Scott Fischer’s May 1996 trek in particular is memorialized as the “deadliest day” in the Mountain’s history, with five individuals dying during the descent from the summit. Though the tragedy was partially attributable to poor environmental conditions, inflexible division of labor, lack of formalized rules and procedures, and the subsequent group think that arose from communication and agency vacuums were also at fault. Hall and Fischer’s teams were rigidly structured with …show more content…

Because of health risks and low oxygen levels that come with high altitudes, defining rules and charting courses of action for different possible situations while the group is under lower physical and mental pressure is highly valuable. Unfortunately, Fischer lost planning time to logistical complications and would also disrupt the group’s progress by escorting a personal friend back to base camp in lieu of sending a supporting guide or Sherpa (Roberto and Carriogia 5,9). The team forewent the most important rule of descending the summit before early afternoon, with Hall waiting for Hanset till 4:00PM and a specific return time never even specified (Roberto and Carriogia 10). Groups with differentiated elements operating in dynamic environments, such as a dangerous expedition, call for a higher level of formalization to reduce error and maximize efficiency of routine tasks. Where reliance on rules and procedures could reduce flexibility, the task of scaling Everest has few innate structural challenges and derives most of its complexity from idiosyncratic environmental factors. Complications like members needing to descend or weather conditions deteriorating are largely predictable, so standardizing best practices under different scenarios would be both feasible and effective. The party neglected to define absolute rules and acted …show more content…

Lack of intra-team rapport building activities and the expedition leaders’ concentration of both decision making power and communication channels left clients feeling “disconnected” from each other, with Krakauer recalling being “worried a great deal about what the others thought about [him]” and “fretting the possibility of not being accepted by teammates” (Roberto and Carriogia 5,8). Coupled with almost unilateral use of the plural “we” when recounting events, these narratives signal not only limited interpersonal familiarity between the mountaineers that discouraged voicing dissent but also strong group identification and desire to conform. Group think, a tendency for group members to defer to the consensus viewpoint in decision making, subsequently manifests as expedition members fail to voice anxieties about weather conditions, lack of defined turn-around time, and the health of Fischer and Hansen, instead “downplay[ing] intuitions” and “try[ing] not to be too pushy” (Roberto and Carriogia 9,12). Without any insight or feedback from the group, the structural ails of poor role definitions and weak playbooks snowballed where they could have been

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