Summary Of Rene Descartes Dualism

3.1.2 Cartesian’s dualism

The discussion of ‘mind-body’ problem in the work of Rene Descartes involves a complex philosophical system that combines mathematics, psychology and the physical sciences, for example, the use of mathematics by Descartes help him to establish a separation between mind and body. Descartes(1641/1985) suggests that there are “corporeal things” and the ‘intellectual act” (p.55), he asserts that “[corporeal things] in general terms are comprised within the subject-matter of mathematics” (Descartes, 1641/1985, p. 55), those corporeal things according to Descartes have a physical substance and are extended; whereas, by contrast, he maintains that “the mind is not an extended thing” (Descartes, 1641/1985, p. 54), hence

Descartes suggests that there is a gland inside the brain in charge of the ‘interaction between the non-physical and physical substance, he maintains that “from there it radiates through the rest of the body by means of the animal spirits” (Descartes, 1649/1984, p.341). In other words, Descartes suggests that it is in the pineal gland of the brain that both substances interact. But this explanation does not successfully address the problem of interaction; however, although controversial, the Cartesian’s concepts of ideas, mind, material bodies, the Cartesian plane or person, are still very influential notions in philosophy today. P.F. Strawson reacted against the view of a person that results from this Cartesian view, and proposed quite a different sort of

However, although Strawson’s views describe the subject in terms of physical and mental, and this view may present an advance from substance dualism (Strawson suggests that the concept of mind should depend on a material base), it is not clear how the M and P predicates interact. Moreover, he seems to suggest that both are independent: “During a lifetime of a human being, two of these things, one of each kind, are peculiarly intimately related; but the intimacy of their union does not count against or diminish the essential independence of their nature” (Strawson, 1966/1981, p.58), thus can be argued that both predicates have a different ontology; in other words if P-properties are non-physical properties of physical subjects what explains their existence and exactly how do they interact with the