Rational Punishment Philosophy

One of the oldest and most fundamental justifications for punishment is the principle of retribution: predating modern society, the basic system of punishment is embedded in Hebrew Law, emphasizing the idea of an “eye for an eye”. According to this principle, also known as lex talionis, we ought to treat people as they treated others: what people deserve as recipients of punishments is determined by what they do as agents. Yet, this idea of an “eye for an eye” is neither constrained by questions of offender responsibility nor directed at preventing future wrongdoing - offenders under this retributive philosophy simply get what they deserve. But does society have the right to punish, and, more importantly, how does society judge the severity

As society evolved past fundamental penal institutions, the necessity to rationally punish criminals became more and more apparent. Western society realized in the last 150 years that rational punishment correlates directly with economic philosophy: the function of punishment is to have criminals internalize the societal costs of their crimes. Thus the most productive and efficient way to maximize the brevity of societal harm is to inflict similar harm on those who committed the crime in the first place. From this evolved a modern, civilized, version of lex talionis to apply this theory of “economic” justice. Over time, this principle of punishment was subsequently modified to recognize that some offenders who commit similar offenses may be less responsible due to factors outside of their control (e.g., diminished capacity, mental disease or defect, immaturity). Yet, under this retributive theory, punishment should only fit the moral gravity of the crime and, to a lesser extent, the characteristics of the offender or situational

First, the U.S uses strict “moral” retributive sanctions based solely on the nature of the offense (e.g., mandatory sentences for drug trafficking) and is often criticized as being overly rigid, especially in in our modern society that recognize degrees of individual responsibility. Second, the principle of lex talionis has limited applicability; for example, how do you punish acts of drunkenness, drug abuse, adultery, prostitution, and/or traffic violations like speeding? Third, our assumption of proportional punishments (i.e., that punishment should be commensurate or proportional to the moral gravity of the offense) is untenable in most of society because there is often widespread public disagreement on the severity of particular offenses. Under these conditions, a retributive sentencing system that adopts proportional sanctions would be based on the erroneous assumption that there is public consensus in the rankings of the moral gravity of particular types of crime. To further assess the inadequacy of U.S retributive policy let us break down the three concepts just