Nietzsche: The Destruction Of A Philosopher's House

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“If I never loved I never would have cried. I am a rock. I am an island” (Simon). K. is that rock. He lives cautiously, seeking order and logic. K. is removed. Removed from his relationships, his work, the entirety of his life. He runs on “…foresight, prudence, and regularity…” (90) as Nietzsche would tell us of the rational man. We see K’s rationality in his quest for an upper hand on the court, his need to keep up appearances at the bank, and in his constant search for logic. K.’s rationality makes him ignorant of the absurd, and that ignorance becomes the cause of his demise. K. tries to make sense of everything he encounters throughout his trial. Any hint he unearths concerning the Court he builds into his understanding of it. He thinks …show more content…

K. studies the altarpiece and sees an armored knight. “He was leaning on his sword…bare except for a stray blade of grass or two. He seemed to be watching attentively some event…It was surprising that he should stand so still without approaching nearer to it” (Kafka 205). This knight stands apart from the melee, sword bare; tangentially connected but fundamentally uninvolved with the possible action of life. The painting gives us a portrait of K., he stands apart, sword bare. (This bare sword only confirms K.’s assurance of his innocence.) The knight is removed, like the rational man, and therefore like …show more content…

is killed by his own rationality. K.’s mental model demands an explanation for the Court, and without accepting the Court’s authenticity that demand cannot be fulfilled. The only power the Court has over K. is the power he gives to it. K. never truly fights the court, instead he wrestles with it in his mind, ultimately inventing a false logic he then has to follow. When the two men come to execute K., he considers resisting, but ultimately “…realize[s] the futility of resistance” (Kafka 225). His contrived logic says that with two stronger men taking him away, resistance must be futile. So he follows that logic and allows the execution—even encourages it: “He set himself in motion…They suffered him now to lead the way…” (Kafka 225). K.’s rational mind walks him to the executioner’s block. As he dies he thinks “‘Like a dog!’” (Kafka 229) and those words demonstrate the ultimate power he’s given to the Court. His own false logic has demanded his death. K.’s demise is a warning. Kafka creates a canvass with K., his lack of a last name allowing us to project our own experiences onto his form: “In The Trial the hero might have been named Schmidt or Franz Kafka. But he is named Joseph K. He is not Kafka and yet he is Kafka. He is an average European. He is like everybody else” (Camus 129). Kafka uses the canvass of Joseph K., rejecting ignorance of the absurd, and perhaps instructing us to reject that ignorance as well. Kafka, like Nietzsche, warns us against living

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