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Challenger space shuttle
Challenger space shuttle
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Despite strict safety regulations and careful consideration of risks and risk mitigation within engineering, tragic disasters still occur, unfortunately. One such disaster was the explosion of the NASA space shuttle, Challenger. On January 28, 1986, the Challenger disintegrated over the Atlantic Ocean 73 seconds after launch, killing all seven astronauts on board. This catastrophe was caused by the failure of an O-ring seal in the right solid rocket booster at launch. The O-ring failed because it was not designed to withstand unusually cold conditions which occurred on the launch day. Since the solid rocket booster joint was no longer properly sealed after the failure of the O-ring, pressurized burning gas from within the solid rocket motor leaked out to surrounding components where it caused the separation of the right solid rocket booster at the joint attachment and also led to the structural failure of the external tank. The orbiter was broken up by aerodynamic forces. Crew members are believed to have survived the initial breakup of the space shuttle. However, the shuttle did not have an escape system, leaving the crew trapped inside. The violent impact of the crew compartment with the ocean was too forceful to allow any of the crew to survive. …show more content…
The commission found that NASA staff were aware that the contractor’s design of the O-rings contained a potentially catastrophic flaw but failed to address the problem. NASA violated several of its own safety rules and their organizational culture and decision- making processes were key contributors to the accident. The decision- makers also ignored warnings from engineers that they should delay the launch until weather conditions were more
While seated in the Oval Office of the White House, January 28, 1986 President Ronald Reagan delivers his speech The Challenger Disaster hours after the space shuttle The Challenger explodes while in take off. Thousands witnessed this horrifying event live, in person and on television. This mission was very unique, allowing the first civilian to ever be allowed in space during a mission. She was aboard The Challenger as an observer in the NASA Teacher in Space Program. Ironically, nineteen years before this disaster, three astronauts were tragically lost in an accident on the ground.
Sharon Christa Corrigan, best known as Christa McAuliffe, was born on September 2, 1948 in Boston Massachusetts. She died on January 28, 1986 because of the Challenger space shuttle exploding seventy-three seconds after take-off, in Florida. McAuliffe would be the first teacher/civilian in space that was not an astronaut, she would go through training like astronauts do, plan lessons to teach while in space, and would later die in a tragic explosion of the Challenger.
NASA has faced many tragedies during their time; but one can question if two of the tragedies were preventable by changing some critical decisions made by the organization. The investigation board looking at the decisions made for the space shuttle tragedies of the Columbia and Challenger noted that the “loss resulted as much from organizational as from technical failures” (Bolman & Deal, 2008, p. 191). The two space shuttle tragedies were about twenty years apart, they both had technical failures but politics also played a factor in to these two tragedies.
On the morning of January 28, 1986, the Space Shuttle Challenger disintegrated in midair as the nation watched in disbelief and sadness. The cause of the Challenger accident was determined to be a system design failure on one of the shuttle’s solid rocket boosters. Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) are a pair of large solid strap-on rockets that were utilized by NASA during the first two minutes of the Challenger’s Space Shuttle launch. The pair of SRBs was applied to provide an extra liftoff boost for the Space Shuttle during takeoff. Each SRB were located on each side of the external propellant tank of the spacecraft. Once they began to operate, “the boosters separate from the orbiter/external tank, descend on parachutes, and land in the Atlantic Ocean” (Wilson, 2006). NASA would then send ships into the Atlantic Ocean to retrieve the boosters. The boosters were refurbished so they can be used again. According to NASA officials, “the SRBs were the largest solid-fuel rocket motors ever flown, and the first to be used for primary propulsion on human spaceflight missions” (Wilson, 2006).
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The Challenger disaster of 1986 was a shock felt around the country. During liftoff, the shuttle exploded, creating a fireball in the sky. The seven astronauts on board were killed and the shuttle was obliterated. Immediately after the catastrophe, blame was spread to various people who were in charge of creating the shuttle and the parts of the shuttle itself. The Presidential Commission was decisive in blaming the disaster on a faulty O-ring, used to connect the pieces of the craft. On the other hand, Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, in The Golem at Large, believe that blame cannot be isolated to any person or reason of failure. The authors prove that there are too many factors to decide concretely as to why the Challenger exploded. Collins and Pinch do believe that it was the organizational culture of NASA and Morton Thiokol that allowed the disaster. While NASA and Thiokol were deciding whether to launch, there was not a concrete reason to postpone the mission.
On February 1, 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia was lost due to structural failure in the left wing. On take-off, it was reported that a piece of foam insulation surrounding the shuttle fleet's 15-story external fuel tanks fell off of Columbia's tank and struck the shuttle's left wing. Extremely hot gas entered the front of Columbia's left wing just 16 seconds after the orbiter penetrated the hottest part of Earth's atmosphere on re-entry. The shuttle was equipped with hundreds of temperature sensors positioned at strategic locations. The salvaged flight recorded revealed that temperatures started to rise in the left wing leading edge a full minute before any trouble on the shuttle was noted. With a damaged left wing, Columbia started to drag left. The ships' flight control computers fought a losing battle trying to keep Columbia's nose pointed forward.
In 1986, the Challenger crew met at NASA's Kennedy Space Center for countdown training. The crew of this shuttle included two civilians and five astronaut members: “Teacher-in-Space” payload specialist Christa McAuliffe; payload specialist Gregory Jarvis; and astronauts Judith A. Resnik, mission specialist; Dick Scobee, mission commander; Ronald E. McNair, mi...
Rodney Rocha is a NASA engineer and co-chair of Debris Assessment Team (DTS). When possibility of wing damage appeared he requested an additional imagery to obtain more information in order to evaluate the damage. This demonstrates that he actually tried to resolve the issue. However, due to absence of clear organizational responsibilities in NASA those images were never received. Since foam issue was there for years and risk for the flights was estimated as low management decided not to proceed with this request. After learning of management decision Rocha wrote an e-mail there he stated that foam damage could carry grave hazard and have to be addressed. At the same time this e-mail was not send to the management team. Organizational culture at NASA could be described as highly bureaucratic with operations under standard procedures only. Low-end employees like Rocha are afraid to bring any safety-related issues to the management due to delay of the mission. They can be punished for bringing “bad news”. This type of relationship makes it impossible for two-way communication between engineers and managers, which are crucial for decision-making in complex env...
According the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Aircraft Accident Report, determines that the probable cause of the Flight 811 was sudden opening of the forward lower lobe cargo door in flight and subsequent explosive decompression, (NTSB,1989). In figure 1, depicted the damage of Flight 811 when it landed.
The Space Race began when the Soviet Union launched Sputnik into space in 1957. The United States’ answer to this was the Apollo program. While the Apollo program did have successful launches, such as the Apollo 11 launch that landed Americans on the moon, not every launch went as smoothly. Fifty years ago, a disaster occurred that shook the Apollo program to its core. On January 27, 1967, the Apollo 1 command module was consumed by a fire during one of its launch rehearsal tests. This led to the death of three astronauts, Virgil Ivan “Gus” Grissom, Edward Higgins White, and Roger Bruce Chaffee. The fire was caused by a number of factors, most of which were technical. These causes range from the abundance of oxygen in the atmosphere of the
It was on January 28, 1986 at 11:38 A.M. that the shuttle Challenger, NASA flight 51-L, the twenty-fifth shuttle flight, took off. It was the "Teacher in Space" mission. At lift-off, the temperature at ground level was 36° Fahrenheit, which was 15° Fahrenheit cooler than any previous launch by NASA. It was the Challenger's tenth flight. Take-off had been delayed several times. Finally the shuttle had taken off. The shuttle had climbed high in the sky thirty-five seconds after take-off, and it was getting hit by strong winds. The on board computers were making continuous adjustments so the shuttle would stay on course. About eight miles in the air, about seventy-two seconds after take-off, people watched in fear and horror as the shuttle was engulfed by a huge fire ball. All the crew members were killed instantly.
For this assignment we will discuss some theories on organizational change learned during this class and how they relate to the case study of NASA (The Challenger and Columbia Shuttle Disaster). First we will look the images of managing change used by NASA in the case study. Then we will discuss the types of change(s) NASA under took. Next we will look at some of the challenges of change that NASA faced. Next we will discuss some of the resistance to change that NASA dealt with. Then we look at how NASA implemented change. Next we will discuss vision and change and the impact in the case study. Finally we will discuss sustaining change as it relates to the changes implemented by NASA in the case study.
As a result of the investigation of this accident, the Safety Board has made recommendations to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration.
After the accident, a full-scale investigation was launched by the United States National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). It concluded that the accident was caused by metal fatigue exacerbated by crevice corrosion, the corrosion is exacerbated by the salt water and the age of the aircraft was already 19 years old as the plane operated in a salt water environment.