NASA has faced many tragedies during their time; but one can question if two of the tragedies were preventable by changing some critical decisions made by the organization. The investigation board looking at the decisions made for the space shuttle tragedies of the Columbia and Challenger noted that the “loss resulted as much from organizational as from technical failures” (Bolman & Deal, 2008, p. 191). The two space shuttle tragedies were about twenty years apart, they both had technical failures but politics also played a factor in to these two tragedies.
When the Challenger shuttle was set to launch NASA was feeling political pressure to gain congressional support for the space program, to help gain this support the shuttle crew had a high school teacher on board, Christa McAuliffe, and millions of people were excited and tuned into watch. NASA officials were hoping that this new endeavor would help generate funding since the U.S. budget deficit was soaring and they were afraid that their budget could be cut. Technical failure was the reason the shuttle exploding after take-off but this was not the only reason. With pressure mounting, decisions made by NASA and Morton Thiokol Corporation, the contractor who manufactured the piece with the technical failure, put political agendas in front of the technical decisions, which resulted in the tragedy (Bolman & Deal, 2008).
Political Decisions and Strategies
Using the political frame to view organizations involved in both the Challenger and Columbia tragedies help shape the outcome of the investigation board. There are five propositions that summarize the perspective of a political frame: organizations are coalitions, coalition members have enduring differences, important deci...
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...naged conflicts leads to the infighting and destructive power struggle revealed in the Challenger and Columbia cases.” The organizations did not use the potential technical issues conflict as a way to address or solve a problem but instead chose to ignore the conflict, which resulted in the loss of human life.
Conclusion
Examining the political frame of NASA’s coalition during these tragedies, the investigation board questioned if changing decisions could have prevented the loss of lives in the Challenger and Columbia shuttles. The failure of effectively navigate the political framework NASA put political influences above the safety of their astronauts. To prevent future catastrophes NASA needs to map the political terrain by build coalitions based on relationships, focusing on effectively managing conflicts, and properly use the power within its’ organizations.
In July of 1958, President Eisenhower passed the National Aeronautics and Space Act, which established the National Aeronautics and Space Administration as a response to the Soviet Union's launch of Sputnik nine months earlier. That administration, now known worldwide as NASA, has become an icon of space exploration and mankind's accomplishments. Who would have thought that fifty years later, NASA's future would be so uncertain? Congress has recently proposed a bill that would significantly cut funding from the NASA's Constellation program. These budget cuts are unnecessary and are counterproductive to the original idea of the space program.
Many things happened before the challenger exploded into fire. The cost of the space shuttle was around 1.2 billion. (Hanson 26+) To avoid disaster and any troubles, millions of dollars were wasted in attempt to keep the Challenger safe. Many things like Space simulation for failure, computer shut downs, engine failures, and many things along those lines. We all know that it didn't succeed. The Challenger made lift off at Cape Canaveral, Florida. In 1949, this site had been the area where the Air Force tested missiles and missile systems. Many of NASA's shuttles were launched out from here including Gemini and Apollo flights. From 1963 to 1973, the Shuttle site was changed to “Cape Kennedy” in memory of President Kennedy. The Space Shuttle was delayed six days prior to the event, due to rainfall and cold weather exceeding launch regulations. (“Challenger Disaster”). Mil...
Politics or politicking is a game that is more ostensible and reserved for the political arena; however, metaphorically, much of the political discourse can also be found within organizations. Politics in organizations, then, is design for groups to reconcile differences between interests, conflicts, and power (Morgan, 2006). The case study to be analyze (Cutting Back at City Hall) is one that illustrates all three aspects of interests, conflicts, and power as the City of Smithville, the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), the International Association of Firefighters (IAF), and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) deliberate the city’s proposed budget.
With consideration to law enforcement responses at Ruby Ridge and Waco, as a public manager, my takeaway is how critical collaboration is to the successful outcome of a crisis. Both responses had many different moving parts that appeared to function without effective collaboration. Effective collaboration could have provided a vetting capability for decisions. For instance, the rules of engagement revision made by the Federal Bureau of investigation (FBI), at Ruby Ridge, could have prevented the unnecessary death of Vicki Weaver, if the decision required higher authorization for approval.
Lack of authority and direction at NASA: The agency did not have a permanent administrator for almost four months and there was a high turnover rate among the high level management employees.
NASA failed to listen to them and went ahead with the launch witch ultimately led to the death of 7 innocent people. After the accident President Ronald Reagan made the Rogers Commission which is a group made for the investigation of the Challenger accident they found out that NASA “disregarded warnings from engineers about the dangers of launching on such a cold day and had failed to adequately report these technical concerns to their superiors.” Showing that after all the people that were not listened to were right and NASA allowed this to happen.
It’s very hard to say what steps, if any, could have been taken to prevent the Space Shuttle Columbia disaster from occurring. When mankind continues to “push the envelope” in the interest of bettering humanity, there will always be risks. In the manned spaceflight business, we have always had to live with trade-offs. All programs do not carry equal risk nor do they offer the same benefits. The acceptable risk for a given program or operation should be worth the potential benefits to be gained. The goal should be a management system that puts safety first, but not safety at any price. As of Sept 7th, 2003, NASA has ordered extensive factory inspections of wing panels between flights that could add as much as three months to the time it takes to prepare a space shuttle orbiter for launch. NASA does all it can to safely bring its astronauts back to earth, but as stated earlier, risks are expected.
Culture at NASA was converted over time to a culture that combines bureaucratic, cost efficiency and schedule efficiency of the flights. This culture of production reinforced the decisions to continue flights rather than delay while a thorough hazard analysis was conducted. Managers were so focused on reaching their schedule targets that the foam insulation problem did not induce them to shift their attention to safety. It appears that at NASA managers overrule engineers when the organization was under budget and time pressure. In my opinion, high-level managers should avoid making important decisions based on beliefs and instead rely on specialist’s opinion.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), was booming in the late 1960 's because the U.S. invested over 4.5 percent of the Federal Budget (Bolden). Unfortunately, in the recent years the Government has slashed funding for many of NASA’s projects in an attempt to cut back on the deficit and boost the economy. Despite the plummet in NASA 's budget, the program has proved that it 's prominence in the U.S., space programs like NASA continue to face difficulty in increasing its funds. Although, NASA leads Evidently, the government doesn 't think NASA is worth more than 0.47 percent of the federal budget. NASA is being underfunded and its funding should be substantially increased to make ends meet. This trend needs
Management issue was one of the major causes of the space shuttle Columbia disaster in 2003. Inadequate risk assessment and the flaw in organization culture accounted for implementation of the launch despite there were potential risks, resulting the disinfection of obiter.
Before we look at the images of managing change that were present in the NASA case study let us review a few of the key events in this case study. The case study for this assignment looks at Challenger and Columbia NASA space shuttle disasters and the commission findings on the disasters/recommendations. Now with a short review of the case study what image(s) of change are present in the case study? From the case study the changes introduced are images of managing. These changes are both management of control and shaping. As NASA recovered from the 1986 Challenger disaster, it used the classic Fayol characterization of management such as planning, organizing, commanding, coordinating and controlling to correct from the top-down the issues that had caused the Challenger disaster (Palmer Dunford, Akin, pg.24, 2009). NASA approached the changes that need to be enacted as a result of the Challenger and also the Columbia disasters from the change image of a director. NASA ...
...the Chevrolet Corvair was given regulations to correct its safety, and how the public created the creation of NASA. By delving into the way the government reacted to the public outcry for increased safety measures, shows that regulations are correlated with the symbols of certain technologies. By comparison the creation of NASA was the governments response to the blow to the United States prestige. Next, we can witness that the original neglect of the government with the Corvair caused many injuries and increased public attention. Finally, NASA was able to achieve its goal and place a man on the moon to reestablish national prestige, and faith from the public. To conclude, the path to success is littered with obstacles, especially obstacles created by the public, and to fix these obstacles the government must step in, fix these problems, and create uniformity
The Columbia Disaster is one of the most tragic events in space shuttle history. In 2003, space shuttle Columbia broke up as it returned to Earth, killing the seven astronauts. This essay will explain the major causes of Columbia disaster which include technical issue and management issue, and illustrate how pressure impacts engineers work in NASA.
During the time of preparation, NASA administration was very adamant about launching the Challenger because of “economic consideration, political pressures, and scheduling backlogs” (The Engineer, 2006). There were prior missions that were delayed due to various reasons associated with the weather and mechanical factors. Several mechanisms on the Challenger were not as suitable as they should have been due to decisions made during the design process. These decisions were determined by the lack of timely funding during the design and development process of the shuttle. However, when it came to the launch of Challenger, NASA wanted to press fo...
The political frame relies on the assumption that organizations are alliances of unique people and interest groups. The people are unique due to their different views of the world, their morals, faith and activities and the information they have given these characteristics. The political frame also assumes that all key decisions arise from the need to allocate scarce resources such as time, money and information. These scarce resources and differences amongst people are what make conflict the core of organizational dynamics and make power such a crucial asset. Finally, the political frame assumes that all objectives and conclusions are e...