Metaphors in Philosophy

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This paper deals with the question of whether metaphors are sufficient for the fulfillment of philosophical tasks, and, if they are, which cognitive or methodological place metaphors can have within philosophical discourse. We can distinguish three attitudes toward metaphors. First is the general rejection of metaphors in philosophy. Second is the unrestricted affirmation of metaphors as ‘absolute’ and as compensating for metaphysics. This conception will be analyzed critically and shown to be self-contradictory. The third position can be described as the restricted affirmation of using metaphors. According to this view, metaphors can be characterized as-strictly speaking-non-philosophical but extrinsic to constitutive forms in constructing theories. In this view, their function is not to explain, and they cannot be used as arguments. But, often they contain numerous implications with value for innovation, as they can anticipate holistic projections which are not yet fulfilled by theoretical analysis.

This paper deals with the question, of whether the cognitive content of metaphors can be put to use in philosophy, and, if so, what cognitive or methodological place metaphors have within philosophical discourse. Three philosophical attitudes toward metaphors can be distinguished: First, the various arguments for rejection of metaphors in philosophy. Second, the unrestricted affirmation of metaphors, taking "absolute metaphor" as the replacement of metaphysics. The third position can be described as the restricted affirmation of metaphors.

1. The rejection of metaphors in philosophy

The rejection of metaphorical language in philosophy can take any one of five forms: first of all against confounding metaphors and concepts or...

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... of Metaphor, Dordrecht 1994, 23-39; c.f. to the ‘literal view’ Donald Davidson, What metaphors mean, in: Inquiries into truth and interpretation, Oxford 1984, 245-264; see also Stierle, 1975, 152; to avoid the obviously misleading terminus "substitution" I therefore propose a substitution-theory, which might be called "Theory of interactive indication" of metaphor.

(18) "aesthetic" in the sense of "sensuous-(artistic)"; when we mean the adjective to aesthetics-as-theory, we use the construction "aesthetic-theoretical".

(19) See Constanze Peres, Antizipation. Spektrum und Struktur, in: F.Gaede/ C. Peres (Ed.), Antizipation in Kunst und Wissenschaft. Ein interdisziplinäres Erkenntnisproblem und seine Begründung bei Leibniz, Tübingen 1997, 19-33; Pegasus und Einhorn. Antizipation in Kunst und Wissenschaft und ihre Begründung bei Leibniz und Goodman, ibid. 47-72.

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