Mackie?s Arguments Against Objective Values J. L. Mackie makes his position explicit by opening his article "The Subjectivity of Values" with this terse statement: "There are no objective values." Mackie had found recent dialogue in moral philosophy to be fraught with misunderstandings and conflations of various moral positions, so he felt it necessary to rigorously define his position as well as the boundaries of his concerns. Thus his article has two major parts: First, Mackie defines the nature of his moral skepticism, and, second, he defends his position by showing the implausibility of moral realism with a series of arguments. Mackie?s first step in defining his position is to describe its essential features. He believes that there are no objective and independent values in the world, but he believes that statements about moral (and aesthetic) judgments are quite literal in claiming objective facts. Basically, Mackie is an error theorist, so he believes that judgments have a truth value even though there are no possible objective values that could ever make them true. The crux of his position is an ontological view about the absence of objective values. Mackie?s second step in defining his position is to set its boundaries. When he speaks of values, he means not only moral values but any sort of values that may be believed objective, such as aesthetic ones, though his focus is on the moral ones. He also wants to make it clear that he is not setting forth a theory prescribing how to act or how to look for values, which he says is the business of first order ethics. His position concerns second order ethics, which is about the status of values. Importantly, he feels that major philosophical questions have been overlook... ... middle of paper ... ...l of human life. He shows that such a source is susceptible to both of his previous main arguments and feels that his only threat here is a viable theistic doctrine, so he brings no new sort of arguments to the table. However, his defense on this last point is also susceptible to the same weaknesses of his main arguments. It is even possible that he could be right that different people will have different moral responses to the same things yet still all subscribe to the same general goal of life; it is consistent that different means may reach the same end. If objective values were defeated above, it should now be considered whether a general goal of human life can be discerned in an objective manner. Regardless of whether we focus on a convergence of general values or an agreement on the goal of life, in this article Mackie runs roughshod over several open questions.
Nye, Howard. PHIL 250 B1, Winter Term 2014 Lecture Notes – Ethics. University of Alberta.
This paper will evaluate the merits of the argument “Too high for humanity” against the validity the theory Utilitarianism. More specifically we will introduce the argument, Milner’s responses to the argument then analyze the arguments’ structure, validity and soundness.
A second and stronger objection to Mackie’s version of the problem of evil is explained to us using the terms 1st and 2nd order goods and evils. 1st order goods/evils are purely physical. Examples are pleasure and pain, happiness and misery. It is claimed by many theists that 1st order evils such as pain and suffering are necessary for 2nd order goods like courage and charity. However there exists what Mackie calls a “fatal objection” to this claim and that is that along with 2nd order goods there must also exist 2nd order evil...
Finally, in Beckwith’s fourth point, he evaluates the absurd consequences that follow moral relativist’s arguments. In his final critique, Beckwith uses typical philosophical examples that Mother Teresa was morally better than Adolf Hitler, rape is always wrong, and it is wrong to torture babies. Beckwith argues that for anyone to deny these universal claims is seen as absurd, yet it concludes with moral objectivism that there are in fact universally valid moral positions no matter the culture from which those individuals
(1) Schafer, Karl. "Assessor Relativism and the Problem of Moral Disagreement." The Southern Journal of Philosophy 50.4 (2012): 602-20. Web.
However, MacIntyre does not think that a state putting forth such a thin conception of the good can rationally settle competing theories of justice (chapter 17 in After Virtue is devoted to this argument). Just as debates in public morality, such as abortion, cannot be settled rationally by members of society, neither can philosophers or a nation’s citizens settle the debates on justice. Though interesting, the validity of this argument will not be explored here, as the objective of this section is not to carefully examine why MacIntyre thinks the neutralist state fails,
The position that I hold regarding the essay’s question is that I do not believe in an objective morality or in objective moral truths, I believe that all morality is entirely relative and subjective based on cultural norms because moral relativism is the philosophized meaning that right and wrong are not absolute values and that they are personalized based on the individual and the circumstances or cultural orientation. Morality applies within cultures but not across them. Ethical or cultural relativism and the various schools of pragmatism ignore the fact that certain ethical percepts probably grounded in human nature do appear to be universal and ancient, if not eternal. Ethical codes also vary in different societies, economies, and geographies
Utilitarianism is a consequentialist moral theory, meaning the morality of our actions is judged according to the consequences they bring about. According to utilitarianisms, all our actions should promote happiness. For Mill, happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain. In this paper, I will discuss the objection to Utilitarianism that is only fit for a swine, and Mill’s responses to that objection. Those people who reject this moral theory will say utilitarianism does not grant human life enough value compared to that of a pig. Mill gives an effective response and states that humans can and are the only ones that experiences higher pleasures and qualities of life, which make a human's life better than a pig's life.
Although he believes that all beings have worth in and of themselves, Murdy does reject what he refers to as the “Franciscan” view that all types of life are equal. From a contemporary anthropocentric lens, to see the intrinsic value of all creatures does not mean that we as a species shouldn’t also interact with our environment by judging things in terms of instrumental value as well. In this line of thought, Murdy would likely approve of animal testing or the killing of a dangerous strain of bacteria, as while both non-human animals and microbes have undeniable value, these acts would be for the imperative benefit of humans. Here, Murdy expands on classical interpretations of anthropocentrism by not placing humans and nature in opposition to each other, and instead takes into account the complexities of life while still standing by his belief that anthropocentrism is a valid
Brannigan, Jack. The Purpose of Life & the General Theory of Ethics. Nebraska, USA: iUniverse, 2005.
“This is a tough-minded world we’ve got going here, George. A realistic one. But as I said, life can’t be safe. This society is tough-minded, and getting tougher yearly; the future will justify it. We need health. We simply have no room for the incurables, the gene-damaged who degrade the species; we have no time for wasted, useless suffering” (Le Guin 122). Le Guin illuminates the ambition of utilitarianism to reduce suffering for the greatest number of people. The quotation illustrates the harshness of utilitarianism to exclude those who do not conform to society in order to achieve the greatest amount of human pleasure in favor of the majority. The psychiatrist Dr. Haber aspires
J. Mackie in his essay, “The Subjectivity of Values”, geared his audience towards the idea that not all people’s moral values are necessarily the same. Not every person has the same value for certain circumstances, objects or other things which moral values can be applied to. Mackie explains moral values somewhat like this; that they are not necessarily based on behavior alone but that behavior can have some affect within certain values. Not all people that act similar necessarily will have the same values. I see Mackie trying to explain his view as many similar people have similar interests, but at the same time there is always those people who are similar by action but different by mentality and ethics. That is where Mackie drew the difference between the idea people were getting that he was solely basing his ideas off
“A reviewer who wanted to find some fault with this work has hit the truth better, perhaps, than he thought, when he says that no new principle of morality is set forth in it, but only a new formula. But who would think of introducing a new principle of all morality, and making himself as it were the first discoverer of it, just as if all the world before him were ignorant what duty was or had been in thoroughgoing error? But whoever knows of what importance to a mathematician a formula is… will not think that a formula is insignificant and useless which does the same for all duty in general.”
Cahn, Steven M. and Peter Markie, Ethics: History, Theory and Contemporary Issues. 4th Edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Harman, G. (2000). Is there a single true morality?. Explaining value and other essays in moral philosophy (pp. 77-99). Oxford: Clarendon Press ;.