If P is not a basic justified belief , but rather a nonbasic justified belief (meaning that these belief do not need support of other beliefs in order to be deemed true), it would have... ... middle of paper ... ...ss is “made-up” to achieve the desired results. How is one supposed to know which process to use in assessing a belief for reliability and justification if there might be an infinite amount of different processes to choose from? This is a major issue for reliabilists and there is no solution to this problem. Reliabilism appears to be a logical reasoning to why your beliefs might be justified, but without a proper, clear-cut, general theory, how is one supposed to know what processes to employ? And if you have beliefs that fit well with each other and make you to believe you beliefs are justified, then they are in fact justified?
This dilemma is sometimes appealed to as a premise in an argument for the claim that it is irrational to accept each element of an inconsistent set. According to this argument, since our rational acceptances are closed under logical consequences, it must be irrational to Page 2 Rationality and Inconsistent Beliefs 2 accept inconsistent sets. Versions of this argument have recently been offered by Ryan (1996) and Evnine (1999). The preceding sort of argum... ... middle of paper ... ... conjunction is at least as informative as its least informative conjunct will permit us to Page 13 Rationality and Inconsistent Beliefs 13 construct an inconsistent set whose elements are both highly informative, and highly probable. Moreover, any acceptable theory of informativeness will have the consequence that a conjunction is always at least as informative as its least informative conjunct.
As a result, failure ... ... middle of paper ... ...d in the discussion of promise keeping and beneficence, identifiable logical or practical contradictions arise when attempting to universalize morally impermissible maxims (according to the CI). Mill argues that the CI only shows “that the consequences of [the maxims] universal adoption would be such as no one would choose to incur.” This is erroneous for there is no such “choice” available. The logical and practical contradictions that Mill fails to recognize produce an outcome (rejection of the maxim) necessitated by rationality and a free will. It is not that the consequences are unpleasant, but that their production is irrational. Works Cited Christine Korsgaard.
It is important to not only weigh the value of the action but also the mind of the individual preforming the act. If they are forced into doing an act that they genuine did not act upon then he or she should not be held responsible. Ultimately, although his conclusion to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities can be viable in some case, it does not manage to completely shadow the idea of morality state in the Principle and is thus rendered false.
SA, briefly put, is this: "Why should I be moral?" is either a request for a moral reason to be moral or a request for another type of reason (or perhaps a motive) to be moral. In the first case it is absurd; in the second it is unreasonable or in some other way illegitimate.... ... middle of paper ... ...t then, a page later, assumes without argument that altruistic considerations provide everyone with prima facie reasons to act. Understandably, he then treats "Why should I be moral?" as something more complicated than a request for a reason.
Introduction In this essay I shall seek to outline what has come to be referred to as the Humean Theory of Reasons (HTR). I will subsequently go on to discuss the moral implications of HTR, surrounding the incompatibility with notions of moral absolutism and universalism. A possible Korsgaardian response to Hume will then be proposed, suggesting that it may in some cases be irrational to act immorally, but only if one’s actions are not compatible with one’s desired end. I will conclude that the question of whether it is irrational to act immorally gives rise to a number of issues if HTR or a Korsgaardian position is to be accepted. Nevertheless, I argue that each of these is more compelling in its answer than an externalist alternative due to a potential capacity to explain why one acts in a certain way.
Compatibilist like Peter van Inwagen believes that freedom can be present or absent in any situations. One of the famous Consequence Argument on compatibilism is by Peter van Inwagen who says: “If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us. "1 The contradiction here is that human cannot refrain from performing free will.
Next we’ll define “perceptual justification.” Perceptual justification, one of James Pryor’s main interests, is a justification rooted from conscious perceptual experiences. Many philosophers, such as Alvin Goldman, object to this type of justification claiming that perceptual experiences are not always reliable for one to know something. Alternatively, he focuses on the mechanisms responsible for one’s perceptual experiences. The reasoning entailed in perceptual justification can be broken down further to propositional justification and doxastic justification, which includes propositional justification. Propositional justification can be defined when a Subject “S” possesses propositional justification for the belief that some proposition “P” if and only if they have good reason to believe that proposi... ... middle of paper ... ...ate first encounter justification.
Second, it could be unsound: even though the conclusion is entailed by the premises, at least one of the premises is false. INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT A successful inductive argument is an argument whose conclusion is supported by its premises. If the premises are true, the conclusion is likely to be true, but it is still possible that the conclusion is false. So inductive arguments are not described as ‘valid’ or ‘sound’. © Michael Lacewing But they can also go wrong in just two ways.
Mill writes that “… when he begins to deduce from this precept [the universal law test] any of the actual duties on morality, he fails … to show that there would be any contradiction, any logical impossibility, in the adoption by all rational beings of the most outrageously immoral rules of conduct” ( Troyer 97). In defending his own moral theory, Mill gives a similar example to Kant’s, explaining how the principle of utility does not justify lying. Mill writes that “… it would often be expedient … to tell a lie. But inasmuch as the cultivation in ourselves of a sensitive feeling on the subject of veracity is one of the most useful… and inasmuch as any, even unintentional, deviation from truth does that much toward weakening the trustworthiness of human assertion… [a person who lies] acts as one of their own worst enemies” (Troyer 112). Mill’s rejection of lying as right course of action is based on the negative consequences it