The problem of moral motivation is one that, as Scanlon correctly identifies, every competent moral theory must recognise. While chapter 4 of Scanlon's What We Owe to Each Other, `Wrongness and Reasons', is praiseworthy in its extended and subtle inspection of why we should be provided with a satisfactory reason for being morally good, there are elements of this piece that I find difficult to swallow, regardless of the tenacity with which I ruminate; in particular, Scanlon unsatisfactorily addresses the problem of the amoralist in his framework. I feel this is due to an incorrect charaterisation of those `left cold' by morality, and, as a result, Scanlon's conclusions concerning amoralist position are incorrect as a result. This essay hopes to provide a more phenomenologically accurate description of the psychology and sociological footprint of the amoralist.
While it would be customary to begin an essay such as this with an account of what I interpret the term `morality' to mean, permit me to start with an account of a few archetypical conceptions of the amoralist that either float around or are derived from the literature, for it is my hope that, pending an appeal to my position, my formulation of morality will appear far less the creation of a fevered imagination and, moreover, something that could be entertained as tenable.
At first glance it seems to be the case that there are two possible kinds of amoral character: what I will call the Amoral Sceptic and the Amoral Extremist. The Sceptic accepts that there is such a thing as morality and that it may well constitute a set of obligations for other agents, but believes that morality does not provide a good enough (if any) reason to perform their own `obligations'. This i...
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...e, profound and complete appreciation of morality. This constitutes one aspect of the deontological nature of morality; its other deontological aspects can be brought forth (and its previous aspects reinforced) by considering how I construe that one comes to learn about morality: in effect, through a primitive Wittgensteinean language game; what I will call a morality game. The original language game, in its basal form, runs as such
`The language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A is building with building-stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the works ``block'', ``pillar'', ``slab'', ``beam''. A calls them out;---B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call.'
In the Second Essay of On the Genealogy of Morals (titled ““Guilt,” “Bad Conscience,” and the Like”), Nietzsche formulates an interesting conception of the origin and function of guilt feelings and “bad conscience.” Nietzsche’s discussion of this topic is rather sophisticated and includes sub-arguments for the ancient equivalence of the concepts of debt and guilt and the existence of an instinctive joy in cruelty in human beings, as well as a hypothesis concerning the origin of civilization, a critique of Christianity, and a comparison of Christianity to ancient Greek religion. In this essay, I will attempt to distill these arguments to their essential points.
Morality derives from the Latin moralitas meaning, “manner, character, or proper behavior.” In light of this translation, the definition invites the question of what composes “proper behavior” and who defines morality through these behaviors, whether that be God, humanity, or an amalgamation of both. Socrates confronted the moral dilemma in his discourses millennia ago, Plato refined his concepts in his Republic, and leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi would commit their life work to defining and applying the term to political reform. Finally, after so many years, Martin Luther King’s “A Letter from Birmingham Jail” reaches a consensus on the definition of morality, one that weighs the concepts of justice and injustice to describe morality as the
Approximately three hundred years separate the earliest of these works, The Prince, from the most recent, Utilitarianism, and a progression is discernible in the concept of morality over this span. Machiavelli does not mention the word "morality," but his description of the trends and ideals of human political interaction allow for a reasonable deduction of the concept. Locke, too, does not use the word, but he does write of "the standard of right and wrong." In contrast, Mill writes explicitly and extensively of morality in its forms, sources, and obligations. A logical starting point in this examination is a look at their relative views of human nature.
To begin, “On Morality'; is an essay of a woman who travels to Death Valley on an assignment arranged by The American Scholar. “I have been trying to think, because The American Scholar asked me to, in some abstract way about ‘morality,’ a word I distrust more every day….'; Her task is to generate a piece of work on morality, with which she succeeds notably. She is placed in an area where morality and stories run rampant. Several reports are about; each carried by a beer toting chitchat. More importantly, the region that she is in gains her mind; it allows her to see issues of morality as a certain mindset. The idea she provides says, as human beings, we cannot distinguish “what is ‘good’ and what is ‘evil’';. Morality has been so distorted by television and press that the definition within the human conscience is lost. This being the case, the only way to distinguish between good or bad is: all actions are sound as long as they do not hurt another person or persons. This is similar to a widely known essay called “Utilitarianism'; [Morality and the Good Life] by J.S. Mills with which he quotes “… actions are right in the proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.';
Aristotle’s psychological types, as described in “Nichomachean Ethics,” are a categorization of different internal moral characters. These categories are a comprehensive attempt - for ancient philosophy - at identifying which internal psychologies manifest virtuous or morally bad behaviour. His moral categories are somewhat obsolete in a post-modern world, where science and politics are far more developed than in Ancient Greece. However, moral psychological ethics and normative debate still holds a relevant position in the moral undercurrent of society – it is dispersed through legal, political, military and medical activity, in relationships and familial function. It is for this reason, that Immanuel Kant examined a similar issue in “Pure Practical Reason and the Moral Law,” and that it still makes for interesting philosophical discussion.
Taking this to be true, Kaufman argues that there is every reason to believe that on the whole our moral judgments will tend to be true. Furthermore, when we take the moral realist’s argument that morality has a deep connection with human flourishing, there are evolutionary reasons, Kaufman believes, for believing that there is a connection between moral judgments and actions that for the most part promote our well being.
Inwardly examining his own nature, man would prefer to see himself as a virtuously courageous being designed in the image of a divine supernatural force. Not to say that the true nature of man is a complete beast, he does posses, like many other creatures admirable traits. As author Matt Ridley examines the nature of man in his work The Origins of Virtue, both the selfish and altruistic sides of man are explored. Upon making an honest and accurate assessment of his character, it seems evident that man is not such a creature divinely set apart from the trappings of selfishness and immorality. Rather than put man at either extreme it seems more accurate to describe man as a creature whose tendency is to look out for himself first, as a means of survival.
Stocker begins his paper by arguing that modern ethical theories fail because, by and large, they deal only with the reasons and justifications for people’s actions and ignore people’s motivations. This failure to address the role of motivation has led to a form of schizophrenia in an important area of value;22 people are unable to reconcile their motives with the moral justifications for their actions. Stocker highlights the constraints that motives impose on both ethical theory and the ethical life in order to show that only when justifications and motives are in harmony can people lead the good life.
The following analysis deals with the nature and source of evil and whether, given our innate motives and moral obligation, we willingly choose to succumb to our desires or are slaves of our passion. From this argument, I intend to show that our human nature requires that we play into our desires in order to affirm our free will. This is not to say that our desires are necessarily evil, but quite the opposite. In some sense, whatever people actually want has some relative value to them, and that all wanted things contain some good. But given that there are so many such goods and a whole spectrum of varying arrangements among them, that there is no way we can conceive anything as embodying an overall good just because it is to some degree wanted by one or a group of persons. In this light, there arises conflict which can only be resolved by a priority system defined by a code, maybe of moral foundations, which allows us to analyze the complexities of human motivation. I do not intend to set down the boundaries of such a notion, nor do I want to answer whether it benefits one to lead a morally good life, but rather want to find out how the constructs of good and evil affect our freedom to choose.
This notion often comes with “should” or “ought”, grounding those who believe in this morality how to act in different circumstances. Just as Harman points out, grammar to language is what morality to certain actions and attitudes: the inability to draw a demarcation between grammar and non-grammar does not interfere with our understanding of what grammar is. Because there is a specific use of “should” and “ought” that addresses the moral judgments, the idea of morality is something that compels us to make such judgments as what we/audiences should or should not do. For example, when faced with the dilemma of prosecuting his father or not, Euthyphro thinks he should (ought to) prosecute his father because justice is impartial. This use of “should” is a moral statement concerning with his morality. A clearer example of such statement is that “you should not lie to other people”. The existence of such use of language simply suggests that there is something, if not called morality, functions as what we call “morality”. The detailed analysis with philosophy of language is not the concern of this paper, and so I will not go into further semantic discussions of morality.
HIS essay presents the key issues surrounding the concepts of partiality and impartiality in ethical theory. In particular, it argues that the tension between partiality and impartiality has not been resolved. Consequently, it concludes that the request for moral agents to be impartial does demand too much. To achieve this goal, this essay consists of four main parts. The first part gives an overview of the concept of impartiality. The second deals with the necessity of impartiality in consequentialism and deontology. The third deals with the tension between partiality and impartiality (Demandingness Objection). Specifically, how a duty to perform supererogatory acts follows from impartial morality. The fourth and final part refutes positions that maintain that partiality and impartiality have been reconciled. Therefore, it demonstrates that current ethical theories that demand moral agents to behave in a strictly impartial fashion are unreasonable.
Harman, G. (2000). Is there a single true morality?. Explaining value and other essays in moral philosophy (pp. 77-99). Oxford: Clarendon Press ;.
The two concepts of Morality and Immorality can be discussed in many different ways, although Glaucon, brother to Plato and Adeimantus, and apprentice to Socrates takes a unique approach to showing the implications of both notions. Glaucon does this through his three-step argument that challenges Socrates by evaluating the benefits of being an immoral person versus one holding onto their morality. Glaucon’s argument dives into three separate segments, which in result leads to Glaucon’s conclusion that immorality is more beneficial than morality.
In David Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature, he divides the virtues of human beings into two types: natural and artificial. He argues that laws are artificial and a human invention. Therefore, he makes the point that justice is an artificial virtue instead of a natural virtue. He believed that human beings are moral by nature – they were born with some sense of morality and that in order to understand our “moral conceptions,” studying human psychology is the key (Moehler). In this paper, I will argue for Hume’s distinction between the natural and artificial virtues.
When considering morality, worthy to note first is that similar to Christian ethics, morality also embodies a specifically Christian distinction. Studying a master theologian such as St. Thomas Aquinas and gathering modern perspectives from James Keenan, S. J. and David Cloutier serve to build a foundation of the high goal of Christian morality. Morality is a primary goal of the faith community, because it is the vehicle for reaching human fulfillment and happiness. Therefore, great value can be placed on foundations of Christian morality such as the breakdown of law from Aquinas, the cultivation of virtues, the role of conscience in achieving morality, and the subject of sin described by Keenan.