Imperialism In The Vietnam War

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Although the Vietnam War was situated in the sixties, a period defined by a surge of social and political movements for equality and justice, the war proved to be an especially tumultuous moment in this era. In particular, the war solidified widespread distrust in the American government because of the drastic disparities between political rhetoric and reality. The pervasive propaganda in the rhetoric of American politicians created an inaccurate portrayal of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, influencing the imaginations of the American public. Focusing on Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, their rhetoric represents how major politicians and media tended to favor war and violence whilst hiding behind deception and secrecy. A close reading of …show more content…

Without any intent of taking in Vietnam as an American colony, Kennedy was intent on protecting South Vietnamese democracy and American safety. Guided by ideas of anti-communism and the Domino Theory, these factors influenced America’s overwhelming presence in Vietnam, exhibited through imperialist dynamics. As a nation grounded in independence and revolution, American presidents carried this ideology into the sixties. In particular, Kennedy subscribed to the Domino Theory which asserted that when one country fell under communism, others would follow suit in succession, like dominoes (Morgan 134). If South Vietnam fell under communism, other countries in Southeast Asia would then follow suit. As more and more nations fall under communism, that would bode poorly for the United States’ presence as a superpower because losing Vietnam to communism would affect America’s hegemonic influence over countries in the East (Morgan …show more content…

Therefore, when Kennedy and his administration took office in 1960, their imperialist actions prompted the United States to engage in war with North Vietnam in order to protect South Vietnam, an independent nation in the eyes of the United States, from the communist regime of Ho Chi Minh. Kennedy and his technocratic team of advisors, with their pragmatic and rational ideologies, facilitated the transition from a proxy war with the Vietnamese into a real one met with violence, antagonism, and atrocities. From a technocratic standpoint, it was more rational to inflict extensive assaults throughout Vietnam instead of allowing for the communist scare that would have risen if the efforts of North Vietnam were entirely ignored (Morgan 136). From their point of view, ignoring Ho Chi Minh and his communist ways, and consequently allowing for the spread of communism, would be a demonstration of American weakness as a global superpower. In particular, South Vietnam was representative of democracy in Southeast Asia along with Burma, Thailand, India, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia (Kennedy 1956). In an effort to protect communism from spreading all throughout Southeast Asia, Kennedy argued that America had a responsibility to assist South Vietnam in their struggle for independence. Kennedy argues that “American influence has steadily grown” in South Vietnam as French influence declined, claiming

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