The law states that there cannot be separate objects or entities that have all their properties in common. If X equals Y, then everything that is true of X must also be true of Y. In simpler terms, if X has all the same properties of Y, and Y has all the same properties as X, than X and Y are the same object. Using this notion, dualists can argue that the mind and the body are indeed separate entities. The line of reasoning is as follows: Premise one states that a certain feature is not true for any mental states.
Block’s counter example argues for the possibility of two systems to have the same functional states which determines their functional equivalence. In addition to functional equivalence, the two systems have distinguishable mental states. If functionalism is as adequate account of mentality, then functional equivalence entails mental state equivalence. Block argues against the consequent of
Dualism and monism are fundamentally different ideas but attempt to offer the same explanation to the problem of what our personal identity is made of. Both ideas give an interesting perspective but I believe that monism provides the most rational explanation. Dualism is the idea that the mind (i.e. beliefs) and body (i.e., brain) are two distinct things (substances), and could exist (at least theoretically) without each other. An argument for dualism is that P1.
‘Strict identity’ applies when there are two ways to pick out one thing. Two objects cannot be strictly identical. Sensation states are strictly identical to brain states meaning there is just one thing. The same component is being referred to when talking about a type of brain process or the sensation state. Place and Smart argue against... ... middle of paper ... ... believes.
In order for them to be the same thing they need to have the exact same characterizes and features. If they do not process all the same traits and characteristic they are, therefore, not the same. This argument is supported by Leibowitz Law. Some dualists argue that there are characteristic from mental states that brain states do not process. One characteristic that conscious state and brain state do not share is the location.
Property dualism is the view “That mental properties are nonphysical properties arising from, but not reducible to, physical properties,” (Vaughn 224). Essentially, the major flaw with property dualism is similar to substance dualism, that is there is no way of creating nonphysical properties that interact with physical properties (Vaugh 220). All three of these perspectives best mesh with the epistemological view of skepticism, that is “The view that we lack knowledge in some fundamental way,” (Vaughn 317). This is because the three dualism perspectives view the mental and physical as distinct, and skepticism accounts for the lack of knowledge in some areas, like the mental in the three
And when two substances star the attribute, they also must have the same nature. However, if mind and body would have the same attribute then they would indistinguishable since we can only distinguish them with attributes. Therefore, no two or more substances can exist with the same
Still, given the intimate connection between each conscious event (C) and a corresponding empirically observable physiological event (P), what P-C relation could render C empirically unobservable? Some suggest that C is a relation among Ps which is distinguishable because it is multi-realizable; that is, C could have been realized by P2 rather than P1 and still have been the same relation. C might even be a 'self-organizing' process, appropriating and replacing its own material substrata. How can this account explain the empirical unobservability of consciousness? Because the emotions motivating attention direction, partly constitutive of phenomenal states, are executed, not undergone, by organisms.
(Meditations, p. 8-9) We can state the argument schematically to make it easier to work with: (1) If something is true of A that is not true of B then A and B are distinct. (2) Any body, being an extended thing, is divisible, at least in theory. (3) The mind, being immaterial and non-ext... ... middle of paper ... ...these considerations aside, Descartes’ argument from indivisibility is formally fallacious from the outset, however. The argument is intended as an independent proof of mind-body dualism and is only true if the mind is indeed indivisible. Yet, the premise that the mind is not divisible can only be valid if the mind is distinct from matter.
The claim that identity can be vague is best understood as the claim that there can be statements of identity which are indeterminate in truth value. This view gains in attractiveness when the precision of the concept of identity is contrasted with the lack of precision endemic to various criteria of identity. As Sainsbury notes, diachronic artifact identity must surely be governed by principles such as this: "Replacing some, but not too many, parts of an artifact does not destroy it, but leaves the very same artifact". Such principles are vague. How could the identity relation, which they determine, be precise?