IPO Underpricing Analysis

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Although most IPOs are underpriced, the level of underpricing varies across IPOs with different issue characteristics, allocation mechanisms, underwriter reputation, and general financial market conditions. For example, the level of underpricing is reduced for larger IPOs, those underwritten by prestigious investment banks, firms with a longer operating history or more experienced insiders on the board, and those which intend to use the proceeds to repay debt. On the other hand, technology firms, firms backed by venture capital, firms with negative earnings prior to the IPO, or firms that went public during a bull market experience greater underpricing.
There is no a simple theoretical framework that could explain the factors that caused underpricing. Various theoretical models have been developed to explain the initial underpricing of stocks.
One of the most prominent explanation and also with the most empirical support is that IPO underpricing occurs due to the presence of asymmetric information between certain parties in an IPO transaction (explaining the short and long term IPO anomalies in US by RD). The issuing firm, the bank underwriting and marketing the deal, and the investors buying the stock are the key parties to an IPO transaction (Literature 2 pg13). There are two asymmetric models: Winner’s Curse & Principal-Agent Theory and Costly Monitoring.
Winner’s Curse Hypothesis
One of the asymmetric models of underpricing is the winner’s curse hypothesis developed by Rock (1986), which is an application of Akerlof’s (1970) lemons problem (Literature 2 pg13). Lemon problems:footnote. Underpricing arise due to the presence of asymmetric information between informed and uninformed investors. The informed investors can access...

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...tics such as the reputation of underwriters, choice of auditors, board of directors, company’s operating performance, international image of the company, and so on (underpricing in Mauritius).

Ownership Dispersion Hypothesis

Ownership dispersion hypothesis explains that underpricing is used to insure oversubscription of the shares issues. Booth and Chua (1996) and Brennan and Franks (1997) argue that firms have the incentive to underprice shares with the aim to create a diffuse ownership base and improve market liquidity of their shares. Thus ownership structure increases the difficulty for outsiders to challenge the board of management (Mai, T.L. 2011).
Underpriced IPOs generate excess demand and create a large number of small shareholders, this is important because high public participation in the company IPO create barriers on the challenge from outsiders.

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