Greco's Virtue Reliabilism: Sailing Short of Adequacy

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John Greco in, The Nature of Ability and the Purpose of Knowledge, argues that, “...knowledge is a true belief grounded in intellectual ability” (Greco 1). Now, this is categorically a 'virtue reliabilist' or more specifically, an 'agent reliabilist' claim. The purpose of this paper to analyze Greco's virtue reliablism. Moreover, to articulate one strong objection to Greco's view and to argue that Greco's defense of virtue reliablism fails. Specifically, the argument will be made that the newly instantiated 'Sea Race Objection' example effectively refutes Greco's version of virtue reliablism.

Greco's Virtue Reliabilism-
Greco contends that, “... knowledge is true belief grounded in intellectual virtue” (Greco 1). Greco then applies intellectual virtues to abilities, claiming that 'we think of' intellectual virtues as being abilities of the agent who 'knows.' Greco then argues that intellectual virtues are success from abilities, said success is creditable to the agent. Meaning, the agent who has the ability is then deserving of credit. Greco contends that, “[a]s such, knowledge attributions can be understood as credit attributions: when we say that someone knows something we credit them for getting it right. When we deny that someone knows something, we deny them credit for getting things right” (Greco 1-2). In short, the success of the agent is therefore creditable, while the failure of the agent is not. Also, it must be noted that the success of the agent must stem from their ability. The luck of the agent is therefore not creditable, the success must stem directly from the agents' ability, even if the luck of the agent has let them to the truth. Greco clearly contends that knowledge is incompatible with luck (Greco 2). Greco ...

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...being lucky. Muriel winning the race clearly shows how luck and knowledge are compatible.
Instead of Greco's claim that 'we' should credit those with knowledge for getting something right, the Sea Race Objection example shows that luck is creditable and intrinsically tied to other knowledge, how ever vague the connection or 'tightly tied' they may be. If this argument holds, then the backbone of Greco's virtue reliablist claim collapses. A further application of the Sea Race Objection would be that luck is virtious, yet this paper is not making that claim. An objection to the Sea Race Objection example that fits Greco's framework is that knowledge is an achievement, while luck is not. Yet, if Muriel wins the race through luck, that is an achievement made by the lucky. In short, knowledge is compatible with luck. This point will be further examined in future work.

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