Gift Exchange In Health Care

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In the standard neoclassical model, firms should pay market-clearing wages and workers should provide minimum effort at equilibrium. However, in reality, some employers pay more than the market-clearing wage, and workers seemingly invest more effort than necessary. Based on the assumption that wages positively relate to worker effort levels, Akerlof (1982) proposes a gift exchange model to show that some firms are willing to pay workers more than the market-clearing wage to motivate more effort. In other words, the standard gift exchange model predicts that workers increase their effort when they receive high wages and decrease their effort to the minimum required when they receive low wages. In “Putting Behavioral Economics to Work: Testing …show more content…

On the physician’s side, the “gift” given is effort in excess of minimum quality of care; and on the patient’s side, the “gift” given is money in excess of what they should pay in the public sector. Gift exchange is common in the health care system in developing countries, while less common in developed countries with mature and complete health care systems. More importantly, gift exchange not only exists in the health care system, but also exists in many other public sectors. For example, companies and government officials might exchange their “gifts” in order to get more benefits. Specifically, companies might bribe government officials in exchange for licenses or banks might provide loans to selected …show more content…

Since patients only need to pay nominal fees in the public sector and the treatment cost might be expensive in the private sector, patients might provide extra money or benefits to avoid being pushed into the private sector by moonlighters. After receiving extra money from patients, some so-called weak moonlighters might increase their quality of care to the recommended care level in the public sectors while so-called strong moonlighters still choose to only provide minimum quality in the public sector and refer their patients to the private sectors. Therefore, based on the definition of moonlighters proposed by Biglaiser and Ma, we can categorize doctors into three groups: dedicated doctors who always provide recommended quality of care without any incentives offered by patients; weak moonlighters who increase their quality of care after being incentivized by patients; and strong moonlighters who only provide minimum quality of care in the public

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