Functionalism as a form of non-robust physicalism. Lewis argues that “If the concept of pain is the concept of a state that occupies a certain causal role, then whatever state does occupy that role is pain” (Lewis, 1980/1991, p. 230). Hence in the case of humans, crows or Martians, what determines the mental state or the role should be the brain state. For example, if I am in pain, there should be an input; let us say because I touch a hot stove with my hands. This will lead to C-fibers firing (a brain state), and this generates the causal role of pain, and the given outputs: moaning, screams, etc.. But could it be the case that a pain in my back might generate another brain state, not necessarily C-fibers firing? Lewis maintains that “If the state of having neurons hooked up in a certain way and firing in a certain pattern is the state properly apt for causing and being caused, as we materialist think, then the neural state is pain…” (Lewis, 1980/1991, p. 230). This is compatible with Goksan et al. "fMRI reveals neural activity overlap between adult and infant pain” the researchers suggests that there are “20 regions of the brain associated with the experience of pain in adults and 18 in infants” (Goksan et al, 2015),[note for Stephen, I take this from this website, …show more content…
119) In other words, only the physical may be described by causal laws, but if a physical event is described as a mental event there is no causal law, and there are no psychophysical laws that connect the mental with the physical . Davidson, may defend a view of identity theory, but he also argues that it is not possible to reduce the mental states to a physical explanation. In Davidson’s
Davidson argues that there can’t be type-type identities between metal and physical events because: (a) if there were such identities, then there would be lawlike statements relating mental and physical events, and (b) there can be no such lawlike statements. According to Davidson, there can be no lawlike connections between the mental and the physical because of the ‘disparate commitments’ (3) of the two realms. Davidson’s argument for this claim can be schematized very roughly as follows:
When it first appeared on the scene in the philosophy of mind, the concept of supervenience was warmly embraced. Supervenience was thought to capture the idea of dependence without reduction and thus promised to provide a useful framework for discussions of mental causation, phenomenal experience, and, more generally, the relation between the mental and the physical. Since then a great deal has changed. Much careful work has been done to show that philosophical applications of supervenience do not, in fact, achieve what they were thought to. For example, Jaegwon Kim, whose name is closely associated with the concept, has shown convincingly that the standard formulations of supervenience in the philosophy of mind (weak, strong, and global) do not capture the idea of psychophysical dependence. (1) Many philosophers believed that supervenience could express a form of physicalism, but since the concept of dependence is a minimal req...
To be in pain is, for example, is to have one's c-fibres, or more likely a-fibres, firing in the central nervous system; to believe that broccoli will kill you is to have one's B(bk)-fibres firing, and so on.
...equence of the fact that certain happenings in the brain cause both. The physical changes observed in Mary after experiencing color may be the result of these enigmatic occurrences. While interactions with qualia may precede physical changes, it is in violation of Humean philosophy to claim that correlation indicates causation.
In this paper I will present an argument I have found in the Second Analogy for the necessity of presupposing the causal determination of each event. I will begin by briefly describing Robert Paul W...
In David Lewis’ article “An Argument for Identity Theory” Lewis defends the psychoneural identity theory, arguing that mental states or experiences are neural states. In his main argument, he argues that physics can explain the causal relationship between mental states or experiences and physical phenomena. He uses an analogy of a cylindrical combination lock to explain the causal role that mental states play in producing physical phenomena. In order to put the lock into a state of being “unlocked”
Pain is capable of leaving a long lasting effect on ones life and in ones memory. It can literally "change" who "you" are. "You" change according to the input that your nervous system receives and reacts to. Permanent changes can be seen in long-term memories with the manufacturing of new proteins stored in the memory that account for the inputs. Pain can be an extremely powerful input to the nervous system with varying effects that could lay dormant for many years, stored in long-term memory. Several questions that could be posed concerning pain and long term memory involve the I-function. Can the I-function be turned off during a painful experience, but still be stored in long-term memory, able to be recalled later such as under hypnosis? Could pain cause a separation of the I-function from the physical self or a loss of ones sense of self? Many examples of pain can be quickly imagined and recalled from long or short-term memory. Certain types of pain reside deep inside the stored memory in the brain and require a special state of consciousness to bring out those memories. Pain memories associated with various actions such as rape and circumcision have been found to exist in long term memory. These painful experiences at different stages in life are separate in the way that they are remembered and recalled, but both involve feelings later of a physical violation and mental trauma due to the lack of consent.
These patterns occur only with intense stimulation. Because strong and mild stimuli of the same sense modality produce different patterns of neural activity, being hit hard feels painful, but being caressed does not. It suggested that all cutaneous qualities are produced by spatial and temporal patterns of nerve impulses rather than by separate, modality specific transmission routes. Gate control theory of pain states that stimulation by non-noxious input is able to nullify pain.
(Harris, 2012). Look at it like this every single thing in the universe obeys the laws of physics, every single thing in reality obeys the laws of causality, everything that happens is a reaction to a prior action within an exact locality. Your physical body and brain are made entirely of molecules, how these molecules are arranged depends on your jeans and environment. Every choice you make results from molecular based electrical impulses and chemical transmissions between two tangible brain cells all these impulses and transmissions must obey the fundamental laws of physics including the laws of causality. Is it more likely that everything that pops into your head almost magically is a reaction to a reaction that happens
Functionalism is a materialist stance in the philosophy of mind that argues that mental states are purely functional, and thus categorized by their input and output associations and causes, rather than by the physical makeup that constitutes its parts. In this manner, functionalism argues that as long as something operates as a conscious entity, then it is conscious. Block describes functionalism, discusses its inherent dilemmas, and then discusses a more scientifically-driven counter solution called psychofunctionalism and its failings as well. Although Block’s assertions are cogent and well-presented, the psychofunctionalist is able to provide counterarguments to support his viewpoint against Block’s criticisms. I shall argue that though both concepts are not without issue, functionalism appears to satisfy a more acceptable description that philosophers can admit over psychofunctionalism’s chauvinistic disposition that attempts to limit consciousness only to the human race.
In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, David Hume states, “there is not, in any single, particular instance of cause and effect, any thing which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connexion” (Hume, 1993: 41). Hume establishes in section II that all ideas originate from impressions that employ the senses (11). Therefore, in order for there to be an idea of power or “necessary connexion,” there must be impressions of this connection present in single instances of cause and effect; if there are no such impressions, then there cannot be an idea of “necessary connexion” (52). To illustrate his statement, Hume examines four situations: bodies interacting in the world, mind causing actions of the body, mind causing ideas of ideas, and God as the source of power. I will highlight Hume’s reasons and outline his arguments to establish that there is no “connexion” between cause and effect on the basis of single instances.
In regards to identity, Smart believes that sensations and brain processes just so happen to be the same. Referring to sensations and brain processes as identical factors would indicate that one is suggesting that the identity is strict. An example of strict identity is Smart’s use of a metaphor that compares lightning with an electrical discharge, just as sensations equate to brain processes. Smith belief contradicts dualism, which is a concept that refers to the mind and body as two distinct
Physicalism, to further specify, states that everything is dependent upon the physical world, and that there is nothing over and above the physical world. It states that everything can be defined in purely physical terms. This view has many implications, especially within the philosophy of mind, where it stands in stark contrast to dualism which puts the mind above the physical world. This focus on the philosophy of mind is, in part, due to it producing most of the objections that appear against physicalism. Within the philosophy of mind, physicalism states that all mental states can be equated to some physical state. Note that this does not necessarily imply the identity hypothesis, or the idea that a specific mental state is associated with a spe...
The first main argument for physicalism, and in this case identity theory, is the argument of neural dependence. This argument states that if mental states were distinct from physical states then they would not be affected when the brain is damaged or manipulated. Since scientific research and observation have shown that they are, then it is logical to conclude that mental states are not distinct from physical states.
Pain is defined by the International Association for the Study of Pain as "an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage" (1). When pain is described in these terms we can see that pain is a perception, sort of like seeing and hearing. When pain is processed there are a number of brain structures activated, commonly referred to as the "central pain matrix" (2). It may seem irrelevant to delve into pain signal activation in the brain since it is seemi...