Attorney Ms. Dwyer-Jones was arrested for driving under the influence after suffering an alcoholic relapse following her father’s death and an ongoing divorce. The next year, over the course of three months, she was suspended the for failing to register and complete (CLE) credits, yet suspension she continued to practice law. The same month she was arrested for another DUI, possession of a controlled substance and resisting arrest. Shortly after she was arrested for driving near the courthouse with a suspended license and violating the conditions of her parole.
She was detained for suspected DUI and transported to a hospital after she made threats to kill herself. A bench warrant was issued for her non-appearance in court while she was undergoing treatment, and after a court ordered mental evaluation she was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and alcohol
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Rule: Presumably Maine Rule of Professional Conduct (8.4) (b) “Misconduct”. The court stated, “Illegal conduct and incapacitation affecting practice of law,” as the sanction’s basis instead of citing their rules.
Analysis: Because of the multiple arrests, neither the unauthorized practice of law RPC 5.5 nor violating the original suspension RPC 8.4 (l) was cited in her suspension hearing, instead the court looked at her criminal conduct RPC 8.4 (b) and inability to manage her own affairs as an indication that her mental state was not sufficient to continue practicing law.
The court reasoned that if treated it was possible for her to regain the mental capacity to practice law because she had competently practiced without treatment or incurring an ethical complaint for over a decade, however that she was a liability to the public if allowed to continue in a state of mental
On December 7, 2009, Kenneth Dascoli was at the home of his ex-wife with his current girlfirend, his ex-wife’s friend, and Dascoli’s half-brother. Dascoli and his half-brother consumed a significant amount of alcohol when a verbal argument developed. The argument escalated and Dascoli’s brother
The violation was due to the failure to abide by the probation set forth during her first disciplinary action. The nurse was put on five years’ probation in June of 2015. The probation was for DUI, leaving the scene of the accident, being under the influence of methamphetamine, heroin, cocaine, alcohol, morphine,
On June 7th 2008, Sarah May Ward was arrested for the murder of Eli Westlake after she ran him over in a motor vehicle in St. Leonards. Prior to the incident the offender had been driving the wrong way down Christine Lane which was a one way street. Whilst this was occurring she was intoxicated, under the influence of marijuana, valium, and ecstasy and was unlicensed to drive. The victim and his brother who were also intoxicated, where walking down the lane and where nearly hit by the offender. This prompted the victim to throw cheese balls at the car and make a few sarcastic remarks regarding her driving ability. After a brief confrontation between the two parties the victim and his brother turned away and proceeded to walk down Lithgow Street. The offender followed the victim into the street and drove into him while he was crossing a driveway.
Recommendations: It is recommended that our law office regretfully deny service to Ms. Carry based upon the precedent in Kentucky. Based upon the analysis the issue, it is apparent that Ms. Carry would not receive a promising conclusion to her situation. Due to the facts involved and the cases discussed (which are somewhat on point) Ms. Carry does not make a claim in which relief can be granted.
Hylton denies current suicidal ideation, homicidal ideation, and symptoms of psychosis. She reports today she was asked to come in to ADS to sign an authorization of release of information in hopes of finding substance abuse treatment for her legal issues that the court suggested she engage yesterday. Mrs. Hylton yesterday after court, she proceed to consume an unknown amount of alcohol due to feeling stressed over court. Mrs. Hylton reports informing her primary care physician to tell Melanie at ADS she did not feel well and was not going to her weekly Wednesday meeting this afternoon. She states, "I didn't want to go, I was tired and stressed out, I asked my doctor to call for me." She reports being called by therapist Melanie to come in to sign some papers. Mrs. Hylton reports she was under the impression her going to ADS was to aid her in finding a inpatient treatment program for substance abuse. She reports going in to ADS around 2 pm. She denies consuming alcohol before going to the meeting, however reports having "3 cups of acohol" mixed drinks after leaving ADS. Mrs. Hylton states,"I had things to do, I had to make sure my dog, who is older and sickly, I had to make sure she was okay, and I told them I would go tomorrow because I didn't want to go there with no clothes and haven't showered." She reports still smelling like alcohol because she had not showered before going to ADS, after a night of drinking." Mrs. Hylton reports she
...who violated Randy’s rights. With such little evidence from the Plaintiff, and the fact that Caruso is not a medical professional, she was not involved in the making of policies and procedures relating to medical matters. Therefore, Caruso did not act with deliberate indifference and was entitled summary judgment, because Plaintiff Parsons failed to provide sufficient evidence on Caruso.
They reasoned that since Barnett didn’t either argue against the dismissal of negligence claim at the time of its dismissal or include the claim in subsequent revisions, she had no support for her claim that the court had erred in dismissing her claim of negligence. The court also ruled that the language of section 3-108(b) of the Tort Immunity Act meant that complete, unconditional immunity was to be offered if supervision was present. As a result of this interpretation, the issue of if the lifeguards had committed willful and wanton misconduct was rendered irrelevant. Since the issues of material fact raised by the appellant weren’t actually issues of material fact, the Supreme Court affirmed the District and Appellate Court’s motion and subsequent affirmation of summary
Mr. P has a history of DUI’s in his past, which thereby warranted his current arrest. He was pleasant and cooperative during his arrest and was taken into custody without incident. He then was released the next day and was given a court date. Mr. P obtained legal defense and faced the judge with fear of being incarcerated, but was confident that he had a defensible case. The judge thought otherwise, and imposed a harsh sentence of 90-day substance abuse treatment at a correctional facility. Yet, Mr. P was defensive when confronted about his alcohol use and denies that that his drinking and driving is a concern. Furthermore, he rejects this behavior as being harmful to his work environment, other than if he were incarcerated he may lose employment.
1- After heard all the progress and the fails DeLena did before the hearing therapy, social services, and probation, do you believe the court was slight in the recommendation they did at that time?
...ng experts to identify mental health symptoms such as delusions, hallucinations, and identifying if any instances of malingering are present. Evaluating a defendant is essential in understanding whether or not they are capable of following legal proceedings. If an individual is in fact found incompetent, attempts to restore competency are performed through treatments with medication or mental training about legal information that is vital for them to know in their case. It is imperative to acknowledge competency to stand trial cases in the legal system to not only ensure fairness in the courtroom, but offer mentally ill defendants an opportunity to have a lawful trial depending on their psychological state.
Andrea Yates’ life started out completely normal. She graduated number one in her high school class, became a registered nurse for the Anderson Cancer Center in Houston, and met the love of her life and got married. Her life sounds as normal as anyone’s does. Four months after she gave birth to her fourth child, something changed. She tried her first suicide attempt by swallowing 40-50 sleeping pills. She was hospitalized to a psychiatric facility and diagnosed with major depressive disorder. Her doctor’s attempt to medicate her was unsuccessful. She was discharged due to insurance restrictions and according to Charles Patrick Ewing, a forensic psychologist and attorney who wrote the book Insanity, Murder, Madness, and the Law “her family contracted to keep a close eye on the patient.” Several months following her hospitalization, her mental health declined. She lost 13 pounds, had no energy, slept all day, and had memory and conce...
him in a lineup (Neufeld and Scheck). This relates to the wrongful conviction because she
When viewed from a strictly medical, psychological aspect, Andrea Yates medical history indicates that after the birth of her first child, she began to suffer from various forms of depression and suicide attempts. If one only examines the paper trail and doesn’t think beyond what the medical history does or does not indicate, then perhaps, Andrea would be innocent by reason of mental insanity as the 2006 acquittal suggest. However, when viewed form a legal aspect there are several inconstancies that challenge if this former nurse was insane or if she in fact premeditated the murder of her children as well as her acquittal.
Insanity, automatism and diminished responsibility all play a significant role in cases where the defendant’s mind is abnormal while committing a crime. The definition of abnormal will be reviewed in relationship to each defence. In order to identify how these three defences compare and contrast, it is first important to understand their definition and application. The appropriate defence will be used once the facts of the cases have been distinguished and they meet the legal tests. The legal test of insanity is set out in M’Naghten’s Case: “to establish a defence…of insanity it must be clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.” To be specific, the defect of reason arises when the defendant is incapable of exercising normal reasoning. The defect of reason requires instability in reasoning rather than a failure to exercise it at a time when exercise of reason is possible. In the case of R v Clarke, the defendant was clinically depressed and in a moment of absent-mindedness, stole items from a supermarket...
Teff, H. (1998) Liability for Negligently Inflicted Psychiatric Harm: Justifications and Boundaries, The Cambridge Law Journal 57,1, 92