Essay On The Articles Of Confederation Executive Power

After the revolution against Britain, Americans carried a distrust of executive power, which was evident in the states and the national government under the Articles of Confederation. The early Americans knew the abuses that can result from a single, unaccountable authority, and this is exactly why America declared independence. Given this history, it seems only natural that Americans feared an all-powerful executive. This fear was first evident in the states, specifically how power was allocated in the executive and legislature. The power was concentrated in the legislature, and the executive was under the direction and guidance of the legislature. Additionally, in the case of Virginia’s Constitution, all executive functions were subject

Under the Articles of Confederation, the legislative body possessed all authority, but this national authority was very weak. Since the early Americans distrusted the centralized British Government, they were hesitant to model it (Milkis, 5). This loose legislative body under the Articles of Confederation was regarded as a “league of friendship,” where all states had equal representation and they reserved major decisions for the state governments (Milkis, 5). The executive function at this national level was a committee-like group composed of legislators; the legislature would delegate certain representatives to execute certain laws (Milkis, 5). This proved to be a very inefficient and slow process because decisions required deliberation between more than one person and the legislature was not always in session. In sum, this was reflective of America’s distrust of any single executive authority, so the easy answer was to root the executive function in the legislative body where it is more accountable to the

Hamilton lists the ingredients that constitute energy in the executive: unity (a single individual), duration (four years), provision for its support (salary cannot be altered by Congress in the middle of an executive’s term), and competent powers (veto power, pardon capability, ability to make treaties, and ability to appoint executive officers) (Fed. 70). Hamilton seems to derive his ideas from his home state of New York, where the executive is stronger than most executives in other states. Although Hamilton does not seem to have the same fears about executive power that his colleagues in other states have, he does anticipate their objection: can an executive have the powers of a monarch yet also be suitably republican? Hamilton answers, “from the election of the President once in four years by persons immediately chosen by the people for that purpose; and from his being at all times liable to impeachment, trial, dismission from office, incapacity to serve in any other, and to forfeiture of life and estate by subsequent prosecution in the common course of law” (Fed. 77). Hamilton is arguing that the executive, although he may possess equal power to the legislature, he is accountable to the people at all times and is not above the law. Publius completes his argument by saying that a feeble executive will execute laws poorly, which will lead to a bad