Issue The issue is whether Paul can evict George at will i.e. Does George have an interest in the property? Or is he merely a licencee? It is evident that George has no legal interest in the property, as his name is not on the title deed, and the house is registered only in Rose and Paul’s names as joint tenants. Since Rose has died, the legal title now solely belongs to Paul as the Right of Survivorship (‘Jus Accresendi’) applies. Rules/ Principles Equitable interest is when an occupier whose name does not appear on the title deed i.e. appears “off the land register” still have some rights. In law, equity is a concept of fairness, justice and good conscience. Trust is a legal device/ mechanism where the trustee, who is typically …show more content…
Licence is mere permission to be on the land. There are four different types of licences namely- contractual licence, licence by way of estoppel, licence coupled with an interest and lastly bare licence. A contractual licence is the most powerful, and it is a permission to use or occupy land based on an express or implied contract. Licence by way of estoppel is a verbal agreement, which consists of promise, reliance, detriment loss, and unfairness. Estoppel occurs when a party “reasonably relies on the promise of another party, and because of that reliance is injured or damaged.” Licence coupled with an interest is a licence that grants an interest in land or in personal property, i.e. when a person mortgages his house to the bank. Bare licence is the weakest among all four types of licences. Specific to property law, bare licence refers to permission given to a person to enter another’s property for that person’s benefit, and this permission can be retracted at any time. …show more content…
It is highly probable that George’s financial contribution from the sale of his flat has directly increased the value of Paul’s house. [William & Glyns Bank v Boland (1981)] [Lloyds Bank v Rosset (1989)] In the case of William & Glyns Bank v Boland (1981), a husband was the registered sole legal owner of the matrimonial home. His wife had made contributions to the purchase, but she had failed to register her rights in equity as a minor interest. However, the court ruled that her interest in the property was still protected as an overriding interest due to the fact that she had both equitable interest in the property and was also an occupant in the property. In the case of Lloyds Bank v Rosset (1991), Mr Rosset purchased solely in his name a house that needed renovation. Mrs Rosset and the builders shared the work, which started prior to the completion. Mrs Rosset claimed an overriding interest in the house, based on the fact that she had equitable interest and was an actual occupant in the house. However, she had difficulty proving these
Rather, the Court finds and rules that the duty to pay the bi-annual assessment is an equitable servitude. It is the rule in the Commonwealth that a previous grantee's promise to make annual payments connected with land may impose on the granted premises an equitable servitude enforceable against the subsequent owner taking title with actual or constructive notice of the obligation, even where the equitable servitude calls for the payment of money. It is an indisputable fact that Plaintiffs' took title to the Property with full knowledge of the existence of the Association; moreover, they certainly had constructive—if not actual—notice of their obligations to the Association. Therefore, there exists an equitable servitude that requires Plaintiffs to pay the assessments as the previous owners
Tooher, Joycey, ‘Jubilant Jamie and the Elephant Egg: Acquisition of Title by Finding’ (1998) 6 Australian Property Law Journal 117
Downey did in fact falsely place the home on a piece of property that the Graves’ did not own. Their actions were a result of the Graves’ $110,589 damages. The Graves’ were given a full compensation of their damages plus interest and costs. After this conclusion was made, S.E. Downey appealed the decision and claimed there was not enough evidence to prove that the damages originated from negligence. They claimed that the Graves family did not provide enough information based on their property boundaries. S.E. Downey stated that the Graves’ failed to provide further information on the owners of their surrounding neighbors’ properties. They continued to exclaim that they were unaware that the Park owned the property where the home intruded on, and blamed the Graves’ for not providing them with the documents that the Park had authority to not allow construction on that piece of
Gummow and Bell JJ concluded that clause 1 of the Deed signed Rural’s debts and its interests under the loan agreements to Equuscorp. Their Honours observed that the phrase “other remedies for these matters” located in clause 2 assigned a claim in restitution for money had and received . Heydon J agreed with this decision on similar grounds .
Fiduciary duty is the main topic of the case presented. Within this case, a father named Perry Olsen died. His children received his land upon his death. They wanted to sell majority of the land. The land they didn’t sell, they wanted to keep. The children hire a real estate broker from Veil Associates to represent them. The real estate broker first introduced them to Magnus Lindholm, who wanted to buy Perry’s land along with the adjacent land owned by the children. The children had an asking price of 400 dollars per acre. Since Lindholm wanted more land than the children were willing to sell, he asked the children’s real estate broker to introduce him to another landowner Del Rickstrew, who also had land adjacent to Perry’s land. The real estate broker did provide a model contract. As time passes, Rickstrew eventually sold his land to Lindholm for six thousand
Both a licensee and an invitee have the permission by the owner to be on the premises. However, a licensee enters a business or property having no business there. For example if I stop at a gas station to ask for directions or use the restroom. I have no business there or is shopping there. An invitee, enters a business or property, but benefits the owner. For example, I stop at the gas station and buy an item or get gas. I am benefiting the owner because I am purchasing something. An invitee could also be me going to the park because it’s for the community and it’s available for all the public to go there.
Monetary value is however indicative of property as evidenced by Yanner v. Eaton’s example of debt as property. The initial issues in Hoiland v. Brown similarly regard the deliberation of whether a chattel “left in the possession” of another for their “use” constituted a gift or a resulting trust. While the chattel in Hoiland was found to constitute a gift, it can be distinguished from the facts at hand because the claimant satisfied the onus to prove that “there was indicia of a gift.” A contributing factor to this finding was that the chattel had never been in possession of the purchaser. In contract to the fact of this case, Brenda did have possession of the eggs both before and after the purchase. They were put in her cart, paid for and subsequently retained by Brenda. It is only after the eggs were put in Brenda’s car and driven to Wendy’s apartment that the eggs were relinquished from Brenda’s possession into the care of Wendy. When the eggs Brenda purchased were left in the possession of Wendy Brenda gave the impression that they were for her use but, as indicated above, never indicated the intent to transfer full title and beneficial interest to Wendy. Supported by persuasive case law found in Yanner, it seems Brenda’s actions imply that she intends to hold beneficial interest proportionate to her
In JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham , the defendant initially took possession of valuable farming and grazing land pursuant to a license which later expired. After the expiration of the license, Graham was asked to vacate the premises, which he did not. Graham remained on the land and continued to run cattle and cut hay which he was originally permitted to do under the license, however, he also conducted other activities which were not specifically permitted under the license. It was found that legal possession comprises the elements of factual possession and the animus possidendi, and that proof of acts of the user inconsistent with the purpose to which the true owner intends to put the land is unnecessary. The House of Lords found that the Grahams were the lawful owners of the land by adverse possession as Pye failed to take possession of his
Promissory estoppel cases arise from a doctrine of contract law, enabling a damaged party to recover compensation due to consequences of a promise that wasn't kept. Promissory estoppel aids the party who relies on a promise of another party and experiences loss because the promise wasn't honored. The purpose of promissory estoppel was to prevent the promisor from reneging on the promise they made, being unable to claim that the original promise, should not be legally enforced. Promissory estoppel deters the promisor from disputing the promise which the promisee depended on.
As for adverse possession, it can be defined as when a person can acquire legal ownership
Licensing occurs when a firm pays a fee and enters into a licensing agreement giving it the rights to another company's product, resulting in the rights to make or sell that company's product.
If the partnership was found to exist - the application of the three elements of s5 of the Partnership Act 1958 (Vic), two parties carrying on a business in common with a view to profit, there would be joint liability between the two parties of Williams and Goudberg. The main discussion point in this case was whether the “carrying on a business” element was in existence to establish a partnership. Relevant law relied on by the judge(s) in making their decision According to the Partnership Act 1958 (Vic) s5, the judge Maxwell P analysed whether Goudberg and Williams was in a partnership at the period when Williams had a contract with Herniman. S5 includes three elements that need to be satisfied in order for partnership to exist: carrying on business, in common and with a view of profit.
The purpose of enacting The Land Registration Act 2002, was to combat the uncertainties evolved around the previous Act, Land Registration Act 1925 . The need for reforms was highlighted in a report by Law Commission known as Land Registration for the 21st Century: a Conveyancing Revolution . LRA 2002 repealed LRA 1925, not only simplify the law by maintaining an accurate record of all the rights and alongside interests held by others that affect the land, but also to give certainty the basic concepts engrossed by the 1925 Act as it can be very clearly evident that 2002 Act revolves around the original and principle ideas with amendments.
2. Telph and Trespass to land. 2.1 -The facts of both cases in Barker v R and Downing v WIN can clearly show it is very possible that each time that Telph had accessed Mr Ziebell’s land can be construed as trespass to land. Mr Ziebell never gave consent to any licensing agreement for a third party (Telph) to access the land, furthermore it was never an implied or expressed term that Mr Ziebell had any intention for a third party (Telph) to have any dealings on Mr Ziebell’s land.
Victorian Stevedoring & General. Contracting Co Pty Ltd & Meakes v Dignan (1931) 46 CLR 73