The question posed asks whether connectionism provides an alternative to language of thought (LOT) in explaining the way that human cognition works. LOT explains cognition in the form of a mental language comprised of a representational system using symbols with syntactic complexity. These complex symbols must have both a part-hood dependence, where complex representations are formed from simple units, and a semantic requirement, where the meaning of the complex representations resembles the meaning of its parts. The connectionist framework uses artificial neural nets, a system of an interconnected and parallel network of computing units with mutable connection strength, to explain cognition.
I do not believe that connectionism offers a viable alternative to LOT in explaining human cognition as it is unable to guarantee certain cognitive regularities inherent to cognition, namely systematicity. Systematicity is that the ability to produce/understand/think particular sentences is connected to the ability to produce/understand/think other sentences with a related structure. For example, any person capable of understanding the sentence, “Mary loves John” will
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In short, they argue that any proposed cognitive model must guarantee systematicity. Additionally, they argue that for a model to guarantee systematicity, it must have combinatorial syntax and semantics where complex representations are comprised of simpler constituents. If the connectionist model has this syntactically structured representation, it may be able to exhibit systematicity. However, being syntactically structured would make it merely an implementation model of LOT. If the connectionist model is not syntactically structured, then it cannot guarantee systematicity and must be scientifically inadequate. If these premises all follow, connectionism is unable to provide an alternative to
The general point behind the homunculi-head introduces consideration to the possibility of brain functions being done by parts which could not together be conscious. Functionalism requires only similar machine instructions which serve out a set of outputs given a set of inputs. Block’s counter arguments shows such an account of
One of the major differences between humans and animals is our ability to reason and differentiate our actions from our instincts (Barrett, 2011, p. 3). Justin Barrett further explains this distinction in the first chapter of his book, Cognitive Science Religion and Theology. He explains that cognitive science recognizes the uniqueness of the human mind and focuses on explaining the thinking processes that take place(Barrett, 2011, p. 5). This may seem similar to what the field of neuroscience aims to do but, cognitive science is not as interested with the biological functions of the brain. Instead of looking at physical structures Barrett writes, that cognitive science focuses on broader processes such as perception, attention, memory, reasoning and learning (Barrett, 2011, p. 7). All of these processes interact with each other to create the big questions asked in cognitive science. Some of these big underlying questions of cognitive science are explored in this first chapter, questions such as “What is innate?” or “How are mind and bodies
... ha, I will say, this is just my point. Our brain does not simply receive input strings, process them, and output strings, there is a very specific and nonrandom association going on that is based on the motivations and inclinations at that time. In other words, it is directly influenced by those hormonal levels, which Bridgeman is so eager to disregard. For instance, I may think, “yum, a banana tastes very good,” because I am hungry right then. At another moment, I might refer to a visual representation of the banana, because I am painting a still life, and banana will do well for my composition. So in turn my fourth point would be that understanding is hormonal and motivational specific, changing, perhaps even from moment to moment. In summary, I feel computational understanding can be achieved at a secondary level, but the primary motivations are lacking.
Wessinger, C.M., Clapham, E. (2009) Cognitive Neuroscience: An Overview , Encylopedia of Neuroscience. 12(4) 1117-1122.
McCloskey, M. & Glucksberg, S. (1979). Decision processes in verifying category membership statements: Implications for models of semantic memory. Cognitive Psychology, 11(1), 1-37.
Firstly, I will outline the article 'On Denoting' giving my own understanding of the theory of descriptions as Russell introduces it. It should be noted that the phrase 'theory of descriptions' is not used in this article, but is coined later in Russell's philosophy.
Functionalism is a materialist stance in the philosophy of mind that argues that mental states are purely functional, and thus categorized by their input and output associations and causes, rather than by the physical makeup that constitutes its parts. In this manner, functionalism argues that as long as something operates as a conscious entity, then it is conscious. Block describes functionalism, discusses its inherent dilemmas, and then discusses a more scientifically-driven counter solution called psychofunctionalism and its failings as well. Although Block’s assertions are cogent and well-presented, the psychofunctionalist is able to provide counterarguments to support his viewpoint against Block’s criticisms. I shall argue that though both concepts are not without issue, functionalism appears to satisfy a more acceptable description that philosophers can admit over psychofunctionalism’s chauvinistic disposition that attempts to limit consciousness only to the human race.
The modern field of cognitive science combines research from fields such as computer science, psychology, linguistics, and neuroscience in order to study the processes of the mind. Using a framework of representational structures and operational procedures, cognitive science has been able to make significant contributions to the study of cognition and information processing. This interdisciplinary approach has been so successful that its application has been extended to areas like metaphysics, which was once considered to be outside the realm of empirical study; theorists hope that cognitive science may provide insight into questions related to the fundamental nature of existence, such as the debate between free will and determinism.
For years philosophers have enquired into the nature of the mind, and specifically the mysteries of intelligence and consciousness. (O’Brien 2017) One of these mysteries is how a material object, the brain, can produce thoughts and rational reasoning. The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) was devised in response to this problem, and suggests that the brain is quite literally a computer, and that thinking is essentially computation. (BOOK) This idea was first theorised by philosopher Hilary Putnam, but was later developed by Jerry Fodor, and continues to be further investigated today as cognitive science, modern computers, and artificial intelligence continue to advance. [REF] Computer processing machines ‘think’ by recognising information
The key assumption of cognitivism is that people have different mental states, each of which can lead to a different response. The manipulation of these different states can be described in terms of algorithms, all of which have become the defining paradigm of psychology (Sperry 1993). One major contribution that cognitivism had on the study of psychology as a science came in the form of psychological theories. It returned the conditioning theory as well as comparative psychology back to a position where they recognized the there were a number of qualitative differences between the psychological processing of humans and animals (Greenwood, 1999). This is as a result of the empirical problems faced by the behaviourists, in which the overestimated the ability of the conditioning theory and presumed that it enabled us to explain every form of behaviour, including complex ones such as language, in humans and animals....
High level symbolic thought and the formation of equivalence classes, groups of objects that differ in some ways but are the same or very similar in others, may rely on categorical perception (Harnard, 1990). A big part of cognitive psychology seeks to understand how symbols (stored words and images) affect the brain’s organization of information, and categorial perception potentially represents a key part of the upper level cognitive processes that allow humans to conceive of broad
The traditional notion that seeks to compare human minds, with all its intricacies and biochemical functions, to that of artificially programmed digital computers, is self-defeating and it should be discredited in dialogs regarding the theory of artificial intelligence. This traditional notion is akin to comparing, in crude terms, cars and aeroplanes or ice cream and cream cheese. Human mental states are caused by various behaviours of elements in the brain, and these behaviours in are adjudged by the biochemical composition of our brains, which are responsible for our thoughts and functions. When we discuss mental states of systems it is important to distinguish between human brains and that of any natural or artificial organisms which is said to have central processing systems (i.e. brains of chimpanzees, microchips etc.). Although various similarities may exist between those systems in terms of functions and behaviourism, the intrinsic intentionality within those systems differ extensively. Although it may not be possible to prove that whether or not mental states exist at all in systems other than our own, in this paper I will strive to present arguments that a machine that computes and responds to inputs does indeed have a state of mind, but one that does not necessarily result in a form of mentality. This paper will discuss how the states and intentionality of digital computers are different from the states of human brains and yet they are indeed states of a mind resulting from various functions in their central processing systems.
Keil, F. C. and Wilson, R. A. (1999) The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences. Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, England: The MIT Press
The 'Standard'. Cognition (8th ed.). Geneseo, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Qinglin, Z., Jiang, Q., & Guikang, C. (2004).
...ocesses which are distinct from observable behavioral responses. Acts such as thinking, remembering, perceiving, and willing are defined by behavioral actions and by dispositions to perform behavioral actions. However, Ryle criticises Behaviorist theory for being overly simplistic and mechanistic, just as he criticizes Cartesian theory for being overly simplistic and mechanistic. While Cartesian theory asserts that hidden mental processes cause the behavioral responses of the conscious individual, Behaviorism asserts that stimulus-response mechanisms cause the behavioral responses of the conscious individual. Ryle argues that both the Cartesian theory and the Behaviorist theory are too simplistic and mechanistic to enable us to fully understand the Concept of Mind.