Carl G. Hempel was of the most influential proponents of what is now regarded as the classic view of explanation in science. In his work, Philosophy of Natural Science, he created the deductive-nomological model which is the following account of scientific explanation, where an explanation is set out as a formalized argument. This is the principle format for works such as Aristotle’s Physica, Ptolemy’s Almagest, Newton’s Principia and Opticks, Franklin’s Electricity, Lavoisie’s Chemistry, and Lyell’s Geology. Thomas Kuhn calls these achievements Paradigms. Through these paradigms normal science developed. In Kuhn’s book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, he argues that normal science in a way hinders the development of new phenomenon. He says that there must be a change in a paradigm to create a scientific revolution. Throughout this essay I will explain what Hempel’s model consists of and how it relates to Kuhn’s view. Hepel explains the process of explaining atmospheric pressure by starting from the beginning with Galileo’s interest in the limitations of a simple suction pump. Galileo’s observation was that a simple suction pump, which draws water form a well by means of a piston that can be raised in the pump barrel, will lift water no higher than about 34 feet above the surface of the well. After Galileo’s death, his pupil Torricelli pursued this dilemma. Torricelli argued that the earth is surrounded by a sea of air that exerts pressure on the surface below, and that this pressure upon the surface of the well forces water up the pump barrel when the piston is raised. The maximum length of 34 feet for the water column in the barrel thus reflects simply the total pressure of the atmosphere upon the surface o... ... middle of paper ... ...black four of hearts. When these cards were first exposed briefly they were almost always identified as normal. So the cards were immediately fitted into one of the conceptual categories based on prior experience. However, when the subjects were exposed to the anomalous cards more often however, they began to hesitate. After having become aware of the anomaly it was not uncommon for the subjects to get irritated and distressed. Further increase of exposure resulted in sill more hesitation and confusion until finally most subjects produced the correct identification without hesitation. There is really no possible way I could contradict Kuhn’s view. I think his ideas are true and could dramatically increase the possibilities of scientists’ ability to create new advances in science. I believe that all scientists should view their work in kuhn’s perspective.
...cam.ac.uk/ vesalius-great-work Accessed on 4/26/14) This approach is what incited a scientific revolution when it came to how new discoveries were made, and it challenged future generations to find out more about the world around them and correct old theories.
In his recent studies showing Galileo's knowledge of and adherence to the deductive standards of explanation in science set forth by Aristotle, Wallace (1) remarks that this Aristotelean theory must not be confused with the contemporary deductive-nomological theory of Hempel and Oppenheim. (2) There are, of course, important differences between the classic works of Aristotle and Hempel, for twenty-three centuries lie between them. But the differences are not as great as might be expected, and, as current discussions of the metatheoretical issues of explanation are generally ahistorical, I believe an attempt to compare these two intellectual mileposts in our understanding of scientific method should prove useful.
(2) Kitcher, Philip, and Wesley C. Salmon, eds. Scientific Explanation. Vol. 13, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989.
At the turning of our century the science of the inert world, i.e. physics and chemistry, discovered phenomena that compelled the scientists to revise old deterministic patterns of explanation wich became controversial, and to look for new ones. During our century concepts like natural law, order, certainty became a matter of doubt for both theoretical and experimental scientists. Almost concomitantly biologists discovered that life phenomena had to be approached as chains of changes, so that the concept of creation was to be redefined together with the concept of order. Similar changes were recorded in the social sciences wich are dealing with animal and human collectivities. Finally, the uncontroversial model of exactness, mathematics, had refine its tools in order to tackle the problems issued from empirical sciences and to use efficiently the amazing facilities provided by electronic computational devices.
Kuhn characterizes most of ‘normal science’ as something he likes to refer to as ‘mop-up work’. To him, ‘normal science’ means research firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice. (Kuhn, Page 10) In other words, he’s talking about theories, which act as building blocks for future research. These theories are recounted by scientific textbooks in elementary and university that explain in depth the body of the accepted theory, describe many or all of its successful applications along with any observations or experiments performed. These achievements must share two very special characteristics, one being that it must be sufficiently unique to attract a group of scientists away from competing modes of scientific activity and that it is also open ended to leave all different kinds of problems for future groups of scientists and their students to research and resolve. These achievements that fulfill the two requirements are called paradigms. Students study these paradigms in order to become members of a particular scientific community that they wish to eventually practice in. There is very seldom disagreement over the fundamentals of specific paradigms as students learn from researchers who have themselves learned from the bases of their field. Therefore, all students and researchers whose research is based on the same paradigm must be committed to the same rules and standards for scientific practice. How are paradigms born though? First scientific inquiry begins with a random collection of facts, then different researchers confronting the same phenomena describe and interpret them in differ...
Without theories, scientists’ experiments would yield no significance to the world. Theories are the core of the scientific community; therefore figuring out how to determine which theory prevails amongst the rest is an imperative matter. Kuhn was one of the many bold scientists to attempt to bring forth an explanation for why one theory is accepted over another, as well as the process of how this occurs, known as the Scientific Revolution. Kuhn chooses to refer to a theory as a ‘paradigm’, which encompasses a wide range of definitions such as “a way of doing science in a specific field”, “claims about the world”, “methods of fathering/analyzing data”, “habits of scientific thought and action”, and “a way of seeing the world and interacting with it” (Smith, pg.76). However in this case, we’ll narrow paradigm to have a similar definition to that of a ‘theory’, which is a system of ideas used to explain something; it can also be deemed a model for the scientific community to follow. Kuhn’s explanation of a Scientific Revolution brings to light one major problem—the problem of incommensurability.
Revolutionary science, however, does not occur all the time. Before a revolution can occur, scientists conduct routine tests and experiments within the commonly held paradigm. This state of puzzle-solving is known as “normal science.” When the scientist carries out...
In other words, these are the objective criteria that all scientists consider when choosing a scientific theory. Kuhn considered these criteria to be the “shared basis for theory choice,” (Kuhn, 1973, p.322) which he and all scientists shared for rationally choosing scientific theories. Furthermore, Kuhn states that he “agree(s) entirely with the traditional view that they play a vital role when scientists must choose between an established theory and an upstart competitor.” (Kuhn, 1973, p.322) The traditional view he refers to is the view that the justification of theory choice should be based on objective factors. Thus, in response to his critics, Kuhn was saying that he did not discount the role objective factors played in choosing a good scientific theory. In his view of theory choice, these objective factors also play a vital role. However, what he objected to was the view that theory choice was purely
In this paper, I will explain three theories on how to solve the demarcation problem, or the problem of distinguishing between science and non-science, and how all three of them need to be combined in order to truly solve this problem. First, I will explain each of the three different theories proposed by A.J. Ayer, Karl Popper, and Paul Thagard, these philosopher’s arguments for each of these theories, and an example of using each theory. Then, I will explain why all three of these theories need to be combined by showing examples of how each individual theory incorrectly categorizes something as scientific. Next, I will show how these three theories together can correctly distinguish science from non-science. Finally, I will explain various refutations to this argument and defend against them. Demarcation is important, because only science can be proven or disproven by facts of nature. All non-science are just theories created by man – hypotheses that cannot be supported by reality.
The first issue presented corresponds to the Natural Sciences as a way of knowing. The Natural Sciences’ most prominent method of conclusion and fact basing is the scientific method. The nature of the Scientific method itself, includes a revisionist stage, where the initial hypothesis is assessed based upon the observations found. The equivalent to a hypothesis could and in most instances where data is reviewed, replace the currently accepted knowledge. For instance, initial knowledge would be the belief that the earth was flat. This knowledge would undergo controversy and ultimately be revise...
In the natural sciences theories are fact-based frameworks initially relying upon a hypothesis. The natural sciences are often regarded as this infallible thing searching for the truth. Theories are come about through use of the scientific method. The scientific method consists of four steps; obser...
“Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism” is Bas van Fraassen’s attack on the positive construction of science. He starts by defining scientific realism as the goal of science to provide a “literally true story of what the world is like;” and the “acceptance of a scientific theory” necessitates the “belief that it is true”. This definition contains two important attributes. The first attribute describes scientific realism as practical. The aim of science is to reach an exact truth of the world. The second attribute is that scientific realism is epistemic. To accept a theory one must believe that it is true. Van Fraassen acknowledges that a “literally true account” divides anti-realists into two camps. The first camp holds the belief that science’s aim is to give proper descriptions of what the world is like. On the other hand, the second camp believes that a proper description of the world must be given, but acceptance of corresponding theories as true is not necessary.
Since antiquity, the investigation of the natural world had started. But the 16th and 17th century are regarded as the dawn of modern science as the Scientific Revolution had taken place then. This had given a great boost to science and it totally changed the lives of the people. I don’t think that scientific knowledge can ever stop growing. The development of one theory leads to the development of another theory, which will thereby lead ...
Shlain, Leonard. Art & Physics. Quill William Morrow. New York, 1991. Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. The University of Chicago Press. Chicago, 1996.
Many scientists seemed to play a small role in Kuhn’s paradigm. Newton believed that science could answer questions accurately, if not “nearly” truthfully. Newton still sought the truth, but acknowledged that one scientist could not solve all of the problems of the world, and thus would solve what he could and leave the harder stuff for people of the future. Newton also believed scientists should focus on observable physical matters that they could answer, rather than philosophical ideas that could not be solved. Newton gave Thomas Kuhn an example of a paradigm shift. Before Newton, there was what was considered new science, which had abjured to Aristotle’s old belief system and the...