Zhiyuan Li
Philosophy 3000
In his paper Realism and Skepticism: Brains in a Vat Revisited, Graeme Forbes considers Putnam’s brains in a vat (BIV) argument. According to Forbes (1995), Putnam argues that in order for a normally embodied thinker to think about such concepts as brain, in and vat, she “must somehow be informationally linked to” instances of those concepts (206). However, Forbes does not consider (and he does not think he needs to consider) what particular sorts of informational links are sufficient to enable a thinker to think about the concepts, though he seems to suggest that an is-and-always-has-been BIV has no such informational links (206). In other words, a BIV cannot think about the concepts of brain, in and vat and it
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For Forbes (1995), a BIV is not a BIV-in-the-image because a BIV is a physical object, whereas a BIV-in-the-image is merely a mental image (206). But as indicated earlier, Brueckner (1986) interprets “the image” as “sense impressions had by the BIV” and therefore he thinks the reason why a BIV is not a BIV-in-the image is that a BIV does not have the sense impressions of being a BIV, but being a human being (150-1). I think Brueckner is misunderstanding Putnam here and Forbes’s account is more accurate. For the sake of argument, let us (temporarily) accept Brueckner’s interpretation (i.e. the image is the sense impressions had by the BIV) and apply it to the tree and tree-in-the-image case. Clearly, a tree is not a tree-in-the-image, but what makes it so? I think Brueckner should be committed to this answer: A tree is not a tree-in-the-image because a BIV does not have the same sense impressions of a tree when faced with a tree-in-the-image. But this is false. As Putnam sets up the scenario, a BIV is able to receive appropriate impulses from the computer so that it is able to have the perfectly normal sensory experiences of a tree when facing a tree-in-the-image (6). By contrast, Forbes does not bring in this potentially troublesome interpretation of “the image.” The idea of a mental image here is pretty self-explanatory and I don’t see why Putnam needs to adopt an additional …show more content…
This conclusion does not rule out the possibility that a BIV’s utterance that “I am a BIV” (in English) could still be true even though this cannot be uttered at all (a BIV can only utter that “I am a BIV-in-the-image” in English, which is clearly false). To put it in another way, Brueckner does not deny that one may be a BIV even if she is unable to have the thought that “I am a BIV” (in English). However, Forbes’s conclusion rejects this possibility.
I think Forbes’s reading of Putnam is more accurate here. Putnam (1981) writes, “In short, if we are brains in a vat, then ‘We are brains in a vat’ is false. So it is (necessarily) false.” (15) If Putnam is right that “We are brains in a vat” is necessarily false, it should be false in every possible world, including the one where a BIV is a BIV though it cannot have the thought that “I am a BIV” (in English), as Brueckner suggests. By contrast, Forbes’s conclusion that I am not a BIV is consistent with the way Putnam phrases his conclusion, and is therefore a more accurate account of his
The concept about the split-brain cases is two hemisphere separate apart, where means the left side focus on the left side, the right side focus on the right side (Parfit 378). He thinks that the concept of the split-brain and the normal brain are both true. Parfit denies that there are no person involved, also the ego theory doesn’t exist. He believes that once the brain has split apart, it has two separate streams of consciousness (Parfit 378). So, he claims that instead of asking “what happened to the original self?,” he says there is no ‘self’ (Parfit 379). Even though there are different events happened at the same time, that is not equal to different egos. “There are not here two different possibilities, one of which be true. These are
ABSTRACT: Many philosophers have lost their enthusiasm for the concept of supervenience in the philosophy of mind. This is largely due to the fact that, as Jaegwon Kim has shown, familiar versions of supervenience describe relations of mere property covariation without capturing the idea of dependence. Since the dependence of the mental on the physical is a necessary requirement for even the weakest version of physicalism, it would seem that existing forms of supervenience cannot achieve that for which they were designed. My aim is to revive the concept of supervenience. I argue that if we construe supervenience along Davidsonian lines — as a relation connecting predicates rather than properties — then it avoids the shortcomings of the more familiar varieties.
The general point behind the homunculi-head introduces consideration to the possibility of brain functions being done by parts which could not together be conscious. Functionalism requires only similar machine instructions which serve out a set of outputs given a set of inputs. Block’s counter arguments shows such an account of
... Theory is instrumental in explaining how the mind can be considered an entity that is separate from the body. We can come to this conclusion by first understanding that we are real, and we cannot logically doubt our own presence, because the act of doubting is thinking, which makes you a thinker. Next, we realize that the mind, and all of its experiences and thoughts, will remain the same no matter what changes or destruction that’s endured by the body. Then we can grasp that we are our minds and not our physical bodies. We can use a number of examples to illustrate that these concepts, including the movie The Matrix. Finally, we can disapprove John Locke’s objections to the Dualist Theory by identifying that the mind is capable of conscious and unconscious thought; therefore, it cannot be divisible like the body. Hence the mind is a separate entity from the body.
One of the most convincing arguments of the QBT is its explanation of how reality is conceived by the brain. Classically, reality should always be changing, even by the slightest notion, and the brain should be aware of these changes as they occur. According to quantum mechanics, this would be impossible; there is no time during which something is changing. Therefore, the brain cannot be in a state of change, it must be in one state or another, there is no in between. The QBT states that our brain takes in reality one moment at a time, it is never in a state where it is observing something change. It observes reality before the change and then after the change and then fuses these two images together in order to make sense of them.
Functionalism is a materialist stance in the philosophy of mind that argues that mental states are purely functional, and thus categorized by their input and output associations and causes, rather than by the physical makeup that constitutes its parts. In this manner, functionalism argues that as long as something operates as a conscious entity, then it is conscious. Block describes functionalism, discusses its inherent dilemmas, and then discusses a more scientifically-driven counter solution called psychofunctionalism and its failings as well. Although Block’s assertions are cogent and well-presented, the psychofunctionalist is able to provide counterarguments to support his viewpoint against Block’s criticisms. I shall argue that though both concepts are not without issue, functionalism appears to satisfy a more acceptable description that philosophers can admit over psychofunctionalism’s chauvinistic disposition that attempts to limit consciousness only to the human race.
I have been a firm believer of the anti-Cartesian argument that in order to join together one mind with one body Cartesians and anti-Cartesians are consider vital principles by Strawson, so one must think the mind as something dependent on someone, and not a separate entity altogether, as Descartes would argue.
In the essay “Thought” by Louis H. Sullivan, he states that people don’t always need words just to communicate. There are several ways that individuals are able to communicate without words, they can express themselves by gestures and facial features, like explaining themselves to others. Sullivan believes that both thinking and creative thinking are better without words and that the minds is always working; therefore, it does not have time to place words together. In order to think clearly they must use other means of pondering; although, the mind works quickly it will take a long time to write what they are thinking because the mind continues without stopping. When individuals are reading they are not think their own thought exactly but what
Hilary Putnam. The thesis states that different physical properties may implement the same mental property. This argument has evolved since Putnam’s original goal of rejecting type-identity theory and many philosophers have redefined the implications of multiple realizability. There are two philosophers in philosophy of mind that are famous for their work in exploring multiple realizability and the implications this thesis has on science, or more specifically psychology. Jaegwon Kim and Jerry Fodor both take a stab at multiple realizability, but neither will come to the same conclusion.
Sternberg, Robert J. & Janet E. Davidson, eds. 1995. The Nature of Insight. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
The American Heritage College Dictionary defines the term image as “An optically or electronically formed representative reproduction of an object, esp. an optical reproduction formed by a lens or a mirror.” This is what is more commonly referred to as a picture. The definition of a word is “a sound or combination of sounds, or its representation in writing or printing that symbolizes and communicates a meaning and may consist of a single morpheme or a combination of morphemes.” In fact, there is a constant debate about the importance and significance of both forms of communication. Because either one can be interpreted and considered differently, depending on who the viewer or reader is, this debate has been ongoing for quite some time now. The power that images have over words is stated simply by Neil Postman’s “The Great Symbol Drain” as “one picture, we are told, is worth a thousand words” (515). So, one can take a stand in saying that images are more powerful than words, because they can be understood and interpreted differently by different people.
After denying the concept of innate ideas, Locke comes to the obvious question of, “How comes it to be furnished?” (Stumpf and Fieser, 195). Answering simply and concisely, Locke offers two explanations. Firstly, ideas come about through sensations, which refer to conditions that are caused by actions of external...
The human body is divided into many different parts called organs. All of the parts are controlled by an organ called the brain, which is located in the head. The brain weighs about 2. 75 pounds, and has a whitish-pink appearance. The brain is made up of many cells, and is the control centre of the body. The brain flashes messages out to all the other parts of the body.
In a world of science, religion, ignorance and opinion common perception on whether or not the mind is separate from the brain has switched more times than one can track. A dualistic view on the body/mind relationship continues to be scrutinized day in and day out. As I will explain throughout the argument dualism is facing increasingly more constraints as time goes on. An evaluation of the mind/body argument from a Humean perspective proves dualism to be flawed in key aspects, where in contrast a materialistic approach is not affected.
soliloquies. He does say himself ‘I am not what I am’ so does this not