Hilary Putnam. The thesis states that different physical properties may implement the same mental property. This argument has evolved since Putnam’s original goal of rejecting type-identity theory and many philosophers have redefined the implications of multiple realizability. There are two philosophers in philosophy of mind that are famous for their work in exploring multiple realizability and the implications this thesis has on science, or more specifically psychology. Jaegwon Kim and Jerry Fodor both take a stab at multiple realizability, but neither will come to the same conclusion.
This essay will discuss both Kim and Fodor’s view on multiple realizability, and how it may affect the way we view psychology. I will first explain Kim’s response to multiple realizability in his 1992 paper “Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction.” This paper was written to respond to Fodor’s paper on multiple realizability and functionalism. Kim believes if we advocate a thesis such as multiple realizability we will be unable to view psychology as a science. This paper will specifically focus on Kim’s jade analogy. I will then discuss why it is I believe that Fodor’s response in “Special Sciences” reveals Kim’s jade analogy to be a mistake, and of false references.
Multiple realizability is the thesis that states that different physical properties can produce the same mental property. The theory was originally constructed by Hilary Putnam to combat the type-identity theorist who asserted that “pain is identical to c-fibers firing.”(Wikipedia) Putnam looked to explain how it might be that humans with their distinct neuroanatomy seem to experience the same pain as a dog or a cat may experience. How is it that a dog can experience t...
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... b, and so forth, and if this is unable to be the case for pain to follow a set of natural laws because of its infinite set of neural-physical kinds, then it would follow that psychology is not of the sciences. In light of Kim’s jade/pain analogy he makes this response in supporting his consequences of multiple realizability, “there are no scientific theories of jade, we don’t need any.” (Kim 16)
In 1997 Jerry Fodor wrote an essay to express his continual belief in multiple realizability and the existence of psychology as an autonomous science, not just locally but globally. His essay is a response to Kim’s 1992 paper, and in this essay I will focus specifically on his response to Kim’s jade analogy, and why it is he believes that jade and pain are not of the same structure of natural kinds, and in turn not subject to disjunctions and the problems that come with it.
Rationalism and empiricism were two philosophical schools in the 17th and 18th centuries, that were expressing opposite views on some subjects, including knowledge. While the debate between the rationalist and empiricist schools did not have any relationship to the study of psychology at the time, it has contributed greatly to facilitating the possibility of establishing the discipline of Psychology. This essay will describe the empiricist and rationalist debate, and will relate this debate to the history of psychology.
Abercrombie states that the human brain plays an active role in shaping the information presented to us, based on one’s past experiences. Kahneman claims that the human mind uses two systems of thinking, System 1 and System 2, where System 2 is more active and effortful than System 1. I attempt to illustrate how Abercrombie and Kahneman's ideal concepts of the perception of reality are applicable to real situations, by referring to the following three readings: Jung’s “The Personal and the Collective Unconscious,” Plato’s “Allegory of the Cave,” and Andersen’s “The Emperor’s New Clothes.” The three readings relate to Abercrombie and Kahneman, considering the overlapping concepts of reality, that words and metaphors structure our understanding of what is real, reality can be altered from different perspectives, and that ignorance can actually be bliss.
Functionalism is a materialist stance in the philosophy of mind that argues that mental states are purely functional, and thus categorized by their input and output associations and causes, rather than by the physical makeup that constitutes its parts. In this manner, functionalism argues that as long as something operates as a conscious entity, then it is conscious. Block describes functionalism, discusses its inherent dilemmas, and then discusses a more scientifically-driven counter solution called psychofunctionalism and its failings as well. Although Block’s assertions are cogent and well-presented, the psychofunctionalist is able to provide counterarguments to support his viewpoint against Block’s criticisms. I shall argue that though both concepts are not without issue, functionalism appears to satisfy a more acceptable description that philosophers can admit over psychofunctionalism’s chauvinistic disposition that attempts to limit consciousness only to the human race.
Physicalism, or the idea that everything, including the mind, is physical is one of the major groups of theories about how the nature of the mind, alongside dualism and monism. This viewpoint strongly influences many ways in which we interact with our surrounding world, but it is not universally supported. Many objections have been raised to various aspects of the physicalist viewpoint with regards to the mind, due to apparent gaps in its explanatory power. One of these objections is Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument. This argument claims to show that even if one has all of the physical information about a situation, they can still lack knowledge about what it’s like to be in that situation. This is a problem for physicalism because physicalism claims that if a person knows everything physical about a situation they should know everything about a situation. There are, however, responses to the Knowledge Argument that patch up physicalism to where the Knowledge Argument no longer holds.
Westen, D. (1998). The scientific legacy of Sigmund Freud: toward a psychodynamically informed psychological science. Psychological Bulletin, 124(3), 333.
... in parapsychology where this provides an empirical case for non-materialism and a counter-example to physicalism.
(Feldman, 2009; Pg. 401) (Feldman, 2009; Pg. 401) (Feldman, 2009; Pg. 401-402) (Feldman, 2009; Pg. 401-402) ¬Essentials of Understanding Psychology, 8th Edition Robert S. Feldman McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2009
The development of psychology like all other sciences started with great minds debating unknown topics and searching for unknown answers. Early philosophers and psychologists such as Sir Francis Bacon and Charles Darwin took a scientific approach to psychology by introducing the ideas of measurement and biology into the way an indi...
New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers. Nairne, J. S. (2009). The 'Second Psychology. The.
The British Psychological Society states that ‘Psychology is the scientific study of people, the mind and behaviour’ (BPS). In this essay I will be discussing what is actually meant by this and whether psychology fits into both the traditional views of a science, as well as more contemporary perspectives. It is widely suggested that Psychology is a “coalition of specialities” meaning it is multi-disciplinary (Hewstone, Fincham and Foster 2005, page 4). I will therefore examine whether it could be considered wrong to think that all parts of the discipline should neatly fit into one view of a scientific approach.
In this essay I am looking at where Psychology as a discipline has come from and what affects these early ideas have had on psychology today, Psychology as a whole has stemmed from a number of different areas of study from Physics to Biology,
We associate psychology to be a science, but in reality it does not meet the five basic
Putnam, Hilary. (1975). “The Nature of Mental States.” Mind Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tunnell, GB & Hernstein, R. . (1977). Three dimensions of naturalness: An expanded definition of field research. Psychological Bulletin, 84 (3), 426-437
Wilhelm Wundt was the first person to claim the title of psychologist and separate psychology from philosophy and science. When you consider that Wundt built the first psychological laboratory in 1879 (Schultz & Schultz, 2011), it would seem like psychology is a fairly modern science dating back less than two hundred years. However, when you consider that psychology has roots in both philosophy and physiology, it has a foundation that extends much further. In this paper I will highlight the contributions of one philosopher and one physiologist and how they contributed to psychology as we know it today. John Locke (1632-1704) was a physician and philosopher (Schultz & Schultz, 2011).