Arguments Against Presentism

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Presentism deals with a branch of metaphysics which is concerned with the nature of time. In particular, it shows how our understanding of time may be linked to our understanding of what exists. In other words, it answers the question: how are time and ontology related? Fundamentally, presentism argues that only present entities exist, what is past does not exist (it did, but doesn't any more) and what is future does not exist (it will, but it doesn't yet). More specifically, presentism involves the ontological thesis just announced, and also a dynamic thesis that what exists changes. In my opinion, presentism faces two major objections in the form of time travel and truth making. Within this essay I shall explain their arguments against presentism …show more content…

From there, I shall show how despite this objection, presentism manages to respond both fluently and sufficiently, consequently retaining the theory's plausibility.

A regular traveller is one who departs and arrives at a destination, and the time elapsed from departure to arrival is equal to the duration of the journey. However, 'if he is a time traveller, the separation in time between departure and arrival does not equal the duration of his journey' (Smith, 2016). Although currently we are not capable of time travel, one might think that it is possible. If presentism is true, then 'it is impossible to time travel as you would be trying to get to somewhere that does not exist' (Ryan, Gensel, 2008). Since only the present exists, would-be time travellers would be trying to go somewhere which either does not or, rather, no longer exists. Consequently, there is a case to argue that this 'nowhere objection' renders time travel and presentism as incompatible. However, I would reject this by stating that non-travellers are able to move from one moment in time to the next on the basis of …show more content…

It is common to accept that if a proposition is true then there is something about the world that makes that proposition true. The truthmaker principle argues that 'p' is true if and only if there exists an entity 'T' such that if 'T' exists then 'p'. Therefore, given there are past-tense truths (for example, 'my father was in the Olympic Judo team') there must be truthmakers for these truths. Eternalism - the theory which argues that all past, present and future entities exist - can readily provide these truthmakers because the past entities exist-simpliciter so they can be the truthmakers. Presentism, however, has no straightforward truthmaker for such truths. Using the example 'large dinosaurs did exist', an eternalist could easily answer by stating that 'there is a region of space-time located earlier than our current region, and dinosaurs did exist in that region' (Miller, 2013). In other words, the past with the large dinosaurs in it, exists in their ontology. Meanwhile, because dinosaurs do not exist in the present, there is scope to argue that this might be extremely problematic from a presentist point of view. Since there are no past or future events in presentism, those events cannot provide the truth of past or future-tensed statements. Therefore, the problem the truthmaker poses for presentists is: 'if asked what things exist-simpliciter that make (past- and

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