Applying the Act of Parliament

Applying the Act of Parliament

It could be argued that the broad perception of the general public is

that once a case is brought to a court, all that is required of the

judge is to look up the relevant statute and rule accordingly. In this

essay I intend to dispel this myth, and suggest that the reality is

not so simple. I propose to look at the reasons why interpreting

statutes is not as simple as one may anticipate, and explain the way

the courts have gotten around this fact, whilst considering the aids

that courts use when doing so. As Britain is now a member of the

European Community, I will also highlight some of the changes that

have been necessary when it comes to interpreting our statutes, and

finally consider some possible reforms to combat the problems, which I

will now go on to identify.

Despite the fact that expert draftsmen carefully draw up Acts of

Parliament, there are many occasions in which the courts find that the

implications of a statute for the case before them are not at all

clear.

F.A.R. Bennion (Statute Law, 1990) has identified a number of factors,

which may cause this uncertainty:

1. The draftsman may refrain from using certain words that he or she

regards as necessarily implied. The problem here is that the users may

not realise that this is the case.

2. A broad term was used, leaving it to the user to decide what it

includes.

3. An ambiguous word or phrase was used on purpose, perhaps because

the provision is politically contentious.

4. The events of the case before the court were not foreseen when the

legislation was produced.

5. The wording is inadequate because of a printing...

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..., our membership to the EC has somewhat compromised this

principle.

Having considered ways in which judges apply these statutes, it would

be fair to say that 'all a court of law can do with an Act of

Parliament is apply it' but we have identified many difficulties faced

in doing so.

During his judicial career, Lord Denning was in the forefront of moves

to establish a more purposive approach, aiming to produce decisions

that put into practice the spirit of the law, even if that meant

paying less than usual regard to the letter of the law. Whilst some

may see this as undermining the sovereignty of Parliament, it arguably

could lead to fewer absurd decisions, such as occurred in London and

North Eastern Railway Co v Berriman and would also bring the UK more

into line with the thinking of our European counterparts.