Analysis of The Logic of Collective Action Public Goods and The Theory of Groups by Mancur Olson
Mancur Olson, wrote The Logic of Collective Action Public Goods and The Theory of Groups, throughout the book Olson discusses such topics rationality, group size and group behaviour, public goods, free rider, collective action problem, and selective incentives. Olson’s world-renowned book is full of useful knowledge and opinion concerning world politics. After reading this valuable text I feel both enlightened and baffled concurrently. Olson’s beliefs in the political system seem to be without the human factor. His theories appear to leave out the complexity of the human psyche. Olson fails to analyze the fact that people may join a political group for such things as social stature, socialization, or just for something to do. In conjuncture with Olson’s theories, people join or start groups for specific reasons.
Collective Goods
Olson states that one purpose for groups and organizations is simply the “furtherance of the interests of their members” (Olson 5). Groups are usually formed to further an issue or goal, so thus if a group works toward a common interest and is successful in making advancements towards that interest, in theory the members should be pleased. This brings us to the term public or collective goods. A collective good can be construed as a good held by no single person and shared by a group. Olson says, “ . . . the achievement of any common goal or the satisfaction of any common interest means that a public or collective good has been provided for that group” (Olson 15). For example, if the People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) lobby for a bill that protects the killing of minks...
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...In order to be classified as a free rider that person must not contribute at all to the group while still benefiting that groups collective goods.
Conclusion
Mancur Olson, wrote this book in 1965 and its knowledge and opinion still proves useful almost 40 years later. Olson’s theories are based on political systems throughout the world but have a focus on U.S. politics. Although through his theories, Olson, neglects to mention the influence of human motivation, and the complexity of the human psyche. Olson’s theories can only be correct to a point because people in general are not as easy to predict. For the most part though Olson has pointed out themes and rationales from U.S. politics, and put them into structured theories. Mancur Olson’s book The Logic of Collective Action Public Goods and The Theory of Groups will be read and studied for years to come.
Mintz Eric, Close David, Croc Osvaldo. Politics, Power and the Common Good: An Introduction to Political Science. 2009. Toronto: Pearson Canada. 15,147,183.
Given the nature of man, factions are inevitable. As long as men hold different opinions, have different amounts of wealth, and own different amount of property, they will continue to fraternize with people who are most similar to them. Both serious and trivial reasons account for the formation of factions but the most important source of faction is the unequal distribution of property. Men of greater ability and talent tend to possess more property than those of lesser ability, and since the first object of government is to protect and encourage ability, it follows that the rights of property owners must be protected. Property is divided unequally, and, in addition, there are many different kinds of property; men have different interests depending upon the kind of property they own. For example, the interests of landowners differ from those who own businesses. Government must not only protect the conflicting interests of property owners, it must, at the same time, successfully regulate the conflicts that result from those who own, and those who do not own, property.
. Factions can be present in many different settings in society. They can be a passion for different opinions on religions, government, or war. Madison claims that "the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever been formed distinct interests in society." The modern government includes factions as necessary operations, and the regulation of these interest groups form the foremost assignment of legislation.
To remind people in an organization why they belong takes continued focus on a common goal or common belief. By having one main function, a group is generally more effective than if everyone has different ideas and outlooks on specific topics. However, to keep everyone on the same page, the members of a group need to accurately know where they stand in reference to their goal. One way to do this is through social facilitation. This is the concern of self image through the presence of other people. It's a concept that allows members to know the acceptable opinions of the group. Someone who agrees to the ideas set out from the organization. "Group polarization is the concept of changing personal opinions to extremities after a group discussion.(Johnson 13)" This concept eliminates members who aren't sure what they think of the group's purpose. They decide that either they agree completely or they disagree completely. Either way it means they decide if they are in or out after the group discussion. A common goal is one way to distinguish and separate the devoted members from the questionable individuals in a group.
In discussing the problems surrounding the issue of factionalism in American society, James Madison concluded in Federalist #10, "The inference to which we are brought is that the causes of cannot be removed and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects." (Federalist Papers 1999, 75) In many ways, the nature of American politics has revolved around this question since our country's birth. What is the relationship between parties and government? Should the party serve as an intermediary between the populace and government, and how should a government respond to disparate ideas espoused by the factions inherent to a free society. This paper will discuss the political evolution that has revolved around this question, examining different "regimes" and how they attempted to reconcile the relationship between power and the corresponding role of the people. Beginning with the Federalists themselves, we will trace this evolution until we reach the contemporary period, where we find a political climate described as "interest-group liberalism." Eventually this paper will seek to determine which has been the most beneficial, and which is ultimately preferable.
Kernell, S., Jacobson, G. C., Kousser, T., & Vavreck, L. (2013). The Logic of American Politics. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
Cooperation between groups is often thwarted by tribalism and personal bias. One solution for this is utilitarianism. Utilitarianism holds that a combination of happiness and maximization of good consequences would allow tribes make good decisions (153). While the Tragedy of the Commons is mainly concerned with selfishness, the Tragedy of Commonsense Morality is a tragedy of moral inflexibility (172). Groups must be perceptive and impartial in order to overcome their differences and
Collectivism, the rejection of personal desires for the communal good of a whole, is a contradictory philosophy, for it punishes those who adhere to its doctrine, while simultaneously rewarding those who exploit it. In Ayn Rand’s We the Living, collectivism, as with any other political ideology, has positive and negative applications, and, whether wielded as a mechanism of justice, or terror, the pendulum of its consequence swings in both directions. In its purest form, collectivism would theoretically rise from the mass cooperation of a group for that group’s benefit; resting in the altruistic hands of the group members and running on honesty, integrity, and moral uprightness. In actuality, as portrayed through Ayn Rand’s novel, collectivism is the suppression of independent thought in the name of an assembly to whom one is forced to swear loyalty and, furthermore, results in the rationalization of tyranny for the ‘common good.’ The enticement of supremacy overwhelms any philanthropy that those in power would potentially have, spelling despair for those at their mercy.
The ADL is very large organization with vast influence benefiting millions of people around the globe, and according to Olson’s collective action problem members could be dissuaded from parti...
Given these points, Thomas’s idea are mostly correct and to a certain extent, there are still hopes for the groups that does goods. The California Water War and Hurricane Haiyan well explains that cities and nations can be greedy, selfish and cruel which proves Thomas’s point to be valid. But to a certain extent, groups may not be bad all the time. The Salvation Army and the American Red Cross shows the exception to Thomas’s argument, providing aids, assistance, educations, and donations to those who need it in various ways. In addition, the Iks may be selfish and cruel, behaving bad whether its individually or in groups, I believe the Iks can only sometimes be compared to the Committees, cities, or nations, but not all the time.
For many centuries there has been arguments between whether a society should be collective or individualistic. In an individualistic society, the idea is that the individual's life belongs to him and he has the right to pursue what he wishes. In a collective society, the individual's life belongs to the group and the individual must sacrifice the values they hold for the “greater good” of the group. The main question asked in this debate is whether an individual's life belongs to him or does it belong to the group. By working as individuals, a society is able to achieve more than a group and can enjoy more benefits and therefore should be individualistic.
Distributive Property or distributive justice is the economic framework of a society that asserts the rightful allocations of property among its citizens. Due to the limited amount of resources that is provided in a society, the question of proper distribution often occurs. The ideal answer is that public assets should be reasonably dispersed so that every individual receives what constitutes as a “justified share”; here is where the conflict arises. The notion of just distribution, however, is generally disagreed upon as is the case with Robert Nozick and John Rawls. These men have different takes on how property should be justly distributed. Nozick claims that any sort of patterned distribution of wealth is inequitable and that this ultimately reduces individual liberty. Rawls on the other hand, prioritizes equality over a diverse group where the distribution of assets among a community should be in the favor of the least advantaged. The immediate difference between the two is that both men have separate ideas on the legitimacy of governmental redistribution of resources; however I intend to defend Nozick’s theory by pointing out significant weaknesses in Rawls’s proposition.
Among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. A faction, as commonly understood, is a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passions or of interest, adverse to the rights of there citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community. There are two methods of curing the mischief of faction: the one, by removing its causes, and the other, by controlling its effects. To attack the causes of faction, there are two possible approaches, either destroy liberty, which is essential to its existence, or by give every citizen the same opinions, passions and interests. Obviously, in this case, the possible remedies are far more intolerable than the disease. The latent causes of faction are inherent traits of human kind, and therefore faction, to one degree or another, appears in almost every facet of society. To ameliorate society of this problem, it is necessary that no man have the ability to be a judge in his own cause because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably corrupt his integrity. Even if some superlative people would be able to circumvent this trait, the fact that those in this position will not always be superlative negates this exception. By this reasoning, the causes of faction cannot be removed; and that relief is only to be sought in means of controlling its effects. If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote; while this may lead to inefficient governing and the convulsion of society, it will effectively deter the violence of faction. The problem from there progresses to one of keeping a powerful majority in check so that it can not trample the interests of the population as a whole. For this reason, a pure democracy is without competence to remedy faction; only in a republic, representative democracy, is the prospect for the deterrence of faction present.
As a minor purpose we provide a Theoretical framework to think deeply about political and social praxis. This is so as a matter of make them feasible answers to problems that have been appearing recently.
The free rider issue has become one of the most serious economic issues today. The free rider is a lazy type person who wants the benefits that others bring in without having to do the work. The free rider typically takes advantage of a public good. Living in a civilized society presents many opportunities for free riding, which we have yet to find a way to control. Economists regard the possibility for free riding as a problem for the free market, which usually leads to government intervention. Government intervention is not generally needed in a free market society but in this case if there were no government intervention this problem would not find a solution.